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It is commonplace to observe that "dual federalism" is dead, 
replaced by something variously called "cooperative federalism," 
"intergovernmental relations," or "marble-cake federalism.''1 Ac­
cording to this conventional wisdom, state and local officials do not 
enforce merely their own laws in their distinct policymaking sphere. 
Rather, as analyzed in a voluminous literature,2 state and local gov­
ernments also cooperate with the federal government in many poli­
cymaking areas, ranging from unemployment insurance to historic 
preservation. These nonfederal governments help implement fed­
eral policy in a variety of ways: by submitting implementation plans 
to federal agencies, by promulgating regulations, and by bringing 
administrative actions to enforce federal statutes. Thus, coopera­
tive federalism offers us a vision of independent governments work­
ing together to implement federal policy. 
But what happens if this harmonious relationship breaks down? 
What if state and local governments refuse to "cooperate"? Can 
the federal government force the state and local governments to 
implement federal policy? Or is the federal government able to 
rely only on the voluntary participation of state and local 
governments? 
The phenomenon of cooperative federalism, and notably its fail­
ures, has brought into sharp relief a basic puzzle of federalism:3 
1. Edward Corwin provided one of the earliest autopsies of "dual federalism" in Edward 
S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). For a more recent 
declaration to the same effect, see MICHAEL D. REAGAN & -JoHN G. SANZONE, THE NEW 
FEDERALISM 11-13 (2d ed. 1981); DEIL S. WRimrr, UNDERSrANDING lNrERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 36-37 (3d ed. 1988). 
2. For general overviews of the theory and empirical literature concerning intergovern­
mental relations or cooperative federalism, see THOMAS J • .ANroN, AMERICAN FEDERAl:ISM 
AND PuBuc PouCY: How THE SYSTEM WoRKS (1989); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FED­
ERALISM: CoMPE'IT110N AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); DONALD F. KETn., THE REGULA­
TION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1983); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM 
WoRKS (1986); WRimrr, supra note 1. For a history of intergovernmental programs from the 
framing of the Constitution until the present, see DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FED­
ERALISM: SLOUCHING Tow ARD WASHINGTON (1995). For a more detailed account of inter­
governmental relations from the Nixon through the Reagan administrations, see TIMOTHY 
CoNLAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM: lNrERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN 
(1988). 
3. By federalism, I mean the delegation of governmental powers to territorially limited 
governments within a nation; the policymakers of the limited governments are elected by the 
persons residing within those governments' jurisdictions. This is not, of course, the only pos­
sible definition of the term. For an extensive history of the term's changing meaning, see S. 
RUFUS DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE: A JOURNEY THROUGH TIME IN QUEST OF A 
MEANING (1978). 
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Given our commitment to having both state governments with cer­
tain powers and a national government with limited but supreme 
powers, where do we draw the line between the two? The national 
government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of fed­
eral law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to 
federal power and a corresponding reservoir of state power if feder­
alism is to have any meaning at all. This article attempts to draw 
that line, but not by appealing to abstract concepts such as "dual 
sovereignty." 
Instead, this article proposes a functional theory of cooperative 
federalism to define the proper limits of federal power to obtain 
state and local governments' implementation of federal policy. This 
theory is consistent with judicial precedent and the original under­
standing of the U.S. Constitution, as Part V of the article explains. 
Nevertheless, I defend this theory primarily in terms of sensible 
policy by applying the tools of basic transaction-costs economics to 
modem intergovernmental relations. I argue that the framework 
for intergovernmental relations proposed here serves intuitively 
useful functions: it preserves the power of state and local govern-
. ments and yet also maintains the supremacy of the federal govern­
ment. I call the theory a "functional" theory for this reason. 
The essence of this functional theory is an analogy between 
nonfederal governments - states, municipalities, counties, school 
districts, and so on - and private organizations. Beginning with 
broad empirical observations about intergovernmental relations, 
the theory maintains that state and local governments should have 
"autonomy" - that is, immunity from federal demands for regula­
tory services. Such demands are just as unnecessary, economically 
inefficient, distributionally unjust, and needlessly destructive of ex­
pressive autonomy as governmental confiscation of private organi­
zations' property or conscription of private organizations' services. 
When the national government seeks goods and services from pri­
vate organizations, it normally purchases such goods and services 
from such organizations through mutually voluntary agreements. 
The Pentagon, for example, does not confiscate military trucks from 
private defense contractors. Rather, it purchases such vehicles 
from contractors who submit acceptable bids. This reliance on vol­
untary agreement rather than conscription or confiscation makes 
eminent sense, because confiscation or conscription would be both 
economically inefficient and distributionally unjust; it would deter 
investors from investing money in military vehicle manufacture, 
and it would place the cost of national defense on the shoulders of 
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the owners of private defense contractors without any ethically 
plausible reason for doing so. 
This article maintains that identical considerations suggest that 
the federal government should not confiscate the property or con­
script the services of nonfederal governments. Rather, the federal 
government should purchase such services through a voluntary in­
tergovernmental agreement. This article maintains that a require­
ment that the national government purchase rather than conscript 
nonfederal governments' regulatory services will not impede useful 
intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, such purchases will 
avoid the inefficiencies, distributive injustice, and invasion of ex­
pressive autonomy that probably would result from the national 
government's commandeering of nonfederal governments' regula­
tory processes. In short, by granting state and local governments 
autonomy, the line between federal and state power is not fixed, 
but fluid; it responds to the costs and benefits of intergovernmental 
relations, seamlessly adjusting in that uncertain region where sover­
eigns meet. 
As this thumbnail sketch of the theory suggests, the justification 
for nonfederal governments' autonomy presented here differs sub­
stantially from the justification provided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Printz v. United States4 and New York v. United States.5 In 
these opinions, the Court ruled by narrow majorities that the na­
tional government cannot unconditionally force state and local leg­
islatures or executive officials to implement federal statutes by 
regulating private persons according to federal standards. This 
holding that nonfederal governments should have autonomy is, of 
course, the conclusion I reach as well. The problem with the 
Court's opinions is not the conclusion but the Court's reasoning. 
The Court, largely abstaining from any empirical examination of 
intergovernmental relations, relied on the abstract notions of dual 
sovereignty and political accountability to support its doctrine that 
the national government cannot commandeer the regulatory 
processes of the state and local governments. 
But, as Part I of this article explains, these concepts cannot ex­
plain why federal demands for state or local services should be re­
garded as more of an intrusion on state sovereignty than simple 
federal preemption of state or local law. Federal demands that 
state and local officials implement federal policies at least preserve 
4. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
5. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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some role for ·such officials. By contrast, preemption eliminates 
their role entirely. Moreover, even if one could explain why com­
mandeering is especially threatening to sovereignty, why are state 
and local governments protected only from unconditional federal 
demands for regulatory services but not from conditional demands 
- that is, demands extracted by threats of federal preemption of 
state law or withdrawal of grant money? And why do Printz and 
New York allow federal regulation of both nonfederal governments 
and private organizations with generally applicable laws? To these 
questions the Court's theory of "political accountability" has of­
fered no acceptable answer. By contrast, my functional theory 
makes sense of these limits on state autonomy. 
If the functional theory makes so much sense, why has it not 
been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court as the basis for state au­
tonomy? The problem is that the Court's jurisprudence is still 
haunted by a theory of state autonomy it inherited from nineteenth­
century jurisprudence - a theory that I call nationalistic dual feder­
alism. As I explain in sections I.A and l.B, this theory has its roots 
in the ratification debates and some of the classic decisions of the 
Marshall and Taney Courts - notably, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,6 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 and Prigg v. Penn­
sylvania. 9 The Marshall and Taney Courts, led by Justice Story, 
used these decisions to develop a theory of state autonomy that, 
ironically, was rooted in contempt and distrust for state officials. 
The implicit premise of this theory - first laid out by Publius in 
The Federalist but carried to its ultimate conclusion by Justice Story 
in Prigg - was that state officials were parochial, deceitful, and 
nonuniform policymakers whose incompetence or untrustworthi­
ness disqualified them from exercising any federal functions. In its 
purest form, such a nationalistic theory barred Congress from dele­
gating federal responsibilities to state officials even when state offi­
cials were willing to accept such duties. 
As I explain in section I.B.3, the theory of nationalistic dual fed­
eralism simply makes no sense in the late twentieth century. It is 
now settled law that state and federal governments have largely 
overlapping jurisdictions and routinely cooperate to implement 
state-federal regulatory schemes. Yet the Court still invokes the 
slogans and concepts of this jurisprudence, and, perhaps half con-
6. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 539 (1842). 
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sciously, provides a bad reason for a good rule - indeed, a justifi­
cation that, if taken seriously, would deprive nonfederal officials of 
some of their most important functions. 
Thus, the justification traditionally offered for state autonomy in 
judicial opinions no longer seems persuasive. Nevertheless, as ex­
plained in the subsequent three Parts of the article, autonomy itself 
- what I call the New York entitlementto - makes eminent sense 
as a matter of policy. In Parts IT, m, and IV, I lay out a functional 
theory to justify autonomy. As explained earlier, this functional 
theory rests on one simple proposition: The federal government 
should commandeer the services of nonfederal governments no 
more than it should commandeer the services of private organiza­
tions or persons. 
Part Il of this article explains why it is unnecessary for the na­
tional government to commandeer the regulatory processes of state 
and local governments. The federal government can purchase the 
services of state and local governments whenever it is cost-effective 
to do so; it has no more need to conscript such services than it has 
to conscript the services of secretaries, FBI agents, janitors, or 
Supreme Court Justices. There is a vigorous intergovernmental 
marketplace in which municipalities, counties, and states - like 
private organizations and persons - compete with each other for 
the chance to obtain federal revenue. Therefore, whenever the na­
tional government values such services enough to pay nonfederal 
governments the costs of providing them, the national government 
can obtain the cooperation of state or local governments in imple­
menting federal law. 
Part ID uses the analogy between private organizations and 
nonfederal governments to explain why federal conscription of 
nonfederal governments' services is improper as well as unneces­
sary. When the government conscripts specific types of private 
services or confiscates specific types of private property, it can inef­
ficiently discourage private persons or organizations from investing 
resources in the production of such services or property. Moreover, 
the distributive injustice of such confiscation is fairly obvious;.to the 
extent that the conscripted service or confiscated property benefits 
the public generally, it is difficult to argue that persons who happen 
to have the ability to provide the service or good ought to bear the 
costs of such programs exclusively. 
10. I name the entitlement after New York v. United States rather than Printz v. United 
States only because New York originally announced the doctrine. 
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But, as P� ill argues, these same considerations suggest that 
the federal government ought not to conscript services or confiscate 
property from nonfederal governments. Section III.A notes that 
one would expect such demands inefficiently to discourage involve­
ment in state and local politics. Moreover, as section III.B explains, 
one would also expect such commandeering arbitrarily and, per­
haps, inequitably to place the costs of federal programs on the co­
alitions of voters who control state and local governments. Finally, 
as section III.C suggests, federal demands that state and local gov­
ernments regulate according to federal standards unnecessarily bur­
den the expressive liberties of state and local officials by forcing 
them to endorse federal policies with their mandated votes. In 
short, federal demands for nonfederal governments' regulatory 
services are improper for the same reasons that confiscation of pri­
vate property or conscription of private action is improper. 
Part IV applies the functional theory outlined in Parts II and III 
to four specific problems in intergovernmental relations: (1) the is­
sues of "generally applicable laws"; (2) the problem of conditional 
preemption; (3) the question of whether the federal government 
should be able to "commandeer" the services of nonfederal execu­
tive and judicial officers; and ( 4) the question of whether the fed­
eral government should be able to impose funded mandates on 
state and local governments. As Part IV explains, the theory out­
lined in Parts II and III better explains the exceptions for generally 
applicable laws and conditional preemption than the theories of 
state sovereignty that are most frequently invoked to justify the 
holdings in New York and Printz. The theory also suggests that 
Printz was correct to forbid commandeering of nonfederal execu­
tive officers' regulatory services. Finally, the theory suggests that 
Justice Souter's argument that the federal government be permitted 
to impose funded mandates on state and local governments is im­
practical and unnecessary. 
In Part V, I offer some reasons to believe that the functional 
argument suggested in Parts II and III might be inferred from con­
stitutional sources other than the traditions of dual federalism, state 
sovereignty, or political accountability that now provide it with such 
an unpersuasive foundation. In particular, Part V argues that, by 
reading the Necessary and Proper Clause11 in light of the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition on takings of private property without 
just compensation12 and the First Amendment's protection of the 
11. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
12. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
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freedom of speech,13 one can derive a stronger and more intellectu­
ally satisfying foundation for the doctrine of state autonomy an­
nounced in Printz and New York than the notion of dual 
sovereignty that the Court invoked. 
At the outset, it is important to make clear that this article will 
not discuss the issue of whether "state autonomy" would be ade­
quately protected through the political process even without judi­
cial enforcement of constitutional limits on Congress's power. I 
have two reasons for such a limit on the article's scope. 
Frrst, such "political process" theories of constitutional federal­
ism are not really theories of federalism at all but theories of judi­
cial review; they are addressed exclusively to courts and purport to 
define when judicial enforcement of constitutional constraints is ap­
propriate.14 But I wish to ask a different question: Even assuming 
that the courts should not protect state autonomy, what constitu­
tional limits should other, nonjudicial decisionmakers - Congress 
or the President - sensibly enforce? Theories of judicial review 
have nothing to say to such decisionmakers, yet Congress and the 
President have a crucial role in determining the Constitution's 
meaning.15 This article is addressed to those political 
decisionmakers. 
Second, political process theories commonly rest on the premise 
that federalism will be "adequately" protected through the political 
process.16 It is impossible to know, however, whether the protec­
tion afforded by the political process is "adequate" until one has 
some sort of normative theory defining the proper role of the fed­
eral and nonfederal governments.17 Otherwise, empirical verifica­
tion of whether Congress adequately protects state autonomy 
degenerates into a meaningless string of anecdotes describing state 
victories or defeats; such anecdotes yield no normative conclusions 
about the adequacy of the political process unless one knows when 
13. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
14. The most famous of such theories are JESSE H. CHoPER, JumCIAL REVIEW AND nm 
NATIONAL PoLrnCAL PRoCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF TIIE ROLE OF TIIE 
SUPREME CoURT 180-84 {1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: 
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). 
15. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 
27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975). For an example of how Congress might consider such issues, 
see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded 
Mandates Refonn Act of 1995, 45 KAN. L. REv. 1113 {1997). 
16. See, e.g., CHoPER, supra note 14, at 171-95; Lewis Kaden, Politics, Money, and State 
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 847, 857-68 (1979). 
17. For an acknowledgement of this problem, see Garrett, supra note 15, at 1119-20. 
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nonfederal officials ought to prevail.18 This article provides a 
benchmark for evaluating the political process, without which polit­
ical process theories make little sense. 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ARGUMENTS 
FOR STATE AUTONOMY 
To understand the problem posed by New York's anticom­
mandeering rule, it is useful to define carefully at the outset the sort 
of entitlement that New York might provide to the state govern­
ments. Under a broad reading, New York seems to give the highest 
state and local governmental decisionmakers - as defined by the 
relevant state's constitution - a limited right to withhold their own 
services and the services of state and local personnel subject to their 
constitutional authority from the federal government. Moreover -
although again, New York did not resolve the question -New York 
seems to bar all federal efforts to commandeer the regulatory 
processes of the state, even if the federal government were to 
compensate the state governments for the costs of the 
implementation.19 
So understood, New York provides a particular kind of entitle­
ment to state governments that is protected by a property rule. I 
use the term property rule in the sense defined by Calabresi and 
Melamed in their classic 1972 article.20 The entitlement provided 
by New York - what I call the "New York entitlement" - gives 
state governments a right to enjoin federal efforts to force state offi­
cials to implement national law. To put this entitlement in perspec­
tive, one can contrast it with three other possible allocations of 
control over state regulatory processes: 
18. For an example of such an incoherent "list" of state officials' victories in Congress, 
see CHoPER, supra note 14, at 185-88. Choper never explains why these victories "outweigh" 
the defeats that state officials incur - an impossible task for Choper given that he provides 
no normative theory about what level of state autonomy is sufficient to ensure that federal­
ism works. Thus, his argument resembles a race without a finish line: there simply is no 
metric by which to determine whether or not Congress has adequately protected federalism. 
19. Justice Scalia seems to have rejected the idea that Congress might impose funded 
mandates on state officials when he suggested that calculating compensation would be judi­
cially unmanageable. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997). As explained 
in Part IV, infra, he was probably right. 
20. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra� 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
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FOUR RULES FOR ALLOCATING CONTROL OVER A STATE 
GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY MACHINERY 
Property Rule to State Government Liability Rule to State Government: 
(the New York entitlement): The federal government can demand 
State governments' policymakers have that state governmental officials 
an entitlement to withhold regulatory implement national law so long as the 
processes from the federal government. federal government provides objectively 
reasonable funding to cover costs of the 
demand. 
Property Rule to National Government: Liability Rule to National Government: 
The federal government may demand The state government may withhold its 
that state officials implement national regulatory processes and refuse to 
law. implement national law - but only 
upon compensating the federal 
government for the costs of such 
national implementation. 
In some sense, therefore, the New York entitlement is a powerful 
rule. It allows state governments to hold out and refuse to imple­
ment national legislation even when the costs to the state of such 
implementation are trivial and the benefits to the national govern­
ment are quite large. The New York entitlement also seems to al­
low the state governments to resist fully funded mandates -..,... that is, 
federal demands that the state governments implement national law 
accompanied by grants-in-aid sufficient to cover the costs of such 
implementation. 
Yet in a second sense, New York and Printz are trivial, in that 
they do nothing to prevent Congress from directly regulating pri­
vate persons with national laws and administrators, thereby pre­
empting inconsistent state laws. To be sure, the doctrine of 
enumerated powers - and, in particular, the so-called "substantial 
effects" test of Wickard v. Filburn21 - places some modest limits 
on the power of the national government to regulate private per­
sons. These limits were recently restated and - perhaps - signifi­
cantly reinvigorated in the recent decision of United States v. 
Lopez.22 Under the best view, however, Lopez probably imposes 
extremely modest constraints on the power of the national govern­
ment to regulate private persons directly.23 
21. 317 U.S. 111, 125 {1942) ("[I]f appellee's activity be local ... it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce"). 
22. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
23. For an extended analysis both of Lopez and of recent lower court opinions that apply 
Lopez in various contexts, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674 
{1995). 
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Seen against a background of almost unlimited national powers 
to regulate private persons directly, New York and Printz present 
something of a paradox: Why give state governments the right to 
withhold their regulatory processes while simultaneously giving the 
state governments nothing to regulate with those processes?24 Why 
permit the national government to preempt virtually all significant 
regulatory fields, leaving the state governments with no significant 
jurisdiction remaining to them, while strictly forbidding the national 
government from imposing even modest regulatory responsibilities 
on state officials? In short, what good is the preservation of state 
administrative autonomy, if the states are not guaranteed some area 
of subject matter jurisdiction in which to exercise it? 
This question takes two forms, both of which I address in this 
article. First, one could ask why any intelligent framer would want 
such a policy. Second, one can ask whether the text and traditions 
of the U.S. Constitution plausibly contain such a policy. Both Jus­
tice O'Connor's opinion in New York and Justice Scalia's opinion in 
Printz are gravely inadequate as efforts to answer either question. 
This Part explains why I believe that the theories of federalism and 
constitutional meaning canvassed by these two opinions simply can­
not justify their holdings. 
A. What Is the Function of the New York and Printz 
Anticommandeering Rule? The Inadequacy of the 
Argument Based on Political Accountability 
New York offered a functional argument to justify the rule 
against commandeering. The Court stated that the rule was neces­
sary to protect "political accountability." According to Justice 
O'Connor, 
[w]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may 
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while 
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Account­
ability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state 
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local elec­
torate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulations.25 
Thus on the facts of New York, because the Federal Low-Level Ra­
dioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments take the form of a re­
quirement that the state make the final unpopular decision to site 
24. But see text accompanying notes 194-201 (observing tbe existence of practical barriers 
to tbe federal government's ability to extend its regulatory authority over areas ostensibly 
within tbe scope of federal power). 
25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
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or subsidize waste,26 aggrieved voters will find it especially difficult 
to trace the causes of these costs to the federal government. Be­
cause the costs are imposed in the immediate form of a state law, 
the voters will tend incorrectly to attribute the consequent rise in 
their state tax burden or the construction of a state-owned landfill 
to the state government. Since Congress will know that such com­
mandeering obscures lines of political accountability, it will have all 
the more incentive to engage in such commandeering.27 
Such an argument is analogous to the argument commonly 
made by lawyers and political scientists against broad congressional 
delegation of legislative powers to federal administrative agencies. 
Under this thesis - most famously expounded by Morris Fiorina28 
and recently revived by David Schoenbrod29 - Congress will have 
an improper incentive to evade voter scrutiny by taking credit for 
vague and popular statutory schemes while delegating responsibil­
ity for implementing such schemes - and their accompanying costs 
- to federal administrative agencies. Voters burdened by agency 
decision - say, a regulation requiring ignition interlock - will lash 
out against the bureaucrats who imposed the decision and not the 
legislators who ultimately enacted the scheme that required the 
agency to make cost-imposing decisions. Likewise, Justice 
O'Connor seems to argue that, by forcing state officials to adminis­
ter potentially unpopular federal programs, Congress will be able to 
take credit for the benefits of such programs while shunting blame 
onto the hapless nonfederal officials. 
26. See 505 U.S. at 177. 
27. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997). This argument is made in 
detail by Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amend­
ment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 V AND. L. REv. 1355 (1993). 
As Zelinsky explains, the "political accountability" argument will not work unless one as­
sumes that Congress commandeers state governments in response to well-organized interest 
groups who are aware that Congress is the ultimate cause of the program. Otherwise, while 
Congress would not receive any blame for the costs of the program, it would also not receive 
any credit for the benefits of the program. Commandeering would be a wash. For comman­
deering to make sense, Congress would have to deliver benefits to groups who would know 
that Congress was responsible for the benefits but impose costs on other voters who would be 
oblivious of Congress's ultimate responsibility for such costs. See id. at 1374-75. For a discus­
sion of the concept of "traceability" of government action, see R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE 
LoGic OF CoNGRESSIONAL AcnoN 47-51 (1990). 
28. See generally Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative 
Authority, in REGULATORY PouCY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Roger Noll ed., 1985). 
The argument is made in simpler form in MoRRis P. FmRINA, CONGRESS: KEYsroNE OF THE 
WASHINGTON EsTABUSHMENT (2d ed. 1989). 
29. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, PoWER WITHOUT REsPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). 
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Such.a thesis has been subjected to some persuasive empirical 
challenges in the context of administrative law,30 and Justice 
O'Connor's analogous thesis undoubtedly is similarly vulnerable to 
the contention that it lacks empirical support.31 But there is a 
deeper conceptual difficulty with the political accountability argu­
ment: it proves too much. Such an argument seems to condemn 
not merely federal laws that commandeer state or local services but 
also even voluntary intergovernmental cooperation. 
After all, whenever federal, state, and local officials jointly ad­
minister some regulatory scheme, it may be difficult for voters to 
determine which set of officials is responsible for which duties: in­
tergovernmental schemes can be notoriously complex in their allo­
cation of responsibilities. Take, for example, block grants -
federal grants to state and local governments that give the grantees 
broad discretion to choose how to spend the money. As several 
commentators have noted, such programs tend to undermine the 
political accountability of state and local politicians who receive the 
cash, because they get the luxury of spending revenue without hav­
ing the responsibility of raising local taxes to generate it.32 In ef­
fect, block grants are exactly the reverse of federal laws that 
commandeer state and local officials: such grants allow state and 
local officials to impose costs on the federal government. If blur­
ring the lines of political accountability is somehow constitutionally 
problematic, then such grants ought to be suspect. 
30. See, e.g., MURRAY J. HoRN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF Ptmuc ADMINISTRATION: 
INSTITUTIONAL CH01CE IN nm Ptmuc SECTOR 44-46 (1995); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelega­
tion: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0Ro. 81, 95-99 
(1985). Hom argues that the thesis depends on an unusual degree of voter apathy and inabil­
ity to trace the proximate cause of a particular burden. He notes that in parliamentary re­
gimes, where such tracing should be easy because the executive and legislative branches 
stand and fall together during elections, one still finds broad delegations of power to the 
bureaucracy, indicating that a desire to evade voter scrutiny is not necessarily the cause of 
such arrangements. See HoRN, supra, at 44-46. 
31. See Evan H. Caminker, Sovereignty and Subordinacy: Can Congress Commandeer 
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1061-67 {1995). 
32. See PAUL PETERSON, THE PruCE OF FEDERALISM 63 (1995) {"Why • . .  should the 
federal taxpayer give unrestricted money to local governments? Would not local officials be 
more accountable to their own citizens and taxpayers if they were not so dependent on fed­
eral assistance?"); Thomas G. Donlan, A More Perfect Union: Welfare Refonn and the New 
Federalism Raise Constitutional Concerns, BARRoN's, July 29, 1996, at 43; Alan Ehrenhalt, 
The Locust in the Garden of Government, GOVERNING, Mar. 1995, at 7-8 (observing that 
block grants are a convenient way for state officials to avoid political responsibility for costs 
of their own spending decisions). Of course, voters migbt be astute enough to blame Con­
gress for iniprudently giving unrestricted funds to nonfederal governments and blame 
nonfederal governments for the waste of such funds. But, if voters are so adept at apportion­
ing responsibility, it is hard to see why they could not also properly assign blame for uncondi­
tional mandates on nonfederal officials. Why is iniprudent coercion easier to detect than 
iniprudent expenditures? 
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Indeed, one should go further: all intergovernmental arrange­
ments under which state officials carry out federal law ought to be 
suspect, because all such arrangements have the potential to con­
fuse voters about the ultimate responsibility for some policy deci­
sion. Martha Derthick provides a detailed illustration of this 
danger in her account of the public assistance program in Massa­
chusetts.33 The federal Bureau of Public Assistance demanded in 
the late 1940s that the state welfare commissioner exclude nonpro­
fessional officials from administering federal welf�e grants in Mas­
sachusetts.34 The federal agency, however, did not openly tell the 
state legislature that it would forfeit federal funds if the state did 
not change its system of having part-time selectmen administer 
public assistance, because such overt threats might have made the 
federal agency "vulnerable to congressional intervention."35 In­
stead, the federal agency counted on the state agency to act as its 
proxy with the state legislature. The state agency would warn that 
federal funds might be terminated, while the federal agency re­
mained discreetly in the background expressing no opinion on the 
issue directly to the state legislature. When speaking directly to the 
state legislature, federal agency officials were more circumspect in 
order to assure Congress and the general public that the federal 
agency was not meddling in state affairs.36 
This practice of using state officials to inform state legislators of 
federal program requirements led to considerable confusion about 
exactly who was responsible for imposing requirements on the 
state. The powerful Massachusetts senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
forwarded complaints from taxpayers' groups to federal agencies, 
which then sent them along to the state agency that was directly 
responsible for promulgating the controversial regulations, which 
would, in turn, cite the requirements of federal law.37 In the end, as 
Derthick notes, "responsibility is hard to fix because it is shared: 
when the federal administration compels the state agency to issue a 
rule, but when the state agency drafts the rule and has some mea­
sure of discretion as to its content, both have, but can deny, respon­
sibility for the consequences. "38 
33. See MAR1HA DERTHICK, THE lNFx..UENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PuBuc AssIST· 
ANCE IN MAsSACHUSETI'S (1970). 
34. Derthick provides an account of the origins of the federal agency's interest in the 
merit system. See id. at 98-102. 
35. See id. at 117. 
36. See id. at 117-19. 
37. See id. 
38. Id. at 118. 
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In short, erosion of political accountability is endemic to all 
forms of cooperative federalism; whenever the federal government 
induces states to act, whether with block grants or categorical 
grants, there is a considerable risk that voters will be confused 
about which level of government imposed the regulatory burdens of 
the program. At least one scholar has suggested that Congress's 
use of its spending power to impose conditions on federal grants 
raises the same sort of problems of political accountability as com­
mandeering legislation.39 To prevent such voter confusion, one 
would simply have to prohibit the federal government from dele­
gating responsibilities to state and local officials. 
Indeed, even absent such delegation, one would have to bar the 
federal and state governments from ever assuming any overlapping 
duties in order to guarantee "accountability." After all, voters 
could be confused about which level of government is responsible 
for the state of some regulatory field if both state and federal offi­
cials could play some role in regulating that field. Such a use of the 
rhetoric of political accountability is not an academic musing; Jus­
tices Kennedy and O'Connor have deployed the political accounta­
bility argument in their Lopez concurrence to condemn even 
federal preemption of state law in regulatory fields traditionally 
governed by the states.4o 
The difficulty with such political accountability arguments is that 
they overlook the complexity inherent in any system of federalism 
that always has the potential to confuse voters and thereby under­
mine political accountability. As de Tocqueville famously noted, 
federal systems of government demand that voters possess high 
levels of sophistication about the responsibilities of each level of 
govemment.41 If one's goal is to maximize political accountability, 
then one would simply adopt a unitary state. Otherwise, to ensure 
that lines of political accountability are not blurred, one would not 
merely have to prohibit commandeering; one would have to build 
an unbreachable wall between state and federal responsibilities to 
demarcate clearly the jurisdiction of each level of government. 
39. ·See Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the Problem of 
Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CoRNELL J.L. & Pun. PoLY. 482 (1995). 
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(stating that "political accountability" would be undermined if "the Federal Government 
[were] to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern" because "the 
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political re­
sponsibility would become illusory"). 
41. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 166 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
1945) ("The most prominent evil of all federal systems is the complicated nature of the means 
they employ."). 
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As section I.B observes, such a strict separation of state and fed­
eral functions is not unprecedented: Justice Story developed pre­
cisely such a theory of federalism in several important opinions for 
the Marshall and Taney Courts. But such a theory logically implies 
not merely that the federal government cannot commandeer state 
and local officials, but also that the federal government cannot even 
enter into intergovernmental bargains to purchase the voluntary 
regulatory services of nonfederal officials. In the language of 
Calabresi and Melamed, such a theory of federalism would protect 
state and local autonomy with an inalienability rule rather than a 
property rule. Such an inalienability rule would deal a devastating 
blow to the prestige and real power of state and local governments 
by depriving them of some of their most important regulatory du­
ties in administering federal programs. Thus, the logical if ironical 
consequence of the political accountability theory expounded in 
New York and Printz is erosion of state power. 
Justices Scalia and O'Connor do not share Justice Story's na­
tionalistic agenda, and so they hardly can be expected to limit Con­
gress's spending powers to exclude all cooperative federalism. But 
they can provide no principled reason for why such an exemption 
for conditional grants makes any sense in light of their worries 
about political accountability. In the end, New York and Printz 
cannot embrace the con,sequences of their political accountability 
functional theory, and this inability suggests that the theory is a 
poor foundation for any doctrin� of state autonomy. 
New York and Printz back away from the implications of their 
political accountability theory in a second way. As O'Connor 
states, the "state autonomy" doctrine in these opinions does not 
apply to "generally applicable laws," meaning laws that apply to 
both private and governmental entities.42 Yet Justice O'Connor 
provides no explanation for why such generally applicable laws bur­
den political accountability less than laws that apply only to govern­
mental entities.43 
42. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-78 (1992). 
43. See D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovern­
mental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982). Pro­
fessor La Pierre, the academic who initially devised the "political accountability" theory, has 
argued that "generally applicable laws" burden political accountability less than laws that 
apply only to governmental entities because, by burdening private parties, they create incen­
tives for governmental entities and private persons to form coalitions to fight such laws. See 
id. at 1000..04. But this is a non sequitur: burdens that fall exclusively on governmental 
organizations motivate them to form powerful lobbying groups such as the National League 
of Cities, the National Governors' Association, and the National Association of Counties. 
Cf. DAVIDS. ARNOLD & JEREMY F. PLANT, PuBuc OFFICIAL AssoCIATIONS AND STATE 
AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT: A BRIDGE ACRoss ONE HUNDRED YEARS (1994) (describing 
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At bottom, the fundamental difficulty with the functional argu­
ment offered by New York and Printz - the political accountability 
argument - is that it leads to unacceptably nationalistic conclu­
sions. It casts suspicion on one of the nonfederal governments' 
most important sources of power - the power to implement fed­
eral legislation. As section l.B explains, this weakness is not pecu­
liar to New York and Printz; judicial theories of state autonomy 
have long been rooted in a nationalistic distrust of state 
governments.44 
the formation and political clout of these organizations). Why should one believe that such 
groups are somehow more vulnerable to political exploitation than lobbies composed exclu­
sively of private interests? Moreover, as a recent commentator has noted, Congress fre· 
quently extends regulatory burdens by stages, first imposing such burdens on private 
enterprises and later imposing the burdens on governmental entities. See Larry Kramer, Un­
derstanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1485, 1512-13 (1994). It is not obvious that private 
enterprises would have any incentive to lobby against the latter extension, given that such a 
regulatory burden would have no effect on their own compliance costs. 
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 {1946), presents a similar debate over the rele­
vance of "general applicability" in the context of federal taxation of state agencies. In that 
case, the question arose whether the United States could impose a tax on the operations of 
New York's water-bottling business at Saratoga Springs. See 326 U.S. at 573-74. According 
to Justice Frankfurter, such a tax did not violate any implied state immunity from federal 
taxes, because the tax also applied to similarly situated private persons. See 326 U.S. at 575· 
76, 583-84. By contrast, federal property taxation of, say, a municipal government's city hall 
would constitute an unconstitutional tax, because such a tax would fall upon local govern­
ments alone; private persons do not own city halls and therefore would not pay the tax. The 
difficulty with such a theory, as Justice Stone noted in his New York concurrence, is that it 
does not provide any account of when a governmental entity is similarly situated to a private 
enterprise. See 326 U.S. at 586-88 {Stone, J., concurring). For example, if municipal corpora­
tions are analogous to private corporations, then a tax on city legislative buildings would not 
discriminate against governmental entities but rather subject them to the same tax treatment 
as private corporations, which must pay federal taxes on their assets. 
44. Justice O'Connor tentatively invokes a fourth notion to support the decision in New 
York: she cites Professor Merritt's work for the proposition that commandeering legislation 
might deprive the persons of a "republican form of government" in violation of Article IV, 
section 4. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee 
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 61-62 
(1988)). According to this argument, when Congress forces state governments to enact legis­
lation, those state governments are prevented from being responsive to their constituents' 
interests; because they are forced to address federally established priorities, they are pre­
vented from devoting state resources to problems of more pressing concern to their own 
constituents. 
To the extent that this argument simply restates the political accountability argument in 
Guarantee Clause clothing, I have addressed it already. But to the extent that the argument 
claims that state governments are no longer republican in form if they are unresponsive to 
their constituents, then the argument does not distinguish commandeering legislation from 
preemption. After all, if Congress bars state legislative action on some concern that is 
deemed important by the state's residents, then the state government will be incapable of 
responding to constituent concerns. How is a veto less of a threat to republican government 
than an affirmative command? 
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B. Searching for State Autonomy in Text, History, and Precedent: 
The Nationalistic Origins of "State Autonomy" 
Jurisprudence in American History 
The political accountability argument, of course, is not the only 
arrow in the quivers of the New York and Printz Courts. At least as 
important is their reliance on originalist history. Both decisions 
rely heavily on sources from the ratification debates suggesting that 
the framers intended to prohibit the national government from 
commandeering the regulatory services of nonfederal officials. 
How persuasive is this argument? The answer to this question is 
paradoxical. On one hand, as explained in this section, there is a 
long constitutional tradition maintaining that Congress cannot force 
state officials to implement federal law. This tradition is embodied 
in the objections to "requisitions" made by Federalists during the 
debates over the ratification of the Constitution. It is also sug­
gested by Justice Story's position in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 45 which 
was, in turn, rooted in the larger jurisprudence of the Marshall 
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 46 McCulloch v. Maryland, 47 and Martin 
v. Hunter's Lessee. 48 
But, on the other hand, as noted in section I.C, there is a deeper 
sense in which such tradition provides a dubious foundation for 
New York and Printz. Ironically, the problem with the reasoning of 
Publius, Justice Story, and the tradition of dual federalism on which 
Story's views rested, is that such reasoning is excessively nationalis­
tic. The fundamental assumption of both Publius's reasoning dur­
ing the ratification debates and Story's reasoning in Prigg is that 
state governments are unfit to implement federal law because state 
officials are devious, demagogic, untrustworthy, parochial, and in­
herently rebellious and, therefore, ought to be excluded entirely 
from implementing federal policy. 
The problem with such a nationalistic theory is that it proves too 
much: it suggests not only that Congress should not commandeer 
the services of state officers but also that Congress ought not use 
such services even when they are volunteered by state governments. 
In effect, such a doctrine of state autonomy is really a nondelega­
tion theory: it bars Congress from delegating federal responsibili­
ties to state officials. Such a theory is entirely unacceptable in the 
45. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
48. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816). 
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late twentieth century, when systems of cooperative federalism are 
commonplace and it is widely conceded that the federal and state 
governments have largely, albeit not entirely, concurrent 
jurisdictions. 
Therefore, although there is a long constitutional tradition that 
condemns the federal commandeering of state officials, the tradi­
tion does not provide a persuasive justification for the condemna­
tion. We have a rule without a reason. In Part II of this article, I 
tentatively suggest how the functional argument presented here 
might fill this void in constitutional doctrine by providing a more 
satisfactory textual and precedential justification for the New York 
entitlement in an era of cooperative federalism. 
1. The Antecedents of State Autonomy in the Ratification 
Debates: Publius's Nationalist Case Against Requisitions 
New York, Printz, and scholarly commentators root their argu­
ments concerning state autonomy in the debates over the ratifica­
tion of the U.S. Constitution.49 New York and Printz note that 
many ratifiers of the Constitution agreed that the Articles of Con­
federation ought to be amended so that the new government would 
be able to regulate private persons directly and not be required to 
requisition the state governments to raise taxes and troops on be­
half of the national government. In Hamilton's words, quoted with 
approval by Justice O'Connor, "The new National Government 
'must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in 
need of no intermediate legislations.' "50 
Against this originalist argument, Justice Stevens responded 
that, by making these statements, the ratifiers simply wanted to 
"enhance the power of the national government, not to provide 
some new unmentioned immunity for state officers."51 The Feder­
alists certainly believed that requiring the national government to 
rely on state governments for enforcement of national law was 
"cumbersome and inefficient."52 But, according to Stevens, it 
hardly follows that the Federalists wished to prohibit the national 
government from having the option of commandeering the state 
49. The main scholarly treatments of New York all devote considerable space to parsing 
the ratification debates. See Caminker, supra note 31; H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Ques­
tion of Constitutional Law, 79 VA.  L. RE.v. 633 (1993); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field 
Office Federalism, 79 VA.  L. RE.v. 1957 (1993). 
50. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 
16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
51. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2389 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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governments, when such commandeering might not be so divisive. 
Indeed, Justice Stevens relied on The Federalist No. 27 and The Fed­
eralist No. 36 to argue that "the federal government was to have the 
power to demand that local o+ficials implement national policy 
programs. "S3 
Which side has the better view of history? The trouble with 
both positions is that each overlooks how an intense nationalism 
might be the basis for a rule against commandeering state govern­
ments. As Stevens correctly noted, the New York-and Printz major­
ities misleadingly imply that the Framers somehow opposed 
requisitions to preserve state autonomy. Further, the majorities' 
view ignores the fact that the Anti-Federalists - quintessential de­
fenders of state power - wanted the national government to rely 
exclusively on the state governments to implement national pol­
icy. s4 They feared that preemption rather than commandeering 
would destroy the state governments by depriving those govern­
ments of meaningful subject-matter jurisdiction.ss Neither Justices 
O'Connor nor Scalia ever explain how allowing the federal govern­
ment to do precisely what the strongest advocates of state power 
wanted to require the federal government to do would violate some 
important norm of federalism in the eyes of the ratifiers of the 
Constitution. 
But Stevens is equally misleading when he implies that the Con­
stitution's ratifiers merely wished to supplement the national gov­
ernment's power to impose requisitions by giving the national 
government an additional power to tax individuals directly. Such a 
position ignores the vehemence with which the Federalists rejected 
the system of requisitions established by the Articles of 
Confederation. 
A quick summary of Publius's views suggests that Stevens sub­
stantially understated the Federalists' objections to requisitions. 
According to Publius, the difficulty was that state politicians, moti­
vated by "love of power," would inevitably display "an impatience 
53. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27, 
supra note 50, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 36, supra note 50, at 235 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
54. As one leading Anti-Federalist pamphleteer, the "Federal Farmer," argued, the Arti­
cles of Confederation were preferable to the proposed Constitution because, under the Arti­
cles, "the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union 
operate on states, as such, and federally: Here, nothing can be done without the meetings of 
the state legislatures." LEITER XVII OF THE FEDERAL FARMER (1788), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE A.Nu-FEDERALIST 330, 331-32 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
55. See, e.g., EssAY I OF BRurus (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE A.Nu-FEDERAL­
IST, supra note 54, at 363. 
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with political control" and "look with an evil eye upon all external 
attempts to restrain or direct [state power]."56 The courts would be 
useless to force political bodies to comply with requisitions,57 and 
the national government would lack resources sufficient to exact 
obedience to requisitions through sheer military force.58 Moreover, 
Publius argued in The Federalist No. 16 that the national govern­
ment would not be able to determine whether state officials were 
complying with requisitions in good faith.59 State officials might 
plead "inability" rather than "disinclination," and the national gov­
ernment would find it extremely difficult to determine whether the 
states' bad faith was sufficiently flagrant "to justify the harsh expe­
dient of compulsion."60 
These arguments suggest a deep distrust and disapproval of 
state officials. Contrary to Stevens's assertion, Publius is not 
merely arguing that state officials are somehow "cumbersome and 
inefficient." Rather, he is arguing that state officials are disloyal 
and dishonest, because they would deliberately resist and under­
mine federal policies and then conceal their resistance. Such a view 
of state officials is completely consistent with the Federalists' more 
general ideological commitments. The Federalists' experience in 
the Continental Congress or the Revolutionary Army - institu­
tions in which many had served - led them to believe that state 
politicians were parochial, narrow-minded, perhaps even unpatri­
otic demagogues.61 State politicians, after all, had refused to ap­
prove an impost needed to pay the veterans of the Revolutionary 
Army,62 and they had failed to comply with requisitions needed to 
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton). 
57. See id. at 110. 
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 50, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton). 
59. See id. at 116-17. 
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton). This was 
Hamilton's complaint about New York - that the state legislature "made an external com­
pliance . . .  to a requisition of congress" but "at the same time counteract(ed] their compli­
ance by gratifying the local objects of the state so as to defeat their concession." 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787' at 295 (Max Farrand ed., revised ed. 1966) 
(1911). Alexis de Tocqueville makes a similar argument about the inability of state govern­
ments to monitor and control New England townships when those townships carried out 
state law. See 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 41, at 78-80. Like Publius, de Tocqueville 
notes that the election of township officials by the local electorate makes control of such 
officials by the state extraordinarily difficult. See id. 
61. See FoRREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL Oruoms 
OF THE CoNSTITUTION 164-65 (1985); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN· 
TION OF 1787, supra note 60, at 89 (speech by Edmund Randolph, as recorded by James 
Madison, decrying "the local demagogues who will be degraded by (the proposed Constitu­
tion] from the importance they now hold"). 
62. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF TIIE CoNSTITU· 
TION, 1781-1788, at 72-102 (1961) (describing state politicians' opposition to proposals to pro-
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make payments on Revolutionary War bonds.63 Some states also 
had refused to protect the property rights of Loyalists in violation 
of national treaties,64 and Rhode Island notoriously had required 
creditors to accept depreciated paper money as payment of debts, 
in violation of contractual rights.65 The Federalists regarded this 
misbehavior as endemic to state governments, blaming state politi­
cians' misconduct on institutional factors such as excessively demo­
cratic state constitutions66 or excessively small constituencies.67 
State politicians, to the Federalists, were simply not suited for the 
pursuit of "great and national objects."68 
When read in light of these more general principles, The Feder­
alist No. 15 suggests that Publius did not want merely to supplement 
requisitions with direct taxation and regulation - a relatively mod­
est reform that would have been acceptable to most Anti-Federal­
ists. 69 Rather, the Federalists wanted as much as possible to replace 
such reliance on state officials with exclusive dependence on federal 
officials, persons who would owe their entire loyalty to the national 
government and the national characters who would presumably oc-
vide the Continental Congress with an impost on trade). As Main notes, this opposition was 
directly Jinked with state politicians' fear of the Revolutionary Army: one purpose of the 
impost was to finance life pensions for officers in the army - a project strongly opposed by 
many state officials. See id. at 106-07. 
63. See McDoNALD, supra note 61, at 170-71. 
64. See id. at 155-56. 
65. See id. at 175-76. As McDonald notes, Rhode Island was a bete noire of the Federal­
ists, and the heat of their indignant rhetoric greatly exceeded the actual harm of Rhode 
Island's action to creditors. 
66. See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 61, at 157; MAIN, supra note 62, at 42-48 (describing 
the controversy over the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776). For the classic account of the 
controversies concerning the radical democracy unleashed at the state level by the American 
Revolution, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CoNFEDERATION: AN lNrERPRETA­
TION OF THE SoCIAL-CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-
1781, at 17-53 (1940). 
67. The classic account is, of course, THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 50, at 83 (James Madison);'see also THE 
FEDERALIST No. 35, supra note 50, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that national 
politicians will have the opportunity for "extensive inquiry and information" that less-edu­
cated state politicians will lack). 
69. Most Anti-Federalists did not condemn direct federal taxation of individuals out of 
hand, but instead argued that the national government should try requisitions first and resort 
to direct taxation of private individuals only if the state governments proved unwilling to 
satisfy the requisitions. Anti-Federalists proposed such a mixed system of requisitions and 
direct taxes in the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Maryland, and New York. See MAIN, supra note 62, at 145-46. Martin Luther, the 
garrulous Anti-Federalist leader from Maryland, proposed such a mixed system at the Phila­
delphia Convention. See 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTioN OF 1787, supra 
note 60, at 359. 
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cupy Congress and the Presidency.70 In short, both Justice Scalia 
and Justice Stevens are correct: the Federalists' case against requi­
sitions did not depend on any regard for state autonomy, but the 
Federalists nevertheless probably wished to discourage state imple­
mentation of national law for totally nationalistic reasons. 
To be sure, as a concession to the Anti-Federalists, Publius ar­
gued in The Federalist No. 36 that the national government would 
be able to "make use" of state tax collectors.71 But, given Publius's 
general skepticism about the federal governments' ability to en­
force demands on obstinate state politicians by court injunction, it 
is implausible to read these statements as suggestions that the fed­
eral government could simply conscript state tax officials by enact­
ing a statutory demand for their services. Rather, Publius seems to 
recommend a more subtle policy of what we would now call condi­
tional preemption. According to Publius, 
[T]he existence of such a power [of direct federal taxation] will have a 
strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States 
know that the Union can supply itself without their agency, it will be a 
powerful motive for exertion on their part.72 
70. For the Federalists, national or diffuse characters were persons whose military or 
political achievements had won them honor throughout the entire continent. A crucial as­
pect of the new Constitution for the Federalists was that it provided a forum of sufficient 
dignity for persons with such a reputation - quintessentially, George Washington. For sum­
maries of how the Federalists believed that large jurisdictions encouraged control of govern­
ment by the natural aristocracy - the most educated, patriotic, cultivated, and wealthiest 
persons with the greatest degree of fame and ambition for fame - see GARRY WILLS, Ex­
PLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 216-47 (1981); GORDON Wooo, THE CREATION OP 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 471-518 (1969). For an interesting discussion of 
how James Wiison believed that voters themselves would adopt a disinterested style of poli­
tics in a larger jurisdiction, see Stephen Conrad, Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's 
Theory of Federal Union, 13 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 47-49, 57 (1988). For the classic account of 
the Framers' obsession with widespread fame, see Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding 
Fathers, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: EssAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 3, 7 (Trevor 
Colboum ed., 1974). For more detailed evidence of this obsession, see STANLEY ELKINS & 
Brue McKrrruCK, THE FOUNDING FATHERS: YoUNG MEN OP THE REVOLUTION (1962) (ar­
guing that the Framers were motivated by a desire for reputations within the larger empire of 
the new republic); Wiiliam Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare 
War, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 695, 713-39 (1997). 
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The na­
tional legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State [for assessing and 
collecting property taxes]. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each 
State can, in all parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government. • . • [I]f the 
exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be judged . . .  inconvenient, 
the federal government may forbear the use of it and have recourse to requisitions in its 
stead."). 
72. Id. at 221. Given the context of the paper, it seems a reasonable conjecture that The 
Federalist No. 36 was written as a concession to Anti-Federalists like the "Federal Fanner," 
who wished to preserve some state influence over any federal system of taxation. In light of 
Publius's argument in The Federalist No. 15 that commandeering strategies would be ineffica­
cious, see THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton), it seems 
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In other words, rather than defend a power to commandeer the 
states through unconditional orders, a power that Publius had al­
ready decried as futile in The Federalist No. 15, Publius recom­
mends a classic strategy of cooperative federalism: threaten to 
bypass state officials unless they comply with federal requisitions. 
The state officials' interest in obtaining implementation powers will 
give them the incentive to obey federal commands when direct or­
ders would necessarily fail. 
Such a power of conditional preemption might also explain The 
Federalist No. 27, a passage of which was cited by both Justices 
Souter and Stevens as evidence that the ratifiers of the Constitution 
authorized Congress to commandeer the states.73 In this para­
graph, Publius argued that Congress's power to regulate private in­
dividuals directly would "enable the government to employ the 
ordinary magistracy of each in the execution of its laws."74 Accord­
ing to Publius, 
It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confed­
eracy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will 
become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which 
all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each state will be 
bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the legislatures, courts, and 
magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the 
operations of the national government as far as its just and constitu­
tional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforce­
ment of its laws.75 
According to Justice Scalia, this passage suggests only that state of­
ficials have a duty "not to obstruct the operation of federal law."76 
Justice Souter disagreed, arguing that the natural import of the lan­
guage is that state officials have a duty also to "take appropriate 
action" to obey the federal government's commands.77 
But there is also a third reading that makes the most sense in 
light of the topic sentence of the paragraph. According to this sen­
tence, Publius believed that the national government, by virtue of 
its ability to regulate "the individual citizens of the several States," 
will be able "to employ the ordinary magistracy of [the states] in the 
unlikely that Publius regarded the requisition power as an important or even useful aspect of 
national supremacy. 
73. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2389 (1997) {Stevens, J., dissenting); 117 
S. Ct. at 2402 {Souter, J., dissenting). 
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 50, at 176 {Alexander Hamilton). 
75. Id. at 177 {footnote omitted). 
76. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374. 
77. 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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execution of [the national government's] laws."78 The puzzle of 
The Federalist No. 27, therefore, is to explain how this might be so 
- how direct federal regulation of private persons might help Con­
gress use the states' magistracy. 
The Federalist No. 36 and its implicit concept of conditional pre­
emption might provide the key to The Federalist No. 27: the power 
to regulate private persons might induce the states to participate in 
federal regulatory schemes, because, as Publius noted in The Feder­
alist No. 36, if the states refuse to enforce federal laws, then the 
federal government simply can threaten the states with the ultimate 
weapon - the weapon of bypass.79 In short, state officials will be­
come agents of the national government, because conditional pre­
emption of state power will provide a "powerful motive" for 
intergovernmental cooperation80 when direct coercion, according to 
The Federalist No. 1581 and The Federalist No. 16,82 would surely 
fail. 
To be sure, this reading of The Federalist No. 27 is not unques­
tionably correct. But it has the virtue of reconciling Publius's state­
ments in The Federalist No. 27 with his frequently expressed belief 
that the legal power to coerce state officials by direct order is a 
useless, futile power. Any other view makes Publius praise the 
Constitution for bestowing a power on the national government 
that Publius has elsewhere condemned as pointless and divisive. 
In sum, read in context of the general ratification debates, 
Publius seems to · argue that Congress practically would never be 
able to demand state officials' services through court injunction or 
even military force because state officials are too parochial, recalci­
trant, and devious to be coerced and will defeat any direct order 
through evasion and passive resistance that Congress might not 
even be able to detect, let alone effectively remedy. At most, The 
Federalist No. 36 suggests that state officials might voluntarily aid 
the national government if they know that their disobedience will 
lead to their exclusion from national affairs because "the union can 
supply itself without their agency."83 
Does this distrust of state officials necessarily imply that 
Publius, or the Federalists more generally, believed that the pro-
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 50, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton). 
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 220-21 (Alexander Hamilton). 
80. See id. at 221. 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 50, at 110-11 (Alexander Hamilton). 
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 50, at 115-17 (Alexander Hamilton). 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 36, supra note 50, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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posed Constitution barred Congress from attempting to comman­
deer state regulatory services? In support of Justice Stevens and 
the other Printz dissenters, one can reply: not necessarily. One can 
believe that a regulatory technique is foolish and futile without be­
lieving that it is unconstitutional. On the specific question raised by 
Printz - the legal power of Congress to demand that state officials 
regulate private persons according to federal standards - both the 
text of the Constitution and the debates surrounding its. ratification 
are silent. 
Yet while the Federalists never expressly stated that they wished 
to prohibit commandeering, the historical record nonetheless sug­
gests that such an immunity would not have bothered them in the 
least - that, indeed, such an immunity would be perfectly consis­
tent with their general views. But before applauding the Printz ma­
jority, note the deeper irony to such an originalist defense of state 
autonomy. Publius's dislike of requisitions, after all, is clearly 
rooted in contempt for state officials - in an extremely nationalis­
tic view that parochial political loyalties drive state officers to sub­
vert federal policies either covertly or overtly. Slandering the good 
faith of state politicians seems like a strange way to vindicate state 
autonomy. As the next section discusses, this contempt for, and dis­
trust of, state officials becomes the explicit basis for the theory of 
state autonomy recognized by Justice Story. Indeed, the whole doc­
trine of state autonomy, as it is first recognized in Kentucky v. 
Dennison84 and Collector v. Day, 85 springs directly out the extreme 
nationalism of the Marshall Court and Justice Story. 
2. State Autonomy in the Marshall and Taney Courts: The 
Nationalistic Roots of Dual Federalism 
What about postratification political practice or judicial prece­
dent? As the Printz dissenters note, there were numerous instances 
in which the national government relied on state officials to carry 
out federal laws.86 But, as the Printz majority notes, it is difficult to 
say whether Congress believed that it could force the state govern­
ments to undertake these duties, because the state governments 
never resisted their performance.87 Again, there simply was no oc­
casion for Congress to rely on force when it could obtain state serv-
84. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
85. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). 
86. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2391-92 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
87. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370-71. 
840 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:813 
ices through cooperation. Thus, Congress never addressed clearly 
the question asked by the Printz court. 
But there is a source of authority that, at least at first glance, 
seems to suggest much more clearly that the Printz and New York 
majorities were correct in their view of constitutional tradition: the 
opinions of Justice Story. This section first explains how Story's 
views provide support for Printz and New York. But it then shows 
how these views - and the larger edifice of dual federalism upon 
which they rest - actually are a weak and unconvincing basis for 
modem doctrines of state autonomy. Story indeed defended the 
notion that the federal government cannot impose regulatory duties 
on nonfederal officers, but he did so not out of respect for state 
autonomy but out of contempt for state officials' capacities. The 
best view of the limited evidence available is that Story wanted to 
exclude nonfederal officials from even voluntarily implementing 
federal law. Story's doctrine of state autonomy, therefore, is more 
a nondelegation doctrine, requiring Congress to create federal 
agencies and barring state officials from carrying out federal 
responsibilities. 
Consider Story's dissent in Houston v. Moore, 88 an 1820 deci­
sion holding that Pennsylvania courts could try militiamen for re­
fusing to serve in the United States forces during the War of 1812. 
Justice Story thought that the state courts had no such power, but in 
his dissent he went even further: 
There is no pretence to say, that Congress can compel a State Court 
to convene and sit in judgment on such an offence. Such an authority 
is no where confided to it by the constitution. Its power is limited to 
the few cases already specified, and these assuredly do not embrace it; 
for it is not an implied power necessary or proper to carry into effect 
the given powers. The national may organize its own tribunals for this 
purpose; and it has no necessity to resort to other tribunals to enforce 
its rights. If it do [sic] not choose to organize such tribunals, it is its 
own fault; but it is not, therefore, imperative upon a state tribunal to 
volunteer in its service. 89 
Again, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,90 Story stated that the Penn­
sylvania officers could not enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause of Ar­
ticle IV. As in Houston, Justice Story went further, arguing that the 
national government could not force the state government to en­
force the Fugitive Slave Clause even if it had wanted to do so. He 
wrote: 
88. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 {1820). 
89. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 67 {Story, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
90. 41 U.S. {16 Pet.) 539 {1842). 
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The clause is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any 
state. It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action 
to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be com­
pelled to enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional 
exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound 
to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national govern­
ment, nowhere delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution.91 
In short, Justice Story's dicta suggests that, well before Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 92 Justice Story believed that the national government 
could not require the state governments to implement national law. 
Of course, Justice Story was merely one justice on the Court, 
and his statements were either dicta, in Prigg, or dissenting state­
ments, in Houston. But his views seem to have been widely shared. 
As Justice McLean noted in Prigg, "It seems to be taken as a con­
ceded point . . . that Congress had no power to impose duties on 
state officers."93 Justice Marshall himself seems to have dropped 
hints in Wayman v. Southard94 that he was sympathetic to Justice 
Story's views, and there is historical evidence that Marshall en­
dorsed Story's opinion in Houston.9s 
There is another, more important reason to pay special heed to 
the views of Justice Story on the issue of state autonomy: Justice 
Story is famously an ultranationalist of the Marshall Court, a justice 
who had little patience for Calhoun's confederation theory or the 
notion of state nullification.96 One might conclude, therefore, that 
if a justice as nationalistically inclined as Justice Story embraced the 
theory of New York and Printz, then such a theory does not require 
one to accept antebellum antinationalist views of state sovereignty 
that are now best viewed as Gone with the Wmd of the Civil War. 
Is Prigg the forgotten foundation for New York and Printz 
-
the constitutional authority suggesting that Justices Scalia and 
91. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 615-16 (emphasis added). 
92. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
93. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 664 (McLean, J., concurring). Even Justice McLean himself 
conceded that "[a]s a general principle, this is true," but he drew an exception for Article 
!V's Fugitive Slave Clause which expressly imposed duties on state governments. See Prigg, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet) at 664 (McLean, J., concurring). 
94. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 (1825). 
95. In Wayman, Marshall stated that "the laws of the Union may permit such agency [i.e., 
state executive officers' implementation of federal laws], but it is by no means clear that they 
can compel it." 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 39-40. The issue in Wayman was whether state law 
governed the manner in which federal marshalls executed judgments of federal courts. 23 
U.S. (10 Wheat) at 3. 
96. Story certainly did not accept the notion that "affirmative" burdens on state officials 
were somehow contrary to the "spirit" of the Constitution. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 343-44 (1816) ("It is a mistake that the constitution was not 
designed to operate upon states, in their corporate capacities."). 
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O'Connor were right after all? Oddly, neither Justice Scalia nor 
Justice O'Connor cites Prigg. Perhaps this omission is sensible, be­
cause, on close reading, Prigg and the jurisprudence from which it 
emerges provide deeply paradoxical support for any modem theory 
of state autonomy. Ironically, the problem is not that Prigg is too 
devoted to states' rights, but rather that Prigg and its intellectual 
foundation in the Marshall Court's jurisprudence - like the writ­
ings of Publius - are too nationalistic: Prigg springs out of the 
same deep suspicion of state governments that seems indefensible 
in an era of cooperative federalism. The legacy of dual federalism 
that Justice Scalia invokes is, indeed, a nationalistic legacy, forged 
by the Marshall Court and carried forward by Justice Story out of 
distrust for state institutions rather than love of state autonomy. 
Consider Justice Story's logic in the passage above quoted from 
Houston. Story contends that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
does not authorize Congress to force state tribunals to adjudicate 
federal crimes, because, given that Congress can create its own fed­
eral tribunals, Congress has no necessity to demand such tribunals 
from the states. But this argument, if taken seriously, would seem 
to prohibit Congress from using state tribunals even with the con­
sent of state legislatures. After all, if one can create federal courts, 
then it is not strictly speaking necessary to delegate business to 
state courts even if they voluntarily accept it. Embedded in Story's 
rhetoric of state autonomy is a deeply nationalistic nondelegation 
theory. 
Story had already elaborated such a theory in Martin v. Hunters' 
Lessee. 97 In Martin, Justice Story argued in dicta that Congress has 
an obligation to create federal courts sufficient to hear every class 
of case enumerated in Article III, section 2 of the Constitution.98 A 
large and sophisticated literature analyzes Story's claim.99 For the 
purpose of this article, it is important to rehearse only the undis­
puted essence of Story's argument. According to Story, by declar­
ing that the judicial power "shall be vested" in Article III courts, 
section 1 of Article ill bars Congress from "vest[ing] any portion of 
the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained 
97. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
98. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 327-33. 
99. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the 1lvo 
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory 
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article 
Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, 
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 39, 55-58; Robert J. Meltzer, The His­
tory and Structure of Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990). 
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and established by itself."100 The essence of Story's argument is a 
nondelegation theory: Congress simply cannot give final authority 
to adjudicate any Article III case to state tribunals, and Congress 
cannot give any authority to state courts to adjudicate certain 
classes of federal business - in particular, maritime and admiralty 
cases and federal crimes.101 If the state courts are to have any 
power to hear federal cases, it is only because federal issues inevita­
bly arise during the course of ordinary state judicial business under 
the state court's preexisting jurisdiction. 
As Houston suggests, this nondelegation doctrine also can be 
the basis of a doctrine of state autonomy: if state courts are unfit to 
hear certain types of federal cases, then Congress a fortiori cannot 
force them to hear such cases. But, as both Houston and Martin 
suggest, this doctrine of state autonomy is hardly a tribute to the 
dignity of state government. Rather, Story's theory is rooted in the 
belief that "[t]he constitution has presumed (whether rightly or 
wrongly we do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, 
state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or 
control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular adminis­
tration of justice."102 This is not to say that state courts cannot hear 
some federal business that incidentally arises in the course of their 
state duties. But Story's strong suggestion in both Houston and 
Martin is that Congress cannot encourage such state exercise of fed­
eral duties by delegating them as a matter of federal law. 
In short, Story simply transforms Publius's prudential advice not 
to trust state officials into a constitutional command. Martin thus 
extends The Federalist No. 15's suggestion that state institutions are 
simply too parochial, disuniform, populistic, and prejudiced to be 
trusted to carry out federal business. 
Like his Houston dissent, Story's dicta in Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
that "the states cannot . . .  be compelled to enforce [the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of Article IV]"103 appears to reflect a nationalistic 
nondelegation doctrine rooted in Martin rather than any high re­
gard for state institutions' independence. According to Story, Con­
gress cannot force county magistrates to enforce slaveowners' 
100. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 330-31. 
101. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337. Story could be read to go even farther: he might be 
arguing that Congress must create federal district courts to exercise original jurisdictions over 
all federal business to the exclusion of state courts. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 336. But, as 
Michael Collins notes, this seems to be wistful acknowledgment of an argument rather than 
adoption of it. See Collins, supra note 99, at 57 n.45. 
102. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347. 
103. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842). 
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claims arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause, because "the clause 
is found in the national Constitution" and "does not point out any 
state functionaries . . .  to carry its provisions into effect."104 
But this logic, like the logic of Houston, implies that Congress 
could not make use of county magistrates even if they consented to 
such duties. After all, the magistrates' consent would not alter the 
fact that Article IV duties are "duties of the national government, 
nowhere delegated or in trusted to [state officials] by the Constitu­
tion. "105 Story, indeed, seems to invoke Martin by suggesting that 
Congress cannot rely on state institutions to enforce slaveowners' 
rights, stating that "the natural, if not the necessary conclusion is 
that the national government . . .  is bound, through its own proper 
departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may re­
quire, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it 
by the Constitution."to6 
This is not to say that Story believed that state officials could not 
adjudicate slaveowners' claims to recover their slaves. To the con­
trary, he states that "state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise 
that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation."107 Story 
seems to be arguing here only that state officials have a preexisting 
police power to "arrest and restrain runaway slaves and remove 
them from their borders," a power that "may essentially promote 
and aid the interests of the owners" but was "designed generally for 
other purposes, for the protection, safety, and peace of the 
state."1°8 Such a view would mirror his theory in Martin and Hous­
ton that, while state courts may "incidentally" hear federal business 
pursuant to their preexisting jurisdiction, Congress cannot deliber­
ately delegate such business to them, because such delegation 
would interfere with the uniform administration of federal law. It 
follows incidentally from such a nondelegation theory that Con­
gress cannot force state officials to hear Article IV claims. Such an 
immunity is not rooted in any high regard for state autonomy but 
104. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615. 
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616. 
106. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616 (emphasis added). While Story does not cite Martin, counsel 
for respondent did, stating that "so far as [the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act] attempts to vest this 
or any jurisdiction in state officers, it is unconstitutional and void. The solemn decision of 
this Court [in Martin] has branded such attempt with condemnation." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 
598. 
107. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622. 
108. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625. As David Currie notes, Story's argument against state en­
forcement of Article IV seems to rest on "the need for uniformity." See DA vio CuRRIE, THE 
CoNSTITIJTION IN nm SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDru!D YEARS 1789-1888, at 242 
(1985). 
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rather in distrust for state officials; the Constitution simply does not 
trust them to carry out federal business.109 
Story's rejection of intergovernmental cooperation is not an 
anomaly. It springs directly out of what I call the Marshall Court's 
jurisprudence of "nationalistic dual federalism," referring to the de­
sire of Marshall to protect the integrity of the federal government 
by excluding state governments from meddling in federal affairs. 
The presupposition of this jurisprudence is that state and national 
governments should enforce their own laws with their own bureau­
cracy, each avoiding any dependence on the other. As Marshall 
stated in McCulloch: 
No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to create a 
dependence of the government of the Union on those of the States, 
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are 
adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely 
for the accomplishment of its ends.110 
The "intention" to which Marshall refers is best exemplified by the 
Federalists' rejection of requisitions and the creation of a national 
government with its own executive and judicial officials. By con­
tending that the new government was "expected to rely" on its own 
institutions "alone," Marshall asserts that direct taxation and regu­
lation of individuals replaced rather than supplemented requisi­
tions. Put another way, the federal government had a duty as well 
as a right to be independent of the states. 
One might object that McCulloch is simply rejecting the notion 
that the national government would be required to rely on state in­
stitutions. This does not imply necessarily that the national govern­
ment lacks the option to rely on such state institutions if it wishes. 
But Marshall's broad argument for separating state and federal 
functions carries a not-so-subtle hint of such a prohibition. In argu­
ing for a categorical bar against even possibly good-faith state taxa­
tion of federal institutions, Marshall compares state governments' 
relations with the national government to the relations between two 
separate states: "Would the people of any one State trust those of 
another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of 
their State government?" Marshall asks rhetorically. "Why, then, 
should we suppose that the people of any one State should be will-
109. See JAMES MCLELLAN, JosEPH STORY AND nm AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 263 
(1971) (noting that Story's opinions "seem to discount the possibility of cooperation between 
the national and state governments and rigidly divide jurisdictions into compartments, nearly 
always at the expense of state power"). 
110. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819) (emphasis added). 
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ing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations 
of [the national government]?"lll 
If one accepts this analogy, then it is natural to bar the national 
government from delegating regulatory power to state govern­
ments. After all, it would be odd to allow the Minnesota legislature 
to delegate regulatory duties to the Wisconsin legislature. If 
federal-state relations are analogous to state-state relations, then it 
ought to be equally odd to allow Congress to delegate its regulatory 
responsibilities to state officials.112 For Congress to delegate signifi­
cant regulatory responsibilities to state officials would be to invite 
the "abuse" that "the people" - that is, the Constitution - pro­
hibit. To borrow Marshall's phrase, "[t]his was not intended by the 
American people. They did not design to make their government 
dependent on the States. "113 
In short, Marshall's opinion in McCulloch suggests a nondelega­
tion theory that is defended explicitly by Justice Story in Martin, 
Prigg, and Houston. While Marshall is never as clear as Justice 
Story in prohibiting Congress from delegating responsibilities to 
state officials, he seemed to presuppose just such a bar in Gibbons 
v. Ogden when he stated that "[a]lthough Congress cannot enable a 
state to regulate, Congress may adopt the provisions of a state on 
any subject."114 
Why would Marshall and Story be so distrustful of Congress 
that they would want to bar Congress from delegating powers to 
state governments? It seems that they did not believe that national­
ism would be protected through the national political process; per­
haps they believed that there was simply too much danger that 
Congress might be captured by parochial - or, at least, Jefferso­
nian - state interests, turn over too much responsibility to state 
governments, and thus undermine the purposes of the Union.us If 
state governments were simply too disuniform or parochial to carry 
111. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431. 
112. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431 ("The legislature of the Union alone . . .  can be trusted 
by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence 
that it will not be abused."). 
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432. 
114. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 207 (1824). 
115. As Professor Vikram Amar has noted, this worry may have been much more plausi­
ble prior to enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, because state legislatures controlled 
the U.S. Senate. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural 
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 V AND. L. REv. 1347, 1378 (1996). One 
might speculate that Marshall's distrust of state officials might have been related to the polit· 
ical reality that, by 1819, most state governments - and, thus, state courts - were being 
taken over by Republican followers of Thomas Jefferson. By contrast, much of the federal 
judiciary still remained firmly under the control of Federalists appointed by John Adams. 
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out federal responsibilities, as the Court has sometimes sug­
gested,116 then the Court would have to step in to control Con­
gress's susceptibility to delegate such responsibilities to state 
officials. 
In any case, the earliest judicial expressions favoring state au­
tonomy in Prigg and Houston seem to owe their existence to this 
hostility toward state officials and to the belief that Congress must 
be barred from relying on them. State autonomy follows naturally 
from the nationalistic dual federalism set forth in Martin, McCul­
loch, and Gibbons - the view that state and federal governments 
must have rigidly separate jurisdictions, pursuing different purposes 
with different sets of officials. While it might seem ironic to us that 
the theory of state autonomy has its origins in fear and loathing of 
states, such a view is not so distant from the arguments of Publius 
upon which Justice Scalia relied so heavily in Printz. 
3. The Demise of Nationalistic Dual Federalism: From Dennison 
and Day to the Intergovernmental State 
The problem with the theory of nationalistic dual federalism and 
the doctrine of state autonomy based on it is that the nationalistic 
premises of the theory were simply untenable. Simply put, advo­
cates of state power destroyed Marshall's and Story's basis for state 
autonomy because they refused to accept the nationalistic premise 
that state governments cannot be trusted with federal responsibili­
ties. Starting with Chief Justice Taney's concurring opinion in Prigg 
and ending with the New Deal Court's repudiation of the Marshall 
Court's nondelegation doctrine, the Court's growing trust of state 
governments rendered obsolete the theory of state autonomy an­
nounced by Justice Story in Prigg. 
But, while the Court quickly rejected dual federalism, it never 
replaced Story's analysis with a more persuasive basis for state au­
tonomy. This is not to say that the Court did not embrace the con­
cept of state autonomy. To the contrary, it continued to repeat 
Story's formula that the national government could not demand 
that state officials implement federal law. But, unlike Story, the 
Court has never come up with a logically consistent reason for the 
rule. 
116. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (barring Congress 
from permitting state officials to apply state workers' compensation law to longshoremen and 
other maritime workers). Jensen demonstrates a deep concern, also reflected in Martin, that 
federal jurisdiction over maritime matters is nondelegable. 
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The two decisions of Kentucky v. Dennison117 and Collector v. 
Day118 illustrate both the inadequacy of nationalistic dual federal­
ism as a basis for state autonomy and the Court's inability to re­
place such a theory with a different analysis. Justice Taney could 
not rely on the theory of nationalistic dual federalism in Dennison; 
he concurred in Prigg expressly to reject Story's argument that state 
officials could not enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV, 
section 2, contending that Congress had properly "counted upon 
[state officials'] cordial co-operation" in the enforcement of the 
1793 Fugitive Slave Act.119 As a practical matter, Taney worried 
that, by excluding state officials from enforcing Article IV, Story's 
views would effectively cripple slaveowners' ability to recover fugi­
tive slaves.120 But, quite apart from this immediate practical con­
cern, the Taney Court generally promoted the notion that state 
governments could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with Congress, 
most famously in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.121 Story's exclusion 
of state officials from federal responsibilities may have rankled this 
commitment to state power. 
Thus, Taney had to come up with a new theory of state auton­
omy, one that did not imply that state officials could not voluntarily 
carry out federal duties. In Kentucky v. Dennison, Taney rewrote 
Prigg to advance such a theory. The issues before the Court were, 
first, whether the antislavery governor of Ohio had violated federal 
constitutional or statutory extradition law by refusing to extradite 
Willis Lago, a man who had helped a slave escape, and, second, 
117. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
118. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). 
119. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 631 (1842). 
120. In Taney's view, the federal government lacked a sufficient bureaucracy to ensure 
such recovery, and the states' police powers were insufficient to ensure the recovery of fugi­
tive slaves. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 632-33. Story may have intended his theory of 
state autonomy to impede the recovery of fugitive slaves. This was, at least, the spin that his 
son later placed upon his father's Prigg opinion, arguing that Story's argument actually repre­
sented the triumph of freedom, because, by allowing state officials to withdraw from the 
enforcement of the fugitive slave laws, the doctrine would make recovery of fugitives practi­
cally impossible. See Paul Fmkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Penn­
sylvania and Justice Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 247, 249. It remains 
controversial whether Story actually intended to promote the freedom of fugitive slaves with 
his opinion. Story later wrote a letter to Senator Berrien from Georgia instructing him on 
how to draft a new fugitive slave law that would not offend Prigg's anticommandeering prin­
ciple. See McLELLAN, supra note 109, at 262 n.94. 
121. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (upholding a state law requiring ships to hire a 
local pilot on the ground that such port regulations, while involving "the power to regulate 
commerce," also involved "the local necessities of navigation"). 
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whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus to the governor 
requiring him to extradite the man as Kentucky had requested.122 
Taney agreed with Kentucky that the governor had violated fed­
eral extradition law, but he refused to issue the writ of mandamus, 
holding that "the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has 
no power to impose on a state officer, as such, any duty whatever, 
and compel him to perform it."123 There was nothing new about 
this opinion; Taney had expressed the same view in- his Prigg con­
currence.124 But Taney could not defend this holding by invoking 
the dual federalism of Story without contradicting his own theory of 
concurrent jurisdiction laid out in Prigg. Thus, Taney's Dennison 
opinion did not mention the classic statement of dual federalism, 
written by Taney himself three years earlier in Ableman v. Booth, 
that "the powers of the General Government, and the States, 
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial 
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately 
and independently of each other, within their respective 
spheres,"125 because his own views as expressed in Prigg concerning 
Article IV contradicted every word. In Taney's view, the state and 
federal governments had concurrent rather than separate and dis­
tinct powers to enforce the Article IV Extradition Clause, and they 
did not act independently and separately but rather with "cordial 
co-operation."126 In short, precisely because Taney wished to en­
hance state powers, dual federalism would be of no use to Taney in 
making the first systematic defense of state autonomy. 
Instead, Taney relied on two new arguments to support the right 
of state officials to decline federal commands. These assertions 
would, in both their vagueness and unpersuasiveness, later become 
typical of state autonomy jurisprudence. First, Taney argued that 
there was no "clause or provision in the Constitution which arms 
the Government of the United States with th[e] power [to issue 
commands to state officials]."127 Second, Taney argued that, if Con­
gress could impose duties on state officers, then "it might overload 
122. See Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 97-99; 5 C. SWISHER, HisroRY OF THE SUPREME 
CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864, at 686-87 (1974). 
123. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107. 
124. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 630 (Taney, J., concurring) ("[S]tate officers . . .  are 
not bound to execute the duties imposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to do so 
or are required to do so by a law of the state."). 
125. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). Edward Corwin credits 
Taney with providing the first clear statement of dual federalism in this passage. See 
EDWARD CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CoNSTITUTION 173 (1947). 
126. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 631. 
127. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 107. 
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the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable 
him from performing his obligations to the State, and might impose 
on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity 
to which he was elevated by the State. "128 
These arguments are decidedly underwhelming. While the Con­
stitution does not mention any congressional power to demand 
services from state officials, an argument could be made that such a 
power is nonetheless given to Congress implicitly because it is 
plainly adapted to accomplish a legitimate end of Congress -
namely, enforcement of rights under Article IV.129 As for the bur­
dens that such demands might impose on state officials, Taney pro­
vides no reason to distinguish them from the normal burden of 
preemption of state policies, which might also "disable [an officer] 
from performing his obligations to the state"13o simply by making 
those obligations illegal. Of course, demands for state officers' 
services will cost the state government money, but so will preemp­
tion of state taxes by congressionally conferred tax immunity.131 In 
short, having abandoned Story's theory of dual federalism, Taney 
could not come up with any alternative theory justifying state au­
tonomy that was minimally persuasive. 
Collector v. Day132 differs from Dennison in that the Day Court 
had no compunction about relying upon the notion of dual federal­
ism or separate and distinct spheres. Moreover, Day correctly ex­
pounded the logic of dual federalism as it was expressed in 
McCulloch. The problem with Day is that such a theory never re­
flected intergovernmental reality in the United States - not even 
at the time Day was handed down. 
Day involved a federal income tax imposed on the income of a 
state probate judge. The state judge paid the tax under protest and 
then sought recovery in federal court.133 In affirming the right of 
the state judge to refuse to pay the tax, the Court restated 
Ableman's classic formulation of dual federalism: 
The general government, and the States, although both exist within 
the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, act­
ing separately and independently of each other, within their respec­
tive spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the 
128. Dennison, 65 U.S. {24 How.) at 108. 
129. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 {1819). 
130. Dennison, 65 U.S. {24 How.) at 108. 
131. See McCulloch, 11 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 376-77 (argument of Luther Martin, Maryland 
Attorney General). 
132. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 {1870). 
133. See 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 113-14. 
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States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the lan­
guage of the tenth amendment, "reserved," are as independent of the 
general government as that government within its sphere is independ­
ent of the States.134 
Having invoked the notion of dual federalism, the Court then sim­
ply turned the leading precedent of nationalistic dual federalism _, 
McCulloch v. Maryland - on its head. "[I]f the means and instru­
mentalities employed by [the national government] to carry into 
operation the powers granted to it are, necessarily, and, for the sake 
of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are 
not those of the States . . . equally exempt from Federal 
taxation?"13S 
Justice Nelson's conclusion followed neatly from the premises of 
McCulloch and, more generally, from the notion that the federal 
government ought to be completely independent of the states. By 
taxing the salary of the probate judge, the national government in­
directly was taxing the revenue used to pay that salary, and there­
fore arguably relying on requisitions against state revenue to fund 
its operations.136 Such dependence on the states was not expressly 
forbidden by McCulloch, but it certainly was inconsistent with the 
theme of national independence that ran throughout the opinion. 
If the national government was supposed to rely on its resources 
alone, as Marshall implied, then why should it lay a tax on a salary 
that was the product of a state legislature's appropriation of state 
revenue?137 
134. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124. 
135. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 127. 
136. The conclusion was not necessary, but it was implied by the Court's earlier holding 
that, by taxing the income of federal officers, the state governments violated the federal 
government's tax immunity. See Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
135 (1842). 
137. Marshall himself had attempted to distinguish federal from state tax immunity by 
observing that the state governments and people were all represented in Congress, whereas 
the national government and people were not represented in the legislature of the trucing 
state. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819). Marshall implied 
that this difference in representation gave the Court better reason to believe that Congress 
would not abuse its authority to tax state institutions. Justice Bradley repeated the argument, 
see Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 128-29 (Bradley, J., dissenting), but it is notably unpersuasive: 
even Marshall did not rest on the argument but instead stated that "if the full application of 
this argument [equating state and federal tax immunity] could be admitted, it might bring 
into question the right of Congress to tax the State banks, and could not prove the right of 
the States to tax the Bank of the United States," McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. The 
problem with the argument is that, if each state's representation in Congress sufficiently pro­
tects it from federal taxation, then it is difficult to see why such representation does not also 
adequately protect the states from the taxes of sister states. After all, if a state legislature 
were to tax some federal agency abusively, the other states' congressional delegations could 
use their power in Congress to bestow express tax immunity on the federal agency, preempt 
the state tax, and thereby end the abuse. That is, if federalism were adequately protected 
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The difficulty with Collector v. Day was not logical but empiri­
cal. Day's deductions from the premises of McCulloch and 
Ableman was unpersuasive because those premises were unpersua­
sive. In particular, it had never been the case that the federal and 
state governments operated in "separate and distinct spheres" pur­
suing independent and distinct objects with distinct resources. The 
federal government, for example, had bankrolled state govern­
ments from the outset of the republic by assuming state Revolution­
ary War debt, an action that subsidized state operations until the 
end of the eighteenth century.138 The state governments had subsi­
dized federal operations by, for example, subscribing to shares of 
the national bank, and the national government had subsidized 
state banks by making them federal depositories after 1836.139 By 
1870, when Day was decided, the rudiments of the system of inter­
governmental aid had been in place for almost a decade: the Mor­
rill Act, enacted in 1862, had provided the state governments with 
Western land to subsidize state educational policy.140 
This is not to say that a full-blown system of intergovernmental 
relations existed before the twentieth century.141 But the theory of 
federalism implied by McCulloch, Martin, Gibbons, Prigg, and 
Ableman - the nationalistic notion that the federal government 
should deeply distrust the states and should not rely on state offi­
cials to carry out federal duties - had never really reflected the 
nation's practice. Indeed, given that the state and national govern­
ments governed almost the same population and territory with the 
same tax base and pursued overlapping regulatory purposes, inter­
governmental separation of the sort assumed by McCulloch and 
Day was utterly impractical.142 
through the national political process, then a fortiori nationalism would also be adequately 
protected through the same political process. 
138. See WILLIAM J. SCHULTZE & M.R. CAINE, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF nm 
UNITED STATES 117-18 (1937). For an account of the politics of assumption, see STANLEY 
ELKINS & Eruc McKrnuCK, THE AGE oF FEDERALISM 146-161 (1993). 
139. See DANIEL ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 89-99 (1961). 
140. See AR'IHUR MAcMAHoN, ADMINISTERING FEDERALISM IN A DEMOCRACY 72 
(1972). 
141. See Harry Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. Tor.. L. REv. 619, 633-34 (1978) (attacking the Elazar thesis 
that federal involvement in state projects and intergovernmental relations were common 
before the Civil War). 
142. Even in Ableman, where Taney had provided the definitive formulation of dual fed· 
eralism and intergovernmental separation, the facts of the case suggested intergovernmental 
dependence: the federal prisoner whose release by a state writ of habeas corpus had been 
overruled by Ableman in the name of federal supremacy and independence had been con­
fined by the federal district judge in a county jail because there was no federal jail in Wiscon· 
sin. See 5 SWISHER, supra note 122, at 661-62. 
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By 1883, the Court acknowledged that the national government 
could delegate at least some regulatory responsibilities to state offi­
cials. In United States v. Jones, 143 the Court held, that Congress 
could delegate to a state board the responsibility for determining 
the amount of compensation owed by the federal government to 
landowners who suffered flooding from federal government-owned 
dams. The Court did not formally reject Story's nondelegation doc­
trine; to the contrary, the Court formally declared that the national 
government's "power of appropriating private property . . .  cannot 
be transferred to a State any more than its other sovereign attrib­
utes."144 The Court could hardly deny, however, that Congress re­
peatedly had delegated administrative duties to state courts and 
officials since the founding. So the Court instead reconciled the 
practical reality of intergovernmental relations with the formal 
nondelegation doctrine by stipulating without explanation that the 
power to ascertain compensation owed was not a "sovereign" func­
tion and, therefore, could be delegated to a state's administrative 
agency.145 
Even this formalistic acknowledgment of Story's nondelegation 
theory was soon exploded completely by the development of coop­
erative federalism during and after the New Deal. There is no need 
to rehash the broad range of federal programs that. are adminis­
tered by state officials in areas ranging from environmental protec­
tion and worker safety to unemployment insurance and historic 
preservation. In light of this reality, described in section II.A of this 
article, the Court has thoroughly repudiated the notion that the fed­
eral government should not rely on state officials to carry out fed­
eral responsibilities. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 146 for 
example, the Court held that Congress could authorize state gov­
ernments to regulate interstate commerce in insurance, even 
though such regulation would not fall within the states' police 
power absent such authorization. In upholding this delegation of 
federal responsibilities to the state governments, the Court emphat-
143. 109 U.S. 513 (1883). 
144. 109 U.S. at 518-19. 
145. See 109 U.S. at 518-19. The Court's distinction between "sovereign" - and there­
fore nondelegable - functions and nonsovereign functions is analogous to the distinction 
drawn by Story between attempts by Congress to bestow federal jurisdiction on state courts 
- which, Story suggests, is prohibited - and the state court's independent power to hear 
federal claims pursu�t to their preexisting jurisdiction conferred by state law, which is gen­
erally permitted ... As Paul Bator has noted, Story's distinction seems "theological." See Paul 
M. Bator, The Constitution as 'Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Ar­
ticle Ill, 65 !ND. LJ. 233, 240-43 (1990). The Jones Court's distinction seems equally cryptic. 
146. 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
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ically rejected Justice Story's notion that state officers should not 
exercise federal responsibilities, stating that Congress has "broad 
authority" to regulate interstate commerce "in conjunction with co­
ordinated action by the states."147 
How does the untenability of nationalistic dual federalism bear 
on the doctrine of state autonomy? Recall that state autonomy 
doctrine first arose in the form of a nondelegation doctrine. Its ear­
liest coherent justification seems to be Justice Story's suggestion 
that the federal government could not demand services from the 
state governments because the national government instead should 
rely on its own officials to carry out federal law. 
The problem with the modem doctrine of state autonomy is 
that, while the premises of such nationalistic dual federalism gener­
ally have been rejected by the Court in other doctrinal areas and 
completely rejected by national political practice, the doctrine of 
state autonomy has never really weaned itself from these origins. 
Some of the precedents, like Collector v. Day, seem to rely on the 
notion that the federal and state governments somehow operate in 
separate and distinct spheres. Others, like Dennison and its lineal 
descendant National League of Cities v. Usery, 14s instead nebu­
lously assert without much in the way of explanation that, by de­
manding services of state governments, the federal government 
somehow endangers the "sovereignty" or existence of state govern­
ments more than when it preempts state law. But no "state auton­
omy" decision provides a convincing reason for why 
commandeering is worse than preemption except by invoking the 
theory of nationalistic dual federalism, a theory that seems inconsis­
tent with well-known facts of intergovernmental relations. 
Printz and New York are no exceptions. Both opinions rely 
heavily on the Federalists' objections to requisitions. But, as ex­
plained in section I.B.1, this history suggests more a nationalist hos­
tility towards state governments than a high regard for state 
autonomy. Both New York and Printz also invoke the notion that 
federal mandates threaten political accountability. But, as noted in 
section I.A, these objections would seem to apply just as well to 
voluntary intergovernmental cooperation, because such "political 
147. 328 U.S. at 434. The Cqurt reinforced this holding 12 years later in United States v. 
Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), when it held that Congress prospectively could adopt 
whatever criminal laws a state legislature might choose to enact in the future as the criminal 
code governing federal enclaves. 
148. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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accountability" arguments imply that federal and state programs 
ought to be separate and distinct. 
Finally, Printz adds a new rationale that suggests a complete re­
turn to the nondelegation doctrine first proposed by Justice Story. 
According to Justice Scalia, by demanding that nonfederal govern­
ments administer federal programs, Congress undermines "the sep­
aration and equilibration of powers between the three branches of 
the Federal Government itself. "149 According to Scalia, when Con­
gress requires state officials to enforce federal laws, Congress 
thereby reduces the power of the President to control the execution 
of the laws. 
But, as Justice Stevens notes, such a defense of Presidential 
power would seem to indict all forms of cooperative federalism, in­
cluding programs rooted in state acceptance of federal grants or 
state submission of implementation plans to avoid federal preemp­
tion.150 After all, every such program of cooperative federalism de­
prives the President of the power to execute the laws just as much 
as congressional "commandeering" of state governments. Justice 
Scalia's only response to this argument is to suggest that it is diffi­
cult for Congress to induce nonfederal governments to implement 
federal law with conditional grants or conditional preemption.151 
This, however, is a non sequitur: it confuses likelihood of success 
with constitutionality of result. Maybe conditional grants are less 
likely to succeed in depriving the president of his Article II powers. 
Nevertheless, when they do succeed, Scalia's logic would suggest 
that they deprive the president of his powers to control the execu­
tion of the laws and, therefore, should be invalidated. Justice 
Scalia's Article II argument is, in short, a revival of Justice Story's 
argument against delegation of federal powers to state officials. As 
Justice Story realized, such an argument works just as well against 
voluntary state implementation of federal law as against involun­
tary implementation. 
II. W"HY COMMANDEERING Is UNNECE S SARY: AN EcoNoMic 
ANALY SI S OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRAN SACTION S 
The justifications for state autonomy, as they exist in judicial 
precedent, are deeply unsatisfying. Does this mean that the doc­
trine itself is misguided? As I argue in the next three Parts, the 
149. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378 (1997). 
150. See 111 S. Ct. at 2396-97 ( Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. See 111 S. Ct. at 2378 n.12. 
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doctrine can be defended on grounds of policy: it serves extremely 
useful functions. Recall the basic nature of the New York entitle­
ment. The entitlement allows nonfederal governments to refuse to 
implement national law even when the national government fully 
funds the mandate. Therefore, as noted above, New York protects 
nonfederal governments' control over their regulatory machinery 
- their administrative agencies, legislative bodies, and other of­
ficers - with a "property rule," an absolute power to "hold out" 
for the highest price that the national government is willing to offer. 
Why might it be worthwhile to give nonfederal governments this 
entitlement? Part II starts from the premise that federalism is a 
useful structural arrangement.152 The- challenge of constitutional 
law, therefore, is not deciding whether to protect federalism, but 
rather deciding how to do so at an acceptably low cost, without en­
croaching on other important values like a free national market or 
protection of important national rights.153 Unlike previous doc­
trines designed to protect state power, the doctrine of state auton­
omy in New York and Printz is useful because it costlessly promotes 
federalism by distributing power to nonfederal governments with­
out impeding any useful national programs. 
Section II.A demonstrates that the New York entitlement pro­
vides nonfederal governments with significant power in a federal 
system, contrary to the widespread academic belief154 that New 
York and Printz are merely formalistic hurdles that provide 
nonfederal governments with little useful power. This section de­
scribes the process by which nonfederal governments can use the 
New York entitlement to extract revenue and policymaking discre­
tion from the federal government when bargaining over a potential 
agreement for nonfederal implementation of federal policy. 
152. For reasons too familiar to bear repetition here, federalism is widely recognized to 
be a useful structural arrangement. For a concise summary of arguments in favor of federal 
regimes, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 1484, 1491-511 {1987). McConnell notes, among other things, that, by devolving 
power to territorially circumscribed states responsive to a local electorate, federal regimes 
allow groups smaller than a national majority to satisfy their preferences for public goods, 
multiply opportunities for political participation, and diffuse power in a way to promote elec­
toral competition. See id. at 1493-94. This catalogue now makes a regular appearance in U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 {1991). For more 
lengthy and detailed arguments on behalf of federalism, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING 
FEDERALISM {1987); VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CON­
STITUTING A SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY 223-48 {1991); ALICE M. RivLIN, REVIVING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, TIIE STATES, & TIIE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT {1992). 
153. See Kramer, supra note 43, at 1511. 
154. For an example of such an attitude, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court 
Overruled National League of Cities, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1623, 1652 (1994) (stating that New 
York does not significantly affect the power of Congress or the states). 
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Section II.B argues that this grant of power to state and local 
governments is essentially costless, because the national govern­
ment easily can use its spending power to reclaim the power 
granted to nonfederal governments: the federal government can 
purchase such services whenever it is cost-justified for nonfederal 
governments to assist the national government. As section II.B ex­
plains, intergovernmental bargains are not likely to be plagued by 
transaction costs such as "holdout" problems or other sorts of stra­
tegic behavior that would prevent such intergovernmental 
transactions. 
The ease with which the national government can purchase the 
entitlement protected by New York and Printz distinguishes those 
cases from past judicial efforts to protect federalism - for example, 
the doctrine of United States v. E. C. Knight Co.155 holding that state 
governments have exclusive powers to regulate manufacturing. 
Whatever the value of those past doctrines to the promotion of fed­
eralism, such doctrines seriously impeded important interests in na­
tional supremacy that simply could not be vindicated through 
voluntary intergovernmental transactions. By contrast, the national 
government has no need to commandeer state or local govern­
ments' regulatory processes, because Congress easily can purchase 
those processes through its spending powers supplemented with its 
power of conditional preemption. Commandeering of nonfederal 
governments' regulatory power, therefore, is pointless centraliza­
tion; it sacrifices an important protection of federalism for no useful 
purpose. 
In this respect, New York is similar to any rule forbidding point­
less confiscation or condemnation of private property.156 One argu­
ment for (sometimes) protecting private owners' control of assets 
with a "property rule" - an injunction rather than an entitlement 
to just compensation - is that transaction costs are sometimes so 
low that the government can purchase private assets through volun­
tary exchange rather than through forced sales.157 The government 
simply does not need eminent domain or the power of confiscation 
155. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
156. One such rule is the doctrine - still sometimes enforced by state courts - that 
governments may not condemn private property without a "public purpose." For a rare ex­
ample of a court actually imposing such a limit on government's eminent domain power, see 
City of Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993), where the court 
struck down a city's condemnation of an easement for a cable on the grounds that the con­
demnation lacked "public purpose." 
157. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 61 
(1986). 
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to obtain computers, ' pencils, squad cars, or any other items for 
which there is a competitive market; if it wants them, then it can 
simply buy them like anyone else. We expect government to do so, 
because, ceteris paribus, we wish to promote private autonomy, and 
this method of promoting private autonomy is essentially costless. 
Likewise, Part II argues that, if the federal government wants 
state or local governments' regulatory services, then they should 
buy them through voluntary sales. The federal government has no 
more need to commandeer state regulatory processes than it has a 
need to confiscate office supplies or conscript janitors. If one ac­
cepts even a weak presumption in favor of federal regimes and their 
implication of state power, then New York and Printz make emi­
nent functional sense. 
A. An Overview of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Is Valuable to State and Local Governments 
In understanding how New York provides a valuable entitle­
ment to state and local governments, the essential point to remem­
ber is that New York does not merely give the states something to 
use but, just as important, something to sell. The value of the New 
York entitlement, in other words, must be measured not simply by 
what the states can do with it but also by what they can get for it. 
How can the states sell their New York entitlement? Such sales 
occur routinely in the broad category of legislation first described 
by Morton Grodzins as "marble-cake federalism."158 In all such 
legislation, Congress purchases the use of state regulatory machin­
ery to implement federal law. The two mechanisms by which such 
purchases occur are described in New York itself - conditional 
grants and conditional preemption. 
1. The System of Conditional Grants 
Barrels of ink have been spilled describing the multitude of con­
ditional grant systems, their probable effect on state behavior, the 
nature and need for federal oversight, and the character of the fed­
eral "strings."159 The following brief summary, however, suffices to 
158. See MoRTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEw VIEW OF GOVERNMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966). 
159. See, e.g., James L. Barr & Otto A. Davis, An Elementary Political and Economic 
Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments, 33 S. EcoN. J. 149 (1966); Edward M. 
Gramlich, Alternative Federal Policies for Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Com­
parison of Their Effects, 21 NATL. TAX J. 119 (1968); E.M. Gramlich, The Effects of Federal 
Grants on State-Local Expenditures: A Review of the Econometric Literature, in PROCEED· 
INGS OF THE 62D ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 569 (1969). 
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explain how states sell their New York immunity by accepting con­
ditional grants. 
Conditional grants are exercises of Congress's spending power 
as it has been understood since Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.16o 
Congress provides funds to the states on the condition that the state 
spend the funds in accordance with federal priorities. As a general 
matter, such conditional grants involve a two-step process. The first 
step concerns the original design of the grant: Congress enacts leg­
islation defining the purposes of the grant, establishing the criteria 
for getting the money, any matching requirements, and so on. Dur­
ing this stage, nonfederal government entities161 and their various 
intergovernmental lobbying organizations may press for federal 
money with little or no conditions on how the funds are spent. 
State and local governments accomplish this end by asking for 
either (1) (relatively) unconditional grants - for example, so-called 
block grants and general revenue sharing - or (2) grants with con­
ditions that, as a practical matter, are already consistent with the 
states' own spending priorities - for example, so-called "develop­
mental programs" that promote the states' economic welfare and 
do not redistribute wealth.162 Against such state and local lobbying 
efforts, various organizations - sometimes private nonprofit 
groups such as the NAACP, the Lawyers Committee for Civil 
Rights, and the Children's Defense Fund,163 but sometimes rival 
state and local government agencies164 - urge more careful restric-
160. 301 U.S. 548, 590-91 (1937). The widespread use of such grants actually precedes the 
New Deal. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); WALKER, supra note 2, at 
76-91. 
161. It is important to avoid treating the state governments as unitary "black boxes" by 
assuming that the grants provided by the federal government to nonfederal levels of govern­
ment benefit the "states" without distinguishing between the subdivisions of the states -
school districts, municipalities, counties, and so on - or branches of the state government -
for example, the governors' office, state departments of transportation, and state legislatures 
- to which such funds might actually be directed. Of course, at least since the New Deal and 
perhaps as long ago as the early 19th century, the Federal Government also has provided 
assistance directly to local governments within the states, often against the wishes of the state 
governments that are, at least nominally, the creators of the localities receiving the funds. 
Congress also might provide funds to the "state" that are spent by the governor without 
being appropriated by the legislature. These intragovemmental controversies are an impor­
tant part of the intergovernmental lobbying process and are discussed infra section II.B. 
162. For a general theoretical account of the differences between categorical and block 
grants, see PETERSON, supra note 32, at 23-37. For an argument that the practical distinction 
between categorical and block grants can be largely illusory, see PETERSON ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 22-23. 
163. For a description of such lobbying by private interest groups, see PETERSON ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 137-38. 
164. For descriptions of specific instances in which one level or department of state gov­
ernment struggled against another for control over federal funds, see CoNLAN, supra note 2, 
at 37-38 (describing the efforts of state departments of transportation to prevent the Nixon 
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tions to prevent states from diverting federal funds to nonfederal 
purposes. 
In response to such pressures, Congress may impose various 
substantive conditions on both the federal grant money and preex­
isting state funds165 to ensure the federal grant is spent for specified 
classes of beneficiaries or specified federal purposes. Congress may 
also demand that state agencies responsible for spending the fed­
eral revenue comply with various structural or procedural require­
ments such as "public participation" requirements,166 "single 
agency" requirements,167 and merit selection of state personnel.168 
In the second stage, individual states decide whether to accept 
the conditions and apply for the funds. This second stage provides 
a second opportunity for one-on-one bargaining between state and 
administration from creating a transportation block grant program that would effectively 
transfer power over federal funds from departments to state governors); DONALD H. 
HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND IN· 
TERGOVERNMENTAL LoBBYING 98-113 {1974) {describing the rivalry between governors and 
mayors for control of federal funds). 
165. Congress may, for example, impose a "nonsupplanting" or "maintenance of effort" 
condition on federal funds, requiring state governments to provide assurances that funds pro· 
vided to the State will be used only to supplement, and not to supplant, the amount of fed· 
eral, state, and local funds otherwise expended for the federal purpose in the State. See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a{C) {1988) (enacting a "maintenance of effort" provision for the Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988). Such requirements bar states from reducing preexisting 
state spending on programs that serve purposes similar to programs funded by the federal 
grant in order to ensure that federal dollars are not effectively converted from federal to state 
purposes. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 79. 
166. For examples of public participation requirements, see JoHN C. DONOVAN, THB 
PoLmcs oF POVERTY 35 {2d ed. 1973); SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SocIETY's PooR LAW: 
A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY 63-64 {1969). For more recent provisions requiring that 
state law allow consumers of federally funded services to participate in decisionmaking re· 
garding such services, see the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(7) {1994) (requiring that states assure that the school district consult with parents of 
children with disabilities concerning the student's individual education plan); Tice v. 
Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200 {4th Cir. 1990). 
167. "Single agency" requirements essentially force state governments to delegate re­
sponsibility for administer,ing a federally funded program to a single state agency that special­
izes in the program. Such requirements tend to strengthen the position of unelected state 
civil servants who specialize in the particular federally funded service. See, e.g., Charles L. 
Schultze, Federal Spending: Past, Present, and Future, in SETTING NATIONAL Pruoru11BS: 
THE NEXT TEN YEARS 323 (Henry Owen & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1976). Such ostensibly 
state bureaucracies can have a greater degree of loyalty to federal program goals than elected 
state officials. See liARoLD SEIDMAN, PoLmcs, PosmoN, AND PoWER: THE DYNAMICS oF 
FEDERAL ORGANIZATION 174-190 (3d ed. 1980). Not surprisingly, state elected officials dis· 
like the intrusion on their discretion. Governor Mark Hatfield, for example, fought unsuc­
cessfully against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1961 to avoid the 
"single agency" requirement. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 128. 
168. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(4) (1986). 
For implementing regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3(g), (h) (1989) (requiring state programs 
to hire "qualified personnel"). 
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local officials and the national government.169 Even if the grant 
system consists of "formula grants" with specifically defined criteria 
for eligibility,110 the states and localities can bargain with the na­
tional government over how stringently the national government 
will enforce the conditions ostensibly attached to the national 
funds. State and local officials may induce individual members of 
Congress to pressure federal agencies to relax their oversight of 
state and local expenditures of nonsource revenue.171 If the pro­
gram consists of "project" or other nonformula grants based on 
general criteria providing federal administrators with significant 
discretion to deny or approve applications for federal money, then 
an even greater opportunity for intergovernmental lobbying exists. 
At this stage of the process, states and localities lobby federal ad­
ministrators for funds through various degrees of "grantsmanship." 
Again, members of Congress predictably intervene in the applica­
tion process on behalf of state · and local officials from their 
constituencies. 
Conditional grants-in-aid, therefore, resemble fee-for-service 
contracts under which the national government provides nonsource 
revenue resembling "fees" in return for state-provided services. 
Assuming that the state and local governments possess the New 
York entitlement, each nonfederal government can independently 
decide whether to proffer the requested services for the tendered 
"price." In this sense, conditional grants-in-aid do not differ in kind 
from other methods by which the national government purchases 
goods and services from private persons. By accepting the money, 
the public or private contractor signals that the costs of performing 
the service are less than the revenue provided by the grant. 
Before I discuss conditional preemption, the second method by 
which the national government obtains state and local governmen-
169. See RoBERT D. PurnAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WoRK: Civic TRADmoNs IN 
MODERN ITALY 22-23 {1993) {distinguishing between intergovernmental relations based on 
"all-on-one," in which all regions lobby for more autonomy against the central government, 
versus "one-on-one," in which a single region seeks greater autonomy from the central gov­
ernment, and finding that the former was more effective than the latter). 
170. In this category, one can place various tax expenditures that benefit the states. For 
example, the federal fax code allows taxpayers to deduct state and local property and income 
taxes to reduce their adjusted gross income on the federal tax returns. See WRIGHT, supra 
note 1, at 143. By reducing residents' federal tax liability in proportion to their state and 
local tax liability, these deductions reduce residents' opposition to state and local taxation. 
There is, however, great uncertainty about how much such deductions actually increase state 
and local revenues. See 1 OFFICE OF STATE AND LocAL FIN., U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
FEDERAL-STATE-LoCAL FISCAL RELATIONS: TECHNICAL PAPERS 313-552 {1986). 
171. See, e.g., John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 19 AM.. PoL. Sa. 
REv. 994, 1008-11 (1985). 
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tal services, I must digress and analyze one objection to the analogy 
between conditional grants-in-aid and other contracts. According 
to one line of reasoning, every offer made by Congress is an offer 
that the states cannot refuse. If Congress offers a grant-in-aid 
earmarked for particular purposes and with matching conditions, 
then the states will be compelled, as a matter of practical political 
necessity, to accept the money - for which the state's residents are 
already paying federal taxes - and accept Congress's conditions 
that follow the grant.112 
What justifies this dim view of states' ability to decline federal 
money? The intuitive reason seems to be that state governments 
rarely do decline federal grants, even when the conditions attached 
to the funds seem onerous. But this is hardly compelling evidence 
that the conditions attached to grants are coercive; state and local 
willingness to sell services might mean only that Congress has made 
a correct estimate of the nonfederal governments' opportunity costs 
of providing the requested services. After all, Congress designs the 
grant package with input from nonfederal governments and their 
organizations, such as the National League of Cities and the Na­
tional Governors' Association. Therefore, it should not be surpris­
ing that, when Congress actually offers the grant, nonfederal 
governments accept it. One might as well argue that one coerces 
storeowners by buying their products because, when one presents 
the requested price for a product, the sales clerk invariably hands 
over the product.173 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that, when state governments face 
special opportunity costs in complying with the conditions attached 
to federal grants, they are willing to forgo the federal funds. So, for 
example, Arizona initially opted out of the Medicaid system by de­
clining funds available under the Social Security Act on the ground 
172. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1911, 1935-39 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: 
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1989 SuP. Cr. REv. 85, 100-01; William Van Alstyne, "Thirty 
Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of 
State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 303 passim (1993). 
173. As Martha Derthick notes, "the acceptance of grants would not be so prompt and 
widespread if the conditions accompanying them were very costly and were known to be 
strictly enforced." MARTHA DERnncK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS 196 (1970). 
This is not to say that all nonfederal governments benefit equally from such grants. To the 
contrary, any nonfederal governments that already provide the federally requested service to 
their constituents will receive the grant and incur zero opportunity costs; such governments 
will obtain pure rents from the grant. Indeed, one would expect governments that provide 
services to their constituents to urge the national government to provide grants to cover the 
cost of the service simply as a way of getting a cross-subsidy for the service from taxpayers 
residing in other states. Such rent-seeking behavior is not commendable, but it is hard to see 
why it is "coercive" in any meaningful sense of the word. 
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that the burden of providing services for its Native -American popu­
lation exceeded the value of the grant.174 Likewise, more than half 
of all states have declined funds available under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970,175 despite the fact that such funds 
cover ninety percent of the cost of devising the state OSHA imple­
mentation plan and fifty percent of the cost of the actual implemen­
tation.176 Moreover, Congress is acutely conscious of the danger 
that nonfederal governments may decline federal funds in order to 
avoid what they regard as onerous conditions. For example, in con­
gressional hearings concerning regulatory barriers to affordable 
housing, both witnesses and members of Congress have expressed 
skepticism that threats to withdraw federal funds provided by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development would induce 
suburban communities to discontinue exclusionary zoning prac­
tices.177 Such skepticism might be justified: communities have 
been known to decline federal funds as a way of escaping obliga­
tions to provide access or services to nonresidents.178 
174. See Hearings Before ACIR on Intergovernmental Problems in Medicaid 26 (San 
Francisco, Sept. 16, 1968) (statement of Charles H. Shreve, Director, Region IX, U.S. Dept. 
of Health, Education, and Welfare); Arizona State Medicaid Chart, 3 Medicare & Medicaid 
Guide (CCH) 'JI 15,554 (1997); Introduction to Medicaid, 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide 
(CCH) 'l! 14,010 (1996). The Colorado legislature threatened to follow Arizona's example in 
1992 when it voted to withdraw from the Medicaid system in response to the cost of federal 
conditions on Medicaid money. Only a veto by Governor Romer prevented such withdrawal. 
See Eric Anderson, Quayle Opposes Bird Medicaid Plan: Proposal to Opt Out of System 
Called Unwise, DENY. Posr, Feb. 20, 1992, at 5B. 
175. See State Activity, 1 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 'll'll 5300-5840 (1996). 
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 672(f)-(g) (1985); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1950-51 (1994). 
177. Economist William FJSchel testified that "[t]he reward system of giving extra money 
to communities who will take low-income housing is simply apt to be ignored by the subur­
ban communities that are the most restrictive. These communities are simply apt to ignore 
the Federal program entirely." Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and 
Insurance and the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. 
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong. 27 (1990) (statement of William Fischel, 
Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College). Testifying the same day, economist Susan 
Wachter also doubted "that there is very much room for incentives, especially from HUD 
alone," but she suggested that conditions on funds "from other Federal sources" might in­
duce states to prevent exclusionary practices. Id. at 28 (statement of Susan Wachter, Associ­
ate Professor of Fmance, University of Pennsylvania). 
The Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing recommended 
that the federal government discourage such barriers by requiring states to take steps to 
remove the barriers as a condition of enjoying the tax exemption on the interest of mortgage 
revenue bonds for single-family home ownership and the tax credit for interest on Industrial 
development bonds issued to build multifamily housing under the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit program. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDA­
BLE HOUSING, 6-4, 7-1 to 7-11 (1991). 
178. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. RICH, FEDERAL PoLICYMAKING AND THE PooR: NATIONAL 
GOALS, LoCAL CHOICES, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES 233-34 (1993) (describing the 
refusal of suburban communities to apply for community block grant funds in order to avoid 
an obligation to accept low-income housing); ROBERT D. THOMAS & RICHARD W. MuRRAY, 
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Such anecd0tes do not, of course, establish that the federal gov­
ernment ought to be permitted to place onerous conditions on fed­
eral funds. They suggest, however, that overblown statements 
about the "coerciveness" of federal grant conditions require a more 
careful analysis of what is meant by "coercion." There does not 
seem to be any a priori reason to believe that state and local gov­
ernments are any more coerced by such conditions than any other 
federal contractor who is required to provide services in return for 
payment of federal monies. 
Some commentators have made the more theoretically elabo­
rate argument that Congress somehow has monopoly power over 
the tax base of the United States.179 According to this view, the 
federal taxes from which federal grants-in-aid are derived occupy 
the "tax space" available to the states. As federal taxes increasingly 
burden each state's residents, such residents are increasingly unwill­
ing to pay additional state taxes, and the state legislatures find it 
politically prudent to avoid reliance on own-source revenues. In­
stead, the states become more dependent on federal revenues to 
replace their shrinking tax bases. In effect, the federal government 
siphons off the state legislatures' revenue sources through federal 
taxes and converts state tax revenue into federal grant revenue, 
forcing the states to rely on the latter rather than the former. 
The difficulty with this theory is that it is hard in practice to see 
how the federal government has any monopoly over tax revenue. 
State and local governments also have taxing powers and used them 
with surprising effectiveness to replace federal grants-in-aid elimi­
nated by the Reagan administration.180 To be sure, the federal gov-
PROGROWfH POLITICS: CHANGE AND GOVERNANCE IN HOUSTON 284-88 (1991) (describing 
the adamant refusal of Houston to apply for federal funds available for urban renewal or 
subsidized housing prior to the late 1960s); James Bennet, Keeping Its Shores to Itself: Green­
wich Eschews Federal Aid to Repair Recreational Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Bl 
(describing Greenwich, Connecticut's refusal to apply for federal disaster relief to repair 
beaches damaged by a hurricane for fear that conditions on federal money would require 
giving the general public access to the beach). 
179. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 150-57 (1993); Baker, 
supra note 172, at 1935-39. 
180. See Richard P. Nathan & John R. Lago, Intergovernmental ·Fiscal Roles and Rela­
tions, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. AssN. PoL. Soc. SCI. 36 (1990). State revenue-raising devices 
are not limited to taxes. States also make heavy use of user fees, impact fees, special assess­
ments, and other benefits charges, as well as financing devices like revenue bonds and special 
assessment bonds that are linked to such charges. See WruoHT, supra note 1, at 130-32. By 
contrast, the federal government makes much more limited use of these devices. See Clayton 
P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 61 
B.U. L. REv. 795, .797 {1987). For a description of five significant federal systems under 
which taxes linked to infrastructure are dedicated to the infrastructure, see APOGEE RE­
SEARCH, lNc., FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS: OPTIONS TO UsE THE CASH (report prepared for the 
National Council on Public Works Improvement, Sept. 28, 1987). 
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ernment has some taxation advantages: federal taxes, for instance, 
respond more elastically - meaning, more immediately - to in­
creases in wealth than state taxes.181 Against this federal advan­
tage, however, one must consider that state taxes seem to be 
relatively more popular than federal taxes; according to the Ameri­
can Council of Intergovernmental Relations's surveys of public 
opinion, state sales and income taxes consistently are ranked more 
fair by the public than the federal income tax.182 
By contrast, the federal government, burdened by deficits and 
public impatience with additional federal taxes, has discovered 
since at least the 1980s that it is hardly the financial juggernaut 
some have suggested. Far from having a monopoly on any revenue 
source, it cannot offer unlimited bribes to nonfederal governments 
in return for unlimited cooperation.183 While it is true that federal 
taxes make it more politically risky for state legislatures to impose 
additional state taxes upon their constituents, the converse is also 
true; state taxes "crowd out" federal taxes by occupying tax space 
that Congress could otherwise occupy. Whether the voters will 
smite Congress or the state legislatures first for their temerity in 
raising revenue will depend on numerous considerations concerning 
the relative visibility of the taxes, the relative popularity of the pro­
grams financed by the taxes, the general standing of the govern­
ments imposing the taxes, and so on. All of these are complex 
empirical questions about which only one fact is certain: the evi­
dence does not support the conclusion that the states are so depen­
dent on federal revenue that they cannot just say "no" to federal 
grants.184 
181. See Steven D. Gold, The Federal Role in State Fiscal Stress, 22 PuBuus, Su=er 
1992, at 42-46 (explaining the concept of tax elasticity). 
182. See ACIR, CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES at S-15 
(1986); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
183. See PETERSON, supra note 32, at 175-83 (describing the demise of President Clinton's 
public investment programs in the face of congressional skepticism ab9ut further federal de­
velopmental spending). As the national government, led by Ronald Reagan, reduced or 
eliminated federal grants-in-aid, state and local governments redirected their attention away 
from Washington, D.C., which suggests that the national government's influence over the 
nonfederal governments was also being diminished. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM: A Vmw FROM TIIE STATES 252 (3d ed. 1984); RICHARD NATIIAN ET AL., REA­
GAN AND TIIE STATES 14-17 (1987); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 99. 
184. Tue more realistic argument for the position that conditional grants-in-aid are "coer­
cive" stems from the congressional practice of imposing new "cross-cutting" conditions on 
"old" grant money. This practice began during the New Deal but became even more preva­
lent during the 1960s under President Johnson's promotion of "creative federalism." Tue 
practice reached its height, ironically, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, despite 
Reagan's early commitment to a program of New Federalism. Such new conditions come in 
at least two varieties. First, Congress may impose so-called "cross-over" conditions on grant 
money by enacting new legislation that would withdraw future funds provided under some 
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2. The System of Conditional Preemption 
Aside from the use of conditional grants, Congress can also 
"hire" the states to carry out federal programs through the use of 
conditional preemption. Under this system, Congress enacts a gen­
eral regulatory scheme, delegating implementation to the states on 
the condition that the states submit an acceptable implementation 
plan to the federal government. 
· 
As with conditional grants, conditional preemption occurs in 
two stages. In the first stage, Congress creates the general federal 
regulatory scheme, responding to, among other interests, the inter­
governmental lobbying organizations. So, for example, the national 
government may enact a statute providing that, unless the state 
governments submit an acceptable plan for reducing airborne pollu­
tants, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
will promulgate and enforce a purely federal plan that will preempt 
any inconsistent state law. Again, during the legislative process, 
states and localities may lobby to insert clauses preserving state 
common law from preemption, limiting the ability of federal agen­
cies to turn down state implementation plans, or delaying the time 
by which the states must achieve compliance. Such systems of con­
ditional preemption frequently are accompanied by federal grants 
to cover the costs of state implementation of federal law,185 and 
state governments may lobby to ensure that the percentage of sup­
port provided by the federal government is as high as possible. 
There is an opportunity for a second stage of intergovernmental 
lobbying that depends on the specificity of the federal acceptance 
conditions. Conditions that lodge considerable discretion in the 
hands of federal administrators in evaluating state implementation 
specific preexisting grant program - for example, highway funds - if the states did not 
enact some new federally mandated regulation - for example, regulations concerning the 
drinking age. Second, Congress may enact more global "cross-cutting" conditions on all fed­
eral aid, requiring, for example, that the state facilitate public participation for all federally 
funded programs. See U.S. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FED­
ERALLY INDUCED Cosrs AFFECTING STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS, M-193, at 21-22 
(1994). 
To the extent that such "cross-cutting" and "cross-over" conditions impose unanticipated 
obligations on state and local governments, one perhaps can argue that the Congress coerces 
the states with such conditions. Under this "bait-and-switch" model of coercion, Congress 
first "addicts" the states to federal money by getting the state to commit some of its own 
resources to some program that is partially funded by federal dollars and that has few costly 
conditions attached to the federal money. After the state has committed the matching funds 
and becomes politically incapable of discontinuing the program, Congress then adds new 
conditions, that, if apparent from the outset, would have deterred the states from accepting 
the funds in the first place. So put, the argument is analogous to equitable estoppel. 
185. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 672(f)-(g) (1986); 
29 C.F.R. §§ 1950-51 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7544 (1995). 
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plans186 give states another opportunity to "lobby" the federal gov­
ernment by submitting its implementation plan for approval. At 
this stage, each state can work out individually tailored enforce­
ment "deals" with the agency within whatever parameters have 
been set by Congress - sometimes with the aid of their congres­
sional delegation.187 Of course, individual states can always refuse 
to submit any plan - and they do, when the combination of discre­
tion and federal funds provided for implementation is insuffi­
cient.188 To summarize, programs for conditional preemption 
resemble programs for project grants; rather than presenting every 
state with the same package of conditions and benefits, Congress 
establishes a set of criteria that each state might be able to meet in a 
different manner by individually applying to a Federal agency for 
approval of its implementation plan. 
If conditional grants-in-aid can be analogized to fee-for-service 
contracts, conditional preemption can be analogized to the various 
conditional duties that the federal government frequently imposes 
on private enterprises. So, for example, when the national govern­
ment requires private employers to pay a minimum wage,189 take 
precautions to protect consumer safety,19o finance unemployment 
insurance,191 give notice to workers about pending layoffs,192 or 
bargain in good faith with employees organized in a certified bar­
gaining unit,193 the national government effectively "preempts" 
business activities that are not consistent with national standards. 
Likewise, when the national government conditionally preempts 
186. See, e.g., John C. Gray, Jr. & Jane Greengold Stevens, The Law and Politics of the 
Enforcement of Federal Standards for the Administration of Unemployment Insurance Hear­
ings, 29 U. Mrca. J.L. REFORM 509, 512-16 (1995) (discussing political constraints on the 
strict enforcement of unemployment insurance standards). The Environmental Protection 
Agency's implementation of the Clean Air Act is a salient example of an administrative 
agency taking advantage of such discretion. See Gary Lee, Compromising on Clean Air Act: 
Under Republican Pressure, EPA Reduces Enforcement Efforts, WASH. Pos-r, Feb. 21, 1996, 
at Al (quoting Administrator Browner's statement that "[b]y giving the states flexibility in 
enforcing the law, we hope to avoid a congressional fight over the act"). 
187. So, for example, the State of Michigan has authority delegated by the Army Corps 
of Engineers to enforce federal regulations concerning wetlands. See Mary Goodenough, 
Public Participation in a State-Assumed Wetlands Permit Program: The Michigan Example, 
10 J. ENVTL. L. & LmG. 221, 222 (1995). 
188. So, for example, over half of all states have not submitted any plan for the imple­
mentation of OSHA workplace safety standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1952 (1997); Current Status 
of State Approved Plans, 1 Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 'l['l[ 5003-5840 (1996). 
189. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). 
190. See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2054-2055 (1994). 
191. See Subchapter III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1994). 
192. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994). 
193. See National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). 
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state laws regulating worker safety, the national government de­
mands that the state governments must either regulate worker 
safety according to federal standards or "get out of the business" of 
safety regulation, leaving the field to the federal government. In 
either case, the national government presents the public or private 
entity with a choice of ceasing to engage in some activity or follow­
ing federally specified standards in the performance of the activity. 
Like conditional grants-in-aid, conditional preemption has been 
criticized as a "coercive" infringement on state autonomy.194 As 
with conditional grants, however, it is not obvious what is meant by 
"coercion" or why such coercion is especially threatening to state 
governments. With conditional grants, Congress is constrained by 
its limited fiscal capacity. With conditional preemption, Congress is 
constrained by its limited regulatory capacity. Congress cannot ob­
tain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemp­
tion. But preemption is politically costly. Especially where federal 
regulators are inexperienced in some field, they might not be capa­
ble of replacing state law with equally popular federal laws. Fed­
eral inexperience might turn any federally implemented regulatory 
scheme into a political liability for Congress. 
So, for example, state governments' refusals to perform eligibil­
ity reviews of disabled persons under the Social Security Act in 
1982-1983 helped to cripple the Social Security Administration's ef­
forts to perform such eligibility reviews. The Social Security Ad­
ministration simply lacked the trained personnel and experience to 
"federalize" this function on such short notice.195 Likewise, the na­
tional government could make no credible threat after New York 
that it would replace state siting systems for low-level radioactive 
waste with some system of federal sites, because Congress lacked 
the institutional will and constituent trust necessary for such a fed­
eralization of siting law.196 Similar considerations prevented the 
194. See, e.g., THE NATIONAUZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT (Jerome J. Hanus ed., 
1981). 
195. See MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESs: THE SocIAL SECURITY ADMIN­
ISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 37-46 (1990). 
196. Anecdotal evidence suggests that congressional not-in-my-backyard sentiment de­
feated post-New York attempts to create a purely federal system of low-level radioactive 
waste site selection. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1996, H.R. 3394, 104th 
Cong. (1996), was defeated in part because Senator Barbara Boxer feared that the Act would 
result in approval of the Ward Valley site for waste in California. See 142 CoNG. REc. E718-
03 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lewis) (denouncing the "emotional demagogu­
ery of California's junior Senator" in opposing the Act). Aside from Congress's institutional 
incapacity to take on such a controversial question, the federal government's poor track rec­
ord of building up public trust in federal siting activities when dealing with high-level radio­
active waste might have blocked any comprehensive federal scheme. See WRIGHT, supra 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from implementing its 
own transportation plan when California officials refused to pro­
mulgate a state implementation plan within the deadline set by the 
Clean Air Act. As EPA officials noted, the federal agency lacked 
the personnel and experience necessary to regulate the driving hab­
its of millions of commuters in Southern California.191 
This inability to federalize regulatory fields at will is consistent 
with conventional political theory about the relative capacity of dif­
ferent levels of government to regulate. According to one promi­
nent theory, lower levels of government serving smaller numbers of 
constituents have a comparative advantage in delivery of labor­
intensive services, while higher-level governments with greater cap­
ital resources have a comparative advantage in delivering capital­
intensive services where there are significant economies of scale.198 
. So, for example, some commentators have argued that metropoli­
tan governments are better equipped than small municipalities to 
provide capital-intensive services like light rail, sewage systems, and 
expensive forensic labs, while smaller municipalities are better 
suited to provide labor-intensive services like basic police patrols, 
zoning hearings, and building inspections.199 Analogous reasoning 
suggests that the federal government is well-equipped to provide 
capital-intensive services like the construction of deep salt-lined 
storage facilities for high-level nuclear waste,200 but is likely to be 
note 1, at 378-82. While the federal government has exclusive responsibility for such waste, it 
has managed simultaneously to fail at providing viable sites while also generating public dis­
trust about the fairness or competence of its siting procedures. See EARNING PUBLIC TRUST 
AND CoNFIDENCE: REomsITES FOR MANAGING RADIOACTIVE WASTES (Fmal Report of the 
Secy. of Energy's Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management Nov. 1993) (noting the 
widespread lack of public trust in the Department of Energy's radioactive waste management 
policies). 
197. See JAMES E. KruER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE EssAY 
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-
1975, at 233 (1977). As one EPA administrator noted, the Ninth Circuit decision in Brown v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), barring the EPA from forcing 
California officials to promulgate an implementation plan "may virtually paralyze our pres­
ent efforts to reduce auto pollution in metropolitan areas." KruER & URSIN, supra, at 233. 
As one commentator has noted, state governments' "option to do nothing" gives them "con­
siderable political leverage because most environmental programs are complex and require a 
skilled staff to administer. Thus, as a practical matter, the federal government has few op­
tions as attractive as delegating operational responsibility to the states." Arnold W. Reitze, 
Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 
PAC. LJ. 1461, 1463 (1996). 
198. See VINCENT OSTROM ET AL., LocAL GOVERNMENT IN TIIB UNITED STATES 97-99 
(1988). 
199. See id. at 113-37. 
200. See Dauiel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 
613 (1996) (arguing that the federal government may be better equipped than the states to 
develop technological standards for environmental regulation). 
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inept at conducting labor-intensive services like the management of 
public hearings to minimize public opposition to waste sites.201 If 
different levels of government have different comparative advan­
tages, then one would expect that the federal government would be 
less capable of credibly threatening to preempt fields where the 
states enjoy the greatest advantage. The political costs of likely fed­
eral bumbling would simply be too high for members of Congress 
to bear. 
In sum, there are practical limits on Congress's ability to tax and 
to regulate, and these limits also necessarily place limits on Con­
gress's ability to obtain state and local regulatory services with con­
ditional grants and conditional preemption. In either case, the 
nonfederal government's threat to decline the money or accept pre­
emption of nonfederal activities places an important constraint on 
the national government's power over state and local governments. 
In this respect, nonfederal governments are exactly like private 
firms. Private contractors refuse to provide services for the na­
tional government when the price offered for such services is too 
low, and private investors reduce their investment in regulated in­
dustries - by allowing the government to "preempt" their eco­
nomic activities - when the regulatory conditions, analogous to 
"mandates," imposed on such activities become too expensive.202 
Such private capacity to abstain from action forms an important 
constraint on governmental regulation of private enterprises. Con­
sider, for example, legislators' fear that raising the minimum wage 
would cause businesses to reduce their economic activities by laying 
off or refusing to hire workers. One can view laws like the Fair 
Labor Standards Act203 as a sort of "conditional preemption" of 
economic activity, the effectiveness of which will vary with the pri­
vate persons' interest in pursuing the activity - what one might call 
the cost-elasticity of supply. 
201. For a detailed examination of the relative effectiveness of siting procedures used by 
Minnesota, Massachusetts, Manitoba, Alberta, and other jurisdictions, see BARRY G. RAnE, 
BEYOND NIMBY: HAzARnous WAi::ra SITING IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
(1994). Rabe concludes that "command-and-control" preemption systems of siting are rela­
tively ineffective at actually siting waste, whereas more labor-intensive systems of early par­
ticipation by the residents of the site area are more effective. See id. at 44-57. 
202. William A. FISchel notes that the willingness of private investors to exit a regulated 
industry forms a powerful constraint on governmental regulation. He offers the additional 
insight that if exit is difficult and investment is cost-inelastic, then heightened judicial scrutiny 
may be appropriate. See William FISchel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More 
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 865, 887-94 (1991). Fischel 
explores this thesis more generally in WILUAM A. F1sCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, 
EcoNoMics, AND PoLITics 135-36, 301-02 (1995). 
203. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 (1994). 
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Conditional grants to private persons and conditional preemp­
tion of private activities, in short, hardly give the federal govern­
ment unlimited power over private enterprises. Likewise, one 
should not expect that such grants or preemption would give the 
national government unlimited power over nonfederal govern­
ments. In either case, the ability of the private or public organiza­
tion to exercise the New York entitlement - that is, abstain from 
action - imposes an important constraint on the ability of the na­
tional government to obtain their services. 
B. Why State Autonomy Permits All Cost-Justified 
Intergovernmental Bargains 
So far, this article has argued that, far from being a formalistic 
hurdle, the New York entitlement could prove to be a valuable enti­
tlement to the states. The measure of its value will be the measure 
of Congress's need for the states' cooperation, for such need will 
determine the amount that Congress will be prepared to pay for the 
purchase of the New York entitlement. But the question remains 
whether such an entitlement is harmful to the nation. How can we 
be sure that such promotion of federalism is not purchased at too 
great a sacrifice of other important values or interests? 
In this Part of the article, I explain that the New York entitle­
ment costlessly protects federalism, because the national govern­
ment can purchase such an entitlement from nonfederal 
governments whenever intergovernmental cooperation is cost­
justified. Section II.B.1 argues that New York and Printz will inter­
fere with no co�t-justified form of cooperative federalism assuming 
that (1) state and national elected officials faithfully represent their 
constituents' preferences and (2) no significant transaction costs af­
fect intergovernmental bargaining. In section IT.B.2, I relax the as­
sumption of no "transaction costs" and consider whether there 
might be "hold-out" problems that could prevent cost-justified in­
tergovernmental arrangements. Section IT.B.2 concludes that few 
transaction costs impede intergovernmental transactions. There­
fore, if the national government's need for nonfederal govern­
ments' services exceeds the nonfederal governments' interest in 
autonomy, then the national government can purchase nonfederal 
governments' services. In section IT.B.3, I relax the assumption of 
no "agency costs" and briefly consider whether "agency costs" 
might interfere with cost-justified intergovernmental arrangements. 
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1 .  The Effects of.State Autonomy Assuming No Agency Costs or 
Transaction Costs 
For the purpose of initially explaining the effect of New York on 
the incentives of the federal and state governments to cooperate, I 
start with two simplifying assumptions that I will later relax. First, I 
assume that there are no significant agency costs affecting the rela­
tionship between state and federal elected officials and their respec­
tive constituencies. That is, I assume that elected officials generally 
vote in order to maximize the satisfaction of their constituents' 
preferences. Second, I assume that there are no transaction costs 
impeding state-federal bargains. That is, I assume that (1) it is rela­
tively inexpensive for the state and local governments to negotiate 
with the national government, using the various institutions of in­
tergovernmental lobbying, and (2) problems of strategic behavior 
such as "hold-out" resulting from bilateral monopoly do not im­
pede bargains. 
With these assumptions in mind, what is the effect of the New 
York entitlement? New York permits Congress to use the states to 
implement federal law only when Congress purchases the services 
of the states in the marketplace of intergovernmental relations. If 
Congress is willing to pay the price - in federal money or imple­
menting discretion - demanded by each state, then Congress can 
use each state's regulatory machinery to implement federal law; if 
not, then Congress must rely on purely federal methods of 
implementation. 
Under these circumstances, the New York entitlement ought not 
interfere with any cost-justified scheme of intergovernmental coop­
eration. As with any other property entitlement, unless there are 
significant transaction costs, the New York entitlement will be 
transferred to the level of government that values it the most. If 
Congress is willing to pay what the states demand, then Congress 
can acquire the states' implementation of federal law in the market­
place of intergovernmental deals. By contrast, if Congress is not 
willing to meet the market price demanded by the states for their 
regulatory machinery, then use of the states to implement federal 
law is probably inefficient, and federal law would be implemented 
more cheaply by purely federal means. 
Why should one equate the respective reservation prices of poli­
ticians sitting in Congress and state legislatures with the true value 
of cooperative federalism? The answer is based on the assumption 
of no agency costs. Under this assumption, each legislator would 
wish to take responsibility for implementing a program only if (1) 
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the legislator's constituency favors the goal of the program and (2) 
the officials implementing the program are capable of effectively 
implementing those goals. To the extent that legislators believe 
that they are well-equipped to "sell" the program to their constitu­
ents and that their level of government will be relatively effective at 
implementing the program, legislators will be more eager to take 
responsibility for the program.204 
An example illustrates the principle. Suppose that Congress is 
considering the possibility of using the state governments to site 
low-level radioactive waste. Assume what is probably true - that 
the federal government enjoys certain economies of scale in setting 
technological standards for siting waste,2°5 indicating that the fiscal 
costs of siting such waste are relatively lower for the federal govern­
ment than the state governments. 
But nonfiscal costs - that is, the likely private resentment that 
the governmental decision would generate - might be higher for 
the federal government. As suggested above, smaller-scale govern­
ments systematically may be better than larger-scale governments 
at managing nonfiscal costs like community resentment through 
labor-intensive methods such as regular appearances at hearings, 
easy availability to constituents by mail or telephone, and personal 
campaigning in neighborhoods affected by waste.206 If this is true, 
204. It would be a mistake, however, to assert that elected representatives' willingness to 
take responsibility for a regulation is solely a function of the costs of such regulation to their 
constituents. Willingness to impose costly regulations may also depend on the proportion of 
the representative's constituents who are burdened by the program and, therefore, on the 
size of the representative's constituency. One would expect, for example, that members of 
Congress systematically would be more willing to take responsibility for enacting programs 
that imposed costs on geographically discrete groups than state or local legislators with over­
lapping constituencies, because the costs of the program would tend to incite anger from a 
smaller proportion of the federal representatives' constituencies. Thus, the federal govern­
ment, in bargaining with state and local governments, might undervalue costs imposed on 
geographically discrete groups too small to capture a congressional seat. This, of course, is a 
persistent fear in the history of both American federalism and electoral law. See RosEMARIE 
ZAGARRI, THE PoUTics oF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1776-1850 
{1987) {discussing the problems of federalism in the context of large and small state 
controversy). 
205. See Esty, supra note 200, at 603. 
206. On the empirical evidence suggesting the ability of officials elected from smaller 
constituencies to make contact with constituents and generate voter satisfaction, see ROBERT 
A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TuFrE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 73-88 {1973); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., 
PARTICIPATION AND PoLmcAL EQUALITY: A SEVEN-NATION CoMPARISON 269-85 (1978) 
{finding lower rates of political participation in urban than in rural areas); JEFFREY M. 
BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 49 {1993) (describing the relationship 
between neighborhood size and effectiveness of neighborhood self-government). On the ef­
fectiveness of state governments in creating participatory structures addressing the issue of 
waste disposal, see RABE, supra note 201, at 90-106 {describing how early participation of 
citizens reduced neighborhood opposition to Manitoba waste disposal). The evidence sug­
gests that state governments have performed more effectively than the federal government in 
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then one might conclude that the political costs to state politicians 
of state implementation of any siting system might be lower than 
the political costs to federal politicians of a purely federal system. 
If Congress is willing to pay more to avoid the fiscal and nonfis­
cal costs of a federal siting system than it would cost state govern­
ments - in terms of both fiscal and nonfiscal costs - to create a 
state waste-siting system, then conditions exist for an intergovern­
mental deal. Congress could create a grant package to induce the 
states to regulate according to federal standards. 
But note that, if the states' total costs exceeded the federal gov­
ernment's costs - and therefore its willingness to pay to bribe the 
states to create a waste-siting system - then no deal would or 
should take place. There would be no deal because the minimum 
bribe that the state government would accept would be greater than 
the maximum that Congress would offer. There should be no deal 
because, under such circumstances, intergovernmental cooperation 
would be a bad idea; there would be no political or fiscal advantage 
to employing the state governments. In such a case, siting of waste 
would be best served by a purely federal program. 
In reality, there is no easy way to ascertain the popular hostility 
that waste siting would excite against a state versus a federal legisla­
tor, nor is there any easy way to measure the relative efficiencies of 
each level of government. But this is precisely the point: it is hard 
to know when intergovernmental cooperation is a good idea. The 
great advantage of intergovernmental deals is that they excuse third 
parties like judges from the necessity of trying to determine how 
much federal interference with state independence is "too much." 
The state and federal politicians themselves, if they are not irra­
tional, will reveal the relative merits of state and federal implemen­
tation with their offers and demands. Thus, Congress's offer will be 
a function of the fiscal savings and political insulation that state co­
operation provides; as an outside limit, Congress will offer the 
states no more than it would cost Congress to implement the fed­
eral statute through purely federal means. Likewise, the states will 
demand a price that varies directly with the political risk and fiscal 
burden imposed by the law. If a state's minimum reservation price 
exceeds Congress's maximum reservation price, then there will be 
winning public trust in disposal of radioactive waste. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 378-
84. 
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no deal, and Congress will rely on purely federal means to imple­
ment the federal law.201 
In sum, so long as there are no agency or transaction costs, New 
York should not impede any cost-justified system of intergovern­
mental cooperation. To the contrary, New York allows "free-trade 
federalism" to flourish. It allows each level of government to trans­
fer powers to some other level whenever such transfer would mini­
mize the fiscal and political costs of implementing federal programs. 
Unless one can identify some sort of agency cost or transaction cost 
that makes this description of New York's effects unrealistic, it is 
difficult to attack New York on the ground that it would somehow 
interfere with useful systems of cooperative federalism. It may be 
the case that New York might doom some intergovernmental coop­
eration - but only because such systems ought to be doomed; they 
are not cost-justified.2os 
2. The Problem of Holdouts and Other Transaction Costs 
One might respond to such a sanguine defense of New York by 
noting that the market for the services of nonfederal governments is 
a good deal thinner than the market for services of private contrac­
tors. When the national government wants to purchase military ve­
hicles, it can request bids from various private manufacturers who 
will then bid against each other to obtain the contract. Any con­
tractor that attempts to misrepresent its production costs to obtain 
207. One might object that this account improperly treats fiscal and nonfiscal costs as 
equally legitimate, when some nonfiscal costs might seem plainly irrational or selfish. Should 
we really design institutions to cater to such base constituent fears, greed, and aversion? For 
example, neighbors may oppose waste sites simply because they want other communities to 
bear the entire cost of waste disposal and selfishly refuse to accommodate their fair share of 
landfill space. Should our systems of cooperative federalism allow the state or local repre­
sentative of such neighbors to opt out of systems of cooperative federalism simply because he 
is unusually vulnerable to such selfish constituent opposition to landfill sites? 
I argue that they should, if only because even irrational or selfish preferences are capable 
of derailing a regulatory program if they are not managed by politicians capable of - or 
interested in - defusing them. So, for example, siting standards that acknowledge only tech­
nical criteria and ignore likely neighbor reactions tend to founder on the latter, because 
neighbors are extremely effective at using political pressure, litigation, and administrative 
procedures to stall sites contrary to their interest. See RABE, supra note 201, at 44-57 (detail­
ing ways in which neighbors stop landfill sites chosen through systems that give neighbors no 
role in site selection). 
208. This account of intergovernmental relations is similar to the account in Jonathan R. 
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: To­
ward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 16 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990), in that it as­
sumes that political incentives will lead state and local legislators into an equilibrium as they 
exchange money and regulatory discretion. This account differs from Macey's in that my 
account ignores the problem of agency costs, deferring its discussion until section II.B.3, 
infra. 
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a more lucrative contract may soon find itself without any contract 
at all. 
By contrast, the conventional wisdom is that state governments 
do not typically bid against each other to enforce federal law; within 
any given piece of territory, there is often only one state govern­
ment from which to purchase such services. Why, then, should the 
national government trust state government assessments of the cost 
of state implementation? What mechanism guarantees that the in­
tergovernmental lobby will correctly inform Congress of the costs 
of nonfederal implementation? Might state and local governments 
strategically exaggerate the fiscal and political costs of implement­
ing federal law? 
Such strategic behavior might actually prevent some otherwise 
cost-justified system of cooperative federalism. Incessant demands 
for more money by governors and mayors might persuade Congress 
that nonfederal governments are inefficient service providers. At 
the least, Congress may become distrustful of state and local offi­
cials as reliable sources of information about implementation costs, 
and might be deterred from using nonfederal governments when it 
otherwise should. This consequence of strategic behavior casts 
doubt on the argument that New York allows all cost-justified inter­
governmental agreements. 
I believe that these dangers of strategic behavior are overstated. 
My reasoning is that the intergovernmental marketplace is more 
competitive than one might believe. State and local politicians usu­
ally are extremely reluctant to turn down federal money in order to 
avoid grant conditions, because voters are notoriously willing to re­
taliate against politicians who fail to apply for "free" federal 
money.209 But, in order to obtain such funds, state and local politi­
cians do not merely cajole or berate Congress; they also compete 
209. As Nelson Rockefeller observed when he was Governor of New York, "If you don't 
apply for this money, somebody will get up and say 'Why don't you ask for this money? 
Here is this free money in Washington you are not using.' Then it becomes a political issue.'' 
liAIDER, supra note 164, at 97. 
Recent experiences in Virginia and New Hampshire illustrate this tendency. Republicans 
in both states declined Goals 2000 grant money for the reform of public school curricula, 
based in part on objections to federal meddling with education and opposition to such funds 
by religious conservatives. In New Hampshire, after a campaign where this decision became 
a major issue, the Republican candidate, who had been the Chairman of the State Board of 
Education when the funds were declined, was defeated by his Democratic opponent. See 
M.L. Elrick, Shaheen Claims Historic Win, CoNCORD MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al. Repub­
lican Governor Allen of Virginia was not defeated, but he suffered at the polls for his deci­
sion to decline the grant money and eventually reversed it. Indeed, he retaliated against 
Democrats in the state legislature by accusing them of declining federal money for charter 
schools. See Michael Hardy & Jeff E. Schapiro, Allen Successful in His Last Session, RICH· 
MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 1997, at All. 
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against each other, private organizations, and federal agencies for 
authority to implement federal programs. This competition 
presents a substantial obstacle to nonfederal governments' ability 
strategically to misrepresent the costs of implementing federal law. 
In short, the premise that there is merely one nonfederal govern­
ment that can implement federal policy within a single state govern­
ment's jurisdiction is simply false. 
Consider first the various nonfederal governments that compete 
with each other for federal funds. There may be three or four 
nonfederal governments within any given piece of a state's terri­
tory, because most states' territory is distributed among several dif­
ferent types of subdivisions - municipalities, counties, townships, 
school districts, and so on - many of which are legally and practi­
cally capable of administering federal programs. These subdivisions 
aggressively compete with the state government and with each 
other for enforcement responsibility. So, for example, state and 
municipal governments actively competed with each other to imple­
ment the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,210 counties fought 
hard with cities to receive funds under the Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964,211 and state and municipal governments struggled from 
the Nixon through the Bush administrations to control the Commu­
nity Development Block Grant Program.212 Indeed, the fight be­
tween mayors and governors for control over federal funds directed 
to the "state" has been a perennial controversy of intergovernmen­
tal relations since the 1960s.213 The litigation over the Brady Act in 
Vermont presents an interesting illustration of such intergovern­
mental competition. The Brady Act requires "local law enforce­
ment officers" to perform background checks on prospective 
purchasers of firearms.214 When the sheriff of Orange County, Ver­
mont, refused to perform these duties, the Vermont Department of 
210. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 187-90, 194-95. The Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3797 (Supp. 1995). 
211. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 168-69. The Act itself is codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2751-2996L (Supp. 1995). 
212. The state governments were able to gain control over the Small Cities component of 
the program during the Reagan administration, but President Bush was unable to consolidate 
the entire program as a megagrant to the states as he proposed to do in 1991. See RicH, 
supra note 178, at 107-13. The Community Services Block Grant Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9901-9912 (1994). 
213. See, e.g., CoNLAN, supra note 2, at 58-60; RicH, supra note 178, at ch. 4. 
214. See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Public Safety volunteered their services to the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, which accepted them.21s 
Such competition between nonfederal governments limits the 
ability of any one type of nonfederal government to "hold out" for 
more than the fiscal and political cost of implementing federal law. 
If governors are too recalcitrant in meeting federal demands, then 
cities will be ready to displace them as federal agents. Counties and 
school districts, likewise, have their own intergovernmental lobby 
and also attempt to win enforcement authority from Congress. In 
short, intergovernmental competition for federal authority is re­
markably vigorous. 
One might object to this argument on the ground that, because 
the state's subdivisions are regarded as "creatures of the state" that 
the state government is free to destroy or restrict, such subdivisions 
cannot provide genuine competition with their parent state govern­
ment. But this argument mistakes legal theory for political reality. 
It is certainly true that, as far as the U.S. Constitution is concerned, 
state governments have the legal power to prevent their municipali­
ties, school districts, and counties from implementing federal law.216 
Indeed, if one follows the logic of New York, the national govern­
ment should not have the power to prevent the state from control­
ling its own subdivisions.217 Therefore, it is theoretically possible 
for a state government to eliminate municipal competition by bar­
ring its subdivisions from accepting federal funds or using them for 
federal purposes. 
215. See Frank, 18 F.3d at 821. The sheriff protested against such competition, arguing 
that the state department did not constitute "local law enforcement" within the meaning of 
the Act, but the Second Circuit deferred to the Bureau's interpretation of the statute that it 
was charged with enforcing. See Frank, 18 F.3d at 822-23. 
216. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177-79 (1907). 
217. If cities, special districts, and counties are really subdivisions or "creatures" of the 
state government, then the federal government effectively commandeers the state govern­
ment when it makes use of these subdivisions against the will of the state government. The 
fact that the subdivisions' political leaders wish to be so employed might be legally irrelevant, 
because, according to Hunter, they derive their legal personality from state law. See Hunter, 
207 U.S. at 177-79. 
It is unclear, however, whether the Court would accept this reasoning. In at least one 
case, the Court has suggested that a state may not require a local government to expend 
federally derived payments in lieu of taxes on purposes specified by the state legislature. The 
Court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause barred such state interference with funds that had 
been earmarked by the federal government for different purposes. See Lawrence County v. 
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985). There has also been some 
controversy among lower courts concerning whether a federal agency can give a municipality 
the power to resist state law. 
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In practice, however, such state interference with local-federal 
relations is extremely rare.218 Especially in states where municipali­
ties have general "home rule" powers, such state interference with 
municipal powers may violate deep political traditions of local au­
tonomy that state officials might be reluctant to disturb.219 More­
over, if the national government makes funds available to 
subdivisions of the state, state decisions barring the subdivisions 
from accepting such funds might be doubly unpopular, both as bur­
dens on local autonomy and as exports of state residents' tax dollars 
to other states.220 Given these political constraints, one would ex­
pect to see what actually occurs - vigorous competition between 
governors, mayors, counties, and other nonfederal entities to obtain 
federal funds. Such competition should mitigate any theoretical 
tendency of state governments to act strategically in withholding 
information about implementation costs from Congress.221 
State governments also face competition from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). These organizations play an extraordinarily 
important role in implementing federal laws that do not involve 
regulation of third parties.222 Such NGOs include universities, legal 
services organizations, hospitals, churches, health clinics, and cul­
tural or social organizations like the Boy Scouts of America.223 The 
national government may be barred from delegating regulatory re-
218. At the dawn of extensive federal-city relations, some state governments were slow to 
give their municipal governments authority to float revenue bonds; such authorization was 
required for cities to take advantage of federal loans to ameliorate the municipal debt crisis 
arising out of the Great Depression. See MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933-1965, at 49-59 (1975). In the context 
of municipal bankruptcy, state governments sometimes have attempted to prevent their mu­
nicipalities from seeking protection under Chapter 9 of the federal bankruptcy code. The 
most famous example remains Connecticut's effort to prevent the City of Bridgeport from 
filing for bankruptcy. See Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy 
Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625 
(1995). 
219. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990) (describing powerful home-rule traditions that limit state 
interference with local governments' powers). 
220. So, for example, although Governor Allen used his veto to prevent Vrrginia from 
accepting federal funds for education under the Goals 2000 program, he permitted individual 
school districts to apply for the money. See supra note 209. 
221. There is, however, a worrisome trend of increased centralization of state govern­
mental structure. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 317-19. As Wright notes, this centralization 
creates "increasing difficulty [for] any national government efforts to target or channel funds 
to local governments for purposes that are independent of, or contrary to, state policies." Id. 
at 319. 
222. See generally ANTON, supra note 2, at 157-79. 
223. See LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE 
NON-PROFIT SECTOR 9-19 (1982). 
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sponsibilities to ·such private organizations,224 but there is an enor­
mous range of federal income maintenance, health care, and service 
provision that do not involve regulatory responsibilities. These pro­
grams are frequently delegated to private organizations that effec­
tively compete with nonfederal governments for federal money.225 
Aside from nonfederal governments and nongovernmental or­
ganizations, the state governments face competition from federal 
executive agencies. The absolute ceiling on the price that state gov­
ernments can exact from the national government is the cost to the 
federal government of providing the services "in-house" through 
federal agencies.226 Depending on the ingenuity that Congress is 
prepared to exercise in designing federal agencies, this ceiling could 
be quite low. In theory at least, Congress might be able to design 
federal agencies that can match any efficiencies provided by state or 
local governments. 
This statement is not inconsistent with the earlier contention 
that different levels of government have different comparative ad­
vantages in delivering governmental services. It may be true that 
"local governments" - meaning agencies with jurisdiction over rel­
atively smaller numbers of persons who elect the governments' 
policymakers - will tend to be more effective at delivering labor­
intensive services than larger scale governments. But nothing in 
principle prevents Congress from creating such small-scale govern­
ments with locally elected policymakers and territorially limited ju­
risdictions. Congress has chartered corporations,227 funded locally 
based community action organizations to manage poverty pro-
224. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); 
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). See generally George W. Liebmann, Dele­
gation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975). 
225. Perhaps the most controversial instance of the federal government encouraging 
competition between public and private entities occurred pursuant to the Economic Oppor­
tunity Act of 1964, which authorized "community action programs" - private, nonprofit 
agencies - to carry out the programs funded under the Act. See Economic Opportunity Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 201, 78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964) (repealed 1981). While state 
governments could also compete for grants and contracts, the reliance on private nonprofit 
organizations - "private federalism" - was clearly intended to prevent nonfederal govern­
ments, distrusted by federal program administrators, from monopolizing the implementation 
of federal law. See DAVID M. WELBORN & JESSE BURKHEAD, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA­
TIONS IN THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 63-74 (1989). 
226. See supra section 11.B.l. 
227. See, e.g., American Natl. Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 274 (1992). Some of these 
corporations strongly resemble municipalities. See, e.g., Martha Hirschfield, Note, The 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1331 (1991) (describing the powers of Alaska Native corporations that manage land and 
mineral rights belonging to Alaskan native tribes). 
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grams,228 and created special districts with territorially circum­
scribed jurisdictions;229 these are all forms of federally sponsored 
local governments that can compete with and even displace conven­
tional municipalities created under state law. Despite their appar­
ently innocuous titles, these federally sponsored local governments 
are sometimes immensely powerful.230 To be sure, under McCul­
loch, the national government can choose only those means that are 
"plainly adapted" to legitimate purposes.231 But, to the extent that 
some federally chartered local governments enforce only federal 
laws that are otherwise within Congress's power to enact, it is diffi­
cult to see the constitutional obstacle that would prevent Congress 
from creating such organizations. The notion that there can be only 
a single federal rule promulgated by a single national agency is sim­
ply a prejudice born of habit rather than legal or practical 
necessity. 232 
Of course, Congress may be extraordinarily reluctant to create 
local elective offices. Unlike appointed bureaucrats whose profes­
sional culture might encourage anonymity,233 such elected politi­
cians might become rivals to incumbent members of Congress, 
taking credit for successful federal programs that Congress would 
like to claim. But such congressional reluctance is not the same as 
practical or legal impossibility. It does not imply that non.federal 
228. See supra note 225 (discussing the Community Action Program under the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964). 
229. So, for example, the United States has subsidized and guide\:i the formation of soil 
conservancy districts since the New Deal. See Soil Conservation an,d Domestic Allotment 
Act of 1936, Act of February 29, 1936, ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1148; SOIL CoNSERVATION SERV., 
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., A STANDARD STATE SOIL CoNSERVATION DISTRICTS LAW (1936). 
Since 1902, the United States has provided subsidies for the creation of 600 water reclama­
tion districts in 17 states, governed by boards elected by certain agricultural end-users of the 
water. See Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in 'scattered sections of 43 
U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498) (1994); see also U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVI­
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION 
RuLES AND REGULATIONS ch. 3, at 2 (1996); Joseph Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclama­
tion Law, 37 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 49 (1964-65). More recently, Congress funded the crea­
tion of air quality districts under the Clean Air Act to manage state and federal air quality 
programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 (1995); see also KRIER & URSIN, supra note 197. 
230. The Salt River Project in Arizona, a reclamation district, employs 5000 persons, has 
its own security force, supplies Phoenix with much of its electricity and water, and uses its 
power to affect policies on matters ranging from zoning density to acid rain. See JOEL 
GARREAU, EDGE CrrY: LIFE ON TiiE NEW FRONTIER 192-97 (1988). 
231. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
232. See James Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal 
System - and Why It Matters, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1226, 1238 (1995). 
233. For an example of such willingness, see MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR 
SOCIAL SECURITY 18-20 (1979) (describing the culture of professional anonymity and indif­
ference to credit taking cultivated in the Social Security Administration). 
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governments somehow have a monopoly on the power to create 
elective institutions for local governance. 
Congress's regulatory discretion to fashion its own national in­
stitutions helps to ensure that the states will lack any monopoly on 
implementation services. The states constantly are competing with 
existing or proposed national institutions - the Office of the Presi­
dent, cabinet and subcabinet departments, independent regulatory 
agencies, and so on - for the right to implement national law. 
When confronted by the states' demands for larger grants or more 
implementing discretion, Congress can compare such demands to 
the fiscal and regulatory costs of purely national implementation.234 
If the states' bids to implement national law are higher than 
these bids by purely national institutions, then Congress can opt for 
the latter, bypass the states, and thwart any state holdouts.235 Con­
gress also can compare the nonfederal governments' track records 
for being faithful agents of Congress,236 assisted by the information 
provided by federal agencies and other monitors of state con­
duct. 237 If Congress finds that nonfederal governments consistently 
are misappropriating federal funds, Congress can pursue a strategy 
of preemption rather than cooperation. By contrast, if the national 
government has greater confidence in elected state and local lead­
ers, then the national government can force national agencies to 
provide such leaders with greater discretion or at least more infor­
mation through block grants,238 general revenue sharing,239 or con-
234. These costs are reflected in, for example, agencies' budget requests that are con­
tained in the budget prepared by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and submit­
ted by the President, the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) and OMB's rival baseline 
projections, and various regulatory "impact statements" on the nonfiscal costs of regulations. 
See ALLAN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: PoLmcs, POLICY, PROCESS 12-48 (1995) 
(describing the process by which the budget is developed). 
235. This is not to say that there are not legal barriers to Congress's ability to create 
administrative agencies. For example, Congress cannot itself execute the laws through a leg­
islative veto on administrative agencies' actions, nor can Congress itself hire or fire, except 
through impeachment, executive officers in charge of implementing national law. But such 
separation of powers doctrines ought not to affect Congress's choices between national and 
state implementation of national law, because the doctrines apply to both sorts of implemen­
tation. If Congress cannot impose a unicameral legislative veto on the Immigration and Nat­
uralization Service, it also cannot impose such a veto on a state's department of community 
affairs. 
236. See, e.g., KETTI., supra note 2, at 98-101 (discussing Senator Proxmire's hearings con­
cerning Community Development Block Grants). 
237. For an account of such monitoring, see id. at 76-98. 
238. For a detailed account of the operation of the Community Development Block 
Grant program, see DONALD K=, MANAGING CoMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW 
FEDERALISM (1980); RICH, supra note 178. 
239. For an overview of general revenue sharing, see RICHARD NATHAN ET AL., REvs­
NUE SHARING: THE SECOND ROUND (1977). 
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sulting requirements.240 The history of cooperative federalism is, in 
part, a history of struggles between elected policy generalists -
mayors, governors, state legislatures, and city councils - and fed­
eral agency specialists for greater control over federal programs, 
with Congress favoring one or another type of organization de­
pending on the political climate and perceived regulatory needs.241 
In effect, the President and the cabinet and subcabinet depart­
ments, states, local governments, and independent regulatory agen­
cies compete with each other to obtain implementation authority 
from Congress. Each entity seeks from Congress larger appropria­
tions or more discretion in enforcement responsibilities. But, be­
cause Congress will seek the most faithful and efficient agent, each 
entity is forced to keep its requests for budget authority and imple­
menting discretion in check by the possibility that Congress will 
delegate implementation responsibilities to the other competing en­
tities. Likewise, each level may tend to exploit its control of infor­
mation about the costs and benefits of implementation to influence 
Congress's appropriation and oversight decisions.242 Thus, national 
agencies might exaggerate the costs of enforcement to inflate their 
budgets. But the other state and local governments' lobbying ef­
forts provide Congress with another source of information about 
the costs and benefits of implementation, and Congress can use this 
source to correct the estimates provided by its own agencies. 
Thus, the redundancy created by overlapping state and federal 
jurisdictions allows Congress to play state and federal officials off of 
each other to avoid dishonesty or corruption by either. As Susan 
Rose-Ackerman has noted, such competition among governmental 
officials reduces the risk of bribe-taking and other illegal bureau­
cratic behavior.243 But analogous reasoning also suggests that inter-
240. For a detailed account of President Johnson's decision to protect the position of 
elected state and local officials from national agencies' failure to consult with them concern­
ing nonfederal implementation of national law, see HAIDER, supra note 164, at 114-23 
(describing Johnson's promulgation of Executive Order A-85 requiring federal agencies to 
consult with state and local elected officials). 
241. For an account of such struggles in the context of so-called "picket fence" federal­
ism, see TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967). Sanford uses the metaphor 
of a picket fence to suggest the rivalry between appointed state and federal agency specialists 
(the "vertical" fence posts) and elected state and federal "generalist" politicians (the hori­
zontal fence boards). 
242. For discussions of the difficulty faced by Congress in maintaining control of the fed­
eral bureaucracy, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE Gov­
ERNMENT (1971); WILLIAM F. WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1995). 
243. See SusAN RosE-ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTION: A STUDY IN PoLmcAL EcoNOMY 137-
51 (1978). 
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governmental competition reduces the costs of state autonomy by 
depriving both the states and national agencies of the ability to hold 
out indefinitely for national benefits in excess of their opportunity 
costs.244 In sum, the risks that strict enforcement of the New York 
entitlement would lead to strategic withholding of that entitlement 
by state and local governments seem low, given competition from 
nonfederal, federal, and private sources. 
This relative absence of holdout problems distinguishes the New 
York entitlement from other entitlements previously possessed by 
the state governments under pre-New Deal precedents, like United 
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,245 Hammer v. Dagenhart,246 A.L.A. 
Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 247 and Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 248 which bestowed upon state governments the exclusive enti­
tlement to regulate private noncommercial activities like manufac­
turing even when such activities produced interstate spillover 
effects. 
Unlike the New York entitlement, this "E. C. Knight entitle­
ment" would be extremely costly for the national government to 
purchase. To the extent that a given state's regulation would im­
pose less cost on commercial activity than would federal regulation, 
that state would not sell its entitlement for fear that it would drive 
its commercial activity to a state that did not accept federal regula­
tion. It would only sell when it was certain that all other states 
would sell their entitlement as well, thus uniformly imposing higher 
costs.249 In order to enforce a federal regulation in one state, there-
244. This complex relationship between the power to regulate private persons directly 
and the power to induce the states to regulate private persons according to federal standards 
was recognized by Publius in The Federalist No. 36, in which Publius remarked that "[w]hen 
the States know that the Union can supply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful 
motive for exertion on their parts [in executing national law]." THE FEDERALIST No. 36, 
supra note 50, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton). 
245. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
246. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
247. 295 U.S. 495 {1935). 
248. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
249. The argument here is familiar. See, e.g., Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Feder­
alism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 
(1994). For example, one state's refusal to allow federal regulation of wages and hours might 
put pressure on other states to abstain from such regulation in order to prevent state resi­
dents from fleeing the regulating jurisdiction to the jurisdiction without the redistributive 
regulations. If even a few states refuse to accept federal regulations requiring employers to 
pay a minimum wage, then there will be a risk that the adopting states' industry and other tax 
bases will flee to those recalcitrant states, depressing the economies of those states that ac­
cept the federal grant and regulate according to federal standards. 
The same sort of analysis applies to state decisions to allow federal regulation of activities 
that impose "spillover" costs on persons in other states. For example, if a state refuses to 
allow federally proposed environmental regulations limiting the airborne pollutants that 
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fore, Congress would simultaneously have to bribe every state to 
allow enforcement of the proposed law. But it might be difficult for 
Congress to obtain the agreement of every state simultaneously to 
yield their E. C. Knight entitlement. Because each state could de­
feat the entire federal scheme, each state might act strategically by 
demanding a premium in order to allow the entire regime to be 
enacted. The costs of dividing such a premium among the contend­
ing states might exceed the value of the regime to Congress and 
thereby cause its defeat. Like a land developer trying to assemble 
fifty parcels of land owned by fifty strategically inclined landown­
ers, the federal government's efforts to create cost-justified regula­
tory regimes would be defeated by transaction costs and holdouts if 
Congress had to obtain the simultaneous consent of fifty individual 
state governments. 
By contrast, Congress has less to fear from state holdouts when 
it bargains to purchase the states' New York entitlements because, 
so long as Congress enforces federal law within a state's territory 
using federal personnel, no state's refusal to sell the entitlement can 
prevent federal law from being enforced in every state. Thus, one 
state's refusal to sell the New York entitlement would not affect the 
costs of purchasing the New York entitlement in other states. For 
example, if some states refuse to implement OSHA with their state 
administrators, the federal government can and does administer 
OSHA directly in the recalcitrant states with the federal Depart­
ment of Labor. Because the federal government can achieve regu­
latory uniformity without purchasing every state's New York 
entitlement, there is no necessity for every state to sell its New York 
entitlement in order for any state to sell it. 
Of course, it is theoretically possible that if a state refused to 
implement federal law then purely federal enforcement of such law 
within the state's territory would be practically impossible. Imagine 
services that the federal government is so utterly inexperienced in 
providing - say, K-12 education - that provision through federal 
personnel would be practically impossible. If a school district re­
fuses to assist the federal government in enforcing federal standards 
manufacturers can emit, then manufacturers within such a state may be able to emit pollu­
tants affecting primarily residents in "downstream" states - in effect, using the airspace 
above the "downstream" states as a storing area for their emissions. Under such circum­
stances, it would be politically difficult for the "downstream" states to enact emissions restric­
tions on their own manufacturers, for the residents of the downstream states would not see 
any benefit - that is, cleaner air - resulting from regulations that, nevertheless, would 
burden its economy. For an elaboration of this argument, see Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environ­
mental Regulation, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1222-24 (1992). 
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in public schools, then it might be impractical for the federal gov­
ernment to create its own federal schools to implement such stan­
dards. Thus, state refusal to assist the federal government could 
conceivably amount to a state veto on some federal regulatory 
scheme, disrupting its uniform enforcement throughout the nation 
and giving rise to the "holdout problems" described above. 
But there are reasons to believe that this theoretical possibility 
is not a pressing practical danger. First, to the extent that the fed­
eral government completely lacks any capacity to provide the regu­
latory service because nonfederal governments utterly dominate 
the regulatory field, one might question whether federal involve­
ment in the field is really necessary. Such a field would seem to be 
a traditional state function best left to nonfederal institutions.zs0 
Second, federal inefficiency can actually encourage state or local 
officials to sell their New York entitlement rather than tolerate fed­
eral administration: the prospect of dealing with slow, inexperi­
enced, or incompetent federal administrators may impel regulated 
interests within a state to lobby the state's legislature to preserve 
state implementation of federal law.251 
3. The Problem of Agency Costs 
A second objection to this argument for the efficiency of New 
York is to dispute the realism of the assumption on which the argu­
ment is based - insignificant agency costs. In fact, state and fed­
eral legislators are not equally responsive to the voters within their 
constituencies. In particular, it is simply not the case that every 
level of regulatory costs imposed by implementation translates au­
tomatically into an identical level of political risk. The political risk 
to state and federal lawmakers arising out of some regulatory cost 
imposed on constituents will depend to a large extent on which con­
stituents are burdened. Well-organized groups of constituents that 
experience concentrated regulatory costs may make a politician's 
political career much more risky than the same level of costs dis-
250. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
251. See Rhode Island Gets Unprecedented Warning from Feds over Water Quality Pro· 
grams, STATE CAPITALS NEWSL., Feb. 24, 1997, at 2 (noting a state agency director's warning 
that, if the state legislature does not increase funding for cleanup of the Bay, EPA will take 
over administration of the Clean Water Act in Rhode Island, which "would be harmful to 
Rhode Island businesses, which would have to deal with regulators in Boston rather than 
Providence"). 
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tributed among diffuse groups of disorganized constituents who are 
less adept at lobbying and turning out to vote at election time.252 
How might relaxing the assumption concerning agency costs af­
fect the optimistic assessment of New York provided above? If 
elected officials respond to different constituents' identical regula­
tory costs with different degrees of attention, then one could not 
assume that the bargains between state and federal officials actually 
distributed the New York entitlement in a way that minimizes regu­
latory costs. Because local and state governments might be more 
sensitive to the ideological objections of well-organized interest 
groups, state and local governments might refuse to implement fed­
eral schemes to which such well-organized groups object, even 
when such implementation might be cost-justified. Local govern­
ments might tum down federal grants for low-income housing, for 
example, because the consumers of such housing have muted voices 
while the middle-class homeowners who oppose such housing are 
vocal and well-organized in their opposition.253 
Agency costs can also arise because nonfederal officials are 
themselves a powerful interest group with interests that can be in­
consistent with the well-being of their constituents. Intergovern­
mental programs may, for instance, suffer from the "flypaper 
effect" - the tendency of nonfederal government officials to retain 
federal grants to m�tain or increase the size of state and local 
budgets, even when such funds can be passed on to residents to 
reduce their tax burden. 
In response to the perception that some constituents are over­
or underrepresented in the local political process by which federal 
grant money is spent, Congress has required state and local govern­
ments applying for such money to provide for public participation 
in the programs funded by such money.254 These "public participa-
252. There is, of course, a voluminous public choice literature analyzing the formation of 
interest groups and the possibility that well-organized interest groups will disproportionately 
affect the political process. For some representative samples, see RussELL HAR.DIN, CoLLEc. 
TIVE ACTION (1982); TERRY M. MoE, THE ORGANIZATION OF lNTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND 
THE lNTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL lNTEREST GROUPS (1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE 
Lome OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); Terry Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organizations, 
7 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 106 (1991). 
253. See supra note 177. Other possible explanations of local government hostility to­
ward redistributive programs are, perhaps, more plausible. According to a widely held view, 
the local government that is reluctant to accept funds for redistributive programs like low­
income housing is actually acting as a faithful agent of all of its constituents, including low­
income constituents, because such programs erode the tax base that the local government 
needs to survive. See generally PAUL E. PETERSON, CrrY LIMITS (1981). 
254. See Terrance Sandalow, Federal Grants and the Reform of State and Local Govern­
ment, in MoRE MoNEY Is NoT THE ONLY ANsWER: REFORM OF GoVERNMENTAL Smuc. 
TURES 175 (1969). 
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tion" requirements are ubiquitous and take numerous forms -
mandatory hearings, consultation with consumers of federally 
funded programs, and so on. They also have raised the ire of some 
local government officials - most famously in the case of the Eco­
nomic Opportunity Act's requirement of "maximum feasible partic­
ipation. "255 But such grant conditions will not, by themselves, 
completely solve the problem of agency costs, because the condi­
tions will be imposed only if elected officials accept these grants. 
Such conditions, therefore, cannot improve the fairness of the poli­
ticians' decisions to apply for or accept the grant.256 
One might ask whether Congress should have the power to 
commandeer state and local regulatory processes in order to ensure 
that all interested constituents are appropriately represented. If the 
state and local officials do not represent their constituents, then 
neither do their bargains with the national government. At the very 
least, Congress might commandeer state and local government 
structure to require the state or local government to extend the suf­
frage to all residents within their boundaries, impose limits on how 
such boundaries might be drawn, and require certain governments 
to elect their members by single-member districts to prevent the 
dilution of constituencies unpopular with a local majority. 
Indeed, the Court's New York doctrine may accommodate such 
commandeering, because the New York entitlement might not limit 
Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or its Article I, section 4, power to require state gov­
ernments to regulate federal elections according to federal stan­
dards. The New York Court did not address the issue of whether 
New York's anticommandeering rule applied to any exercise of the 
255. See J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN UR· 
BAN PoLmc:s: COMMUNITY p ARTICIPATION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 4-6 (1973); SAR LEVI­
TAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY (1969); DANIEL 
PA1RICK MOYNIHAN, MAxlMtJM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN 
THE WAR ON POVERTY 110-13 (1969) (expressing skepticism about community action pro­
grams). Consider also the statutory requirements for school districts to consult with parents 
of handicapped children in designing an individualized education plan under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1995); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (1997). 
For a detailed description of the purposes that such a requirement can serve, see JOEL 
HANDLER, THE CoNDmONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY ch. 
7 (1986). 
256. See, e.g., RICH, supra note 178, at 233-34; Elizabeth Provencio, Making the Silent 
Voices of the Colonias Heard: Examining the Lack of CDBG Funding in Dona Ana County, 
New Mexico (unpublished seminar paper, subinitted Apr. 23, 1997, on file with author) 
(describing the failure of border counties to apply for small cities CDBG funds despite eligi­
bility). In particular, as noted by Greenstone and Peterson, powerful mayors like Chicago's 
Mayor Daley simply refused to create community action organizations with genuine auton­
omy from the city government, but Chicago still received federal grant money. See Green­
stone & Peterson, supra note 255, at 19-24. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has upheld provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965257 that arguably commandeer the electo­
ral process of state governments,258 and, as early as its 1879 decision 
in Ex parte Siebold,259 the Court upheld Congress's power to com­
mandeer state officials' services pursuant to Congress's power to 
regulate the "time, place, and manner" of federal elections.260 To 
be sure, the Court has been more reluctant to allow Congress to 
grant voting rights to groups other than racial minorities in 
nonfederal elections.261 But the functional argument outlined here 
suggests that Congress's need to commandeer nonfederal govern­
ments' electoral process is greater than its need to commandeer 
nonfederal governments' regulatory processes. 
One should be wary, however, about too casually invoking the 
unresponsiveness of state and local legislators to their constituents 
as a way to justify congressional imposition of duties upon 
nonfederal officials. Congress, too, is affected by agency costs, and 
giving Congress the power to demand regulatory services from state 
and local governments unconditionally might exacerbate such costs. 
Consider, for example, the often recognized tendency for Con­
gress to favor programs that maximize its ability to perform 
casework for constituents and take credit for "unsticking" the bu­
reaucratic process.262 This incentive can encourage Congress to de­
prive elected policy generalists - governors, mayors, state and 
local legislators - of influence in intergovernmental arrangements 
even when such influence might be desirable. After all, members of 
Congress may regard elected policy generalists like mayors, gover­
nors, and state and local legislators as potential challengers in re­
election campaigns.263 Therefore, Congress might disfavor any 
257. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-l (1994). 
258. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980). 
259. 100 U.S. 371, 397-99 (1879). 
260. Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-52 (1986) (describing vote dilution). Both 
of these powers have been invoked to uphold the so-called "motor voter" law, a measure 
designed to increase the registration of racial minorities and other underregistered groups. 
See Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 967 (D.S.C. 1995) (upholding the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994)). 
261. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-296 (1970) (striking down an amendment 
of the Voting Rights Act that bestowed the right to vote in state and local elections on per­
sons between 18 and 21 years of age). 
262. The thesis was initially propounded in FIORINA, supra note 28. It is developed with 
more data and sophistication in BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VoTE: CONSTITUENCY 
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987). 
263. See HAIDER, supra note 164, at 98-101. Haider cites "Egger's Law" of intergovern­
mental relations - "the contempt that a U.S. Senator feels for his Governor is equal and 
opposite to the contempt that the Governor feels for his U.S. Senator." This fear of state 
elected officials as potential rivals for office is thoroughly justified. The state house is essen-
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form of cooperative federalism that gives such potential rivals op­
portunities for credit-taking that the members of Congress would 
prefer to reserve for themselves.264 Such a suspicion of state and 
local elected leaders is not necessarily inefficient.265 Congress, 
however, might use such power in perverse ways to strip elected 
officials of most policymaking discretion, transferring that discre­
tion to state bureaucrats who are less likely to be challengers to 
federal incumbents and more easily controlled by federal office­
holders, both elected and unelected. By allowing state and local 
elected officials to withhold their state bureaucracy, New York gives 
them bargaining power against Congress to counteract what John 
Chubb calls the "bias for centralization."266 
In short, the safest conclusion is that, to the extent that one is 
willing generally to trust the electoral process to ensure that elected 
officials fairly represent their constituents, then one should also 
trust intergovernmental bargains to ensure that the New York enti­
tlement will be transferred to the level of government, state or fed­
eral, that can make the best use of it. If one believes that elected 
officials, as a general matter, fairly represent their constituents, 
then one should also endorse New York and the intergovernmental 
bargains by which the New York entitlement is transferred. By con­
trast, if one distrusts elected officials' incentives to act as faithful 
agents of their constituents, then one might favor limits on the New 
York entitlement. One would need to go further, however, and 
identify precisely the type of agency cost that justifies such limits. 
If, for example, state and local governments systematically under­
represent racial minorities or other disadvantaged or disorganized 
constituencies even more than the national government, then it 
might make sense to allow the national government to commandeer 
tially a training ground for half of the U.S. Congress. See generally MICHAEL BERKMAN, THE 
STATE Ro01s OF NATIONAL PoLmcs: CoNGRESS AND THE TAX AGENDA, 1978-1986 (1993). 
264. See ANToN, supra note 2, at 111 (asserting that members of Congress tend to disfa­
vor grant programs that diminish their opportunities to take credit for benefits delivered to 
their constituencies); CoNLAN, supra note 164, at 38 (attributing congressional opposition to 
a proposed transportation block grant to Congress's "desire to retain control over pork bar­
rel projects"); John Chubb, Federalism and the Bias in Favor of Centralization, in THE NEW 
DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 273, 284-85 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 
1985). 
265. Especially where Congress is using local officials to administer a program with the 
purpose of protecting the welfare of low-income persons, it might be essential to insulate 
such programs from state and local political control and develop an intergovernmental bu­
reaucracy dedicated to the redistributive function of the program. See PETERSON ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 131-59 (describing how development of a state bureaucracy sympathetic to 
the purposes of federal redistributive programs can help assure that such programs are insti­
tutionalized and insulated from misdirection into developmental ends). 
266. See Chubb, supra note 264, at 273. 
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the states and bypass the intergovernmental marketplace. Other 
sorts of agency costs, however, might lead one to strengthen New 
York's rule. For now, it is important only to see that the relation 
between agency costs and New York is complex and that, absent 
agency costs affecting the state but not the national governments, 
such costs are not a good reason to reject New York. 
* * * 
It shotild not be surprising that the national government can ac­
quire state and local regulatory services through voluntary ex­
change. This is how the national government normally obtains 
services from private persons. When the national government 
wishes private persons or companies to serve as defense contrac­
tors, mail carriers, FBI agents, park rangers, or cabinet secretaries, 
it does not conscript them but instead purchases the services with 
revenues generated by taxes. If conscription is unnecessary to ob­
tain private services, then why should it be necessary to obtain state 
or local services? In both cases, there is a competitive marketplace 
in which to purchase such services, and, if a nonfederal seller's ask­
ing price is too high, the federal government can frequently, if not 
always, instead enforce federal law through a variety of other 
nonfederal and federal entities. In particular, unlike the sort of ex­
clusive state entitlement to regulate private persons asserted by the 
Court in E.C. Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, Schecter Poultry, and 
Carter Coal, the New York entitlement need not lead to hold-out 
problems that would prevent the entitlement from moving to the 
level of government that can use it most effectively. 
Thus, New York and Printz promote federalism by providing 
nonfederal governments with a valuable entitlement but without 
depriving the national government of any useful power. Assuming 
that one is willing to indulge even the weakest presumption in favor 
of federal regimes, New York and Printz make eminent functional 
sense. 
ill. How COMMANDEERING LEADS TO INEFFICIENCY, 
DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE, AND INVASION OF 
EXPRESSIVE AUTONOMY 
One might not be willing, however, to presume that promotion 
of state and local governments' power is an intrinsically valuable 
goal. If one lacks such a minimum presumptive commitment to fed­
eral regimes, then the argument presented in Part II will be unper­
suasive for two reasons. 
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First, Part II shows only that the allocation of entitlements pro­
vided by New York is one possible efficient allocation. But it does 
not show that the national government's commandeering of state 
and local governments' services is inefficient. After all, Coasean 
bargains might run either way. It is at least theoretically possible 
that state and local governments could ensure that Congress did not 
overburden their regulatory resources by offering Congress state­
generated revenue - reverse grants-in-aid - for the right to forgo 
implementation of federal law. One might argue that, if Congress 
declined the state funds, this would provide conclusive evidence 
that Congress placed a higher value on nonfederal implementation 
than the state and local governments valued their autonomy.267 
What loss of efficiency, therefore, can result from allowing Con­
gress to commandeer state and local regulatory processes? 
Second, the argument in Part II does not address any concerns 
besides the smooth and efficient sale of the New York entitlement 
to the level of government that values it the most. But efficiency is 
not everything. One might also wish to consider the distributive 
consequences of New York. New York, after all, makes the national 
government pay nonfederal governments for the right to use their 
regulatory machinery. It makes the nonfederal governments rela­
tively richer and the national government relatively poorer. If one 
generally favors diffusion of power in a federal regime, then this 
distributive consequence will seem self-evidently desirable and re­
quire no further defense, assuming that the distribution sacrifices 
no efficiency, as Part II argued. But, if one does not indulge such a 
presumption, then one will want further justification for this distrib­
utive consequence. 
267. The argument for such reverse grants-in-aid is highly speculative, because the device 
has never been tested. For practical reasons, nonfederal governments probably would have 
to buy their way out of federal mandates by offering revenue to federal administrative agen­
cies rather than to Congress. There are, however, reasons to believe that federal agencies 
would prefer inefficiently continued control over nonfederal governments' personnel than 
additional revenue. The agencies might fear that Congress would reduce their appropriation 
by the amount of the revenue that they receive from nonfederal governments. Such a fear of 
an offset has made agencies reluctant to accept fees in other contexts. See Barry S. Read, 
The Permit Fee Program of Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1990: Developing State Fee Pro­
grams, 44 Sw. L.J. 1553, 1556 (1991) ("[T]he prospect that an agency's legislative appropria­
tion might be reduced by an amount equal to the fees collected may reduce the agency's 
incentive to establish and implement a fee system."); see also Joyce M. Martin et al., Funding 
State Environmental Programs: Indiana's Solution, 1 ENVrL. LAW. 435, 444 (1995) (describ­
ing how the Indiana legislature reduced the Indiana Department of Environmental Manage­
ment's budget by "the exact amount IDEM would have raised from municipal fees"). By 
contrast, Congress could not reduce easily an agency's budget by the value of the nonfederal 
officials' services that it receives, if only because such services are nonfungible and difficult to 
value. Agencies, therefore, might perversely prefer mandates on nonfederal officials over 
reverse grants-in-aid as a way to protect their budgets from congressional offsets. 
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Part III of this article addresses these two concerns by arguing 
that even those lacking a minimum presumptive commitment to 
federalism must embrace the functional theory to the extent they 
argue that the utility of commandeering depends on states qua 
states - independent governments established and maintained by 
subnational constituencies. Pervasive commandeering would 
render state governments indistinguishable from the various species 
of federal local government that advocates of commandeering feel 
are inadequate in the first place. 
The analogy to private property is straightforward: a king desir­
ing com for his warehouses, yet unwilling to exert royal effort to 
grow com, may firmly renounce any belief in private property and 
further state than any com in the kingdom is his for the taking. But 
because com is a type of property that depends on the efforts of 
others for its existence, such a policy would likely discourage farm­
ers from devoting their efforts to producing com. Thus, Part III 
suggests that commandeering is both inefficient and distributionally 
improper by drawing an analogy between state regulatory processes 
and private property. Section III.A explains that the inefficiency 
springs from the possibility that commandeering state and local in­
stitutions will tend to undermine voters' and politicians' incentives 
to participate in state and local government, just as confiscation of 
private property tends to undermine incentives of investors to in­
vest in property likely to be confiscated. Sections III.B and III.C 
suggest that commandeering might also be distributionally unjust in 
some of the same ways that confiscation of private property and 
forced speech is conventionally regarded as unjust - because it in­
equitably distributes the costs of government and forces nonfederal 
policymakers to vote for federal policies with which they might 
disagree. 
A. Commandeering as Inefficient Demand for In-Kind 
Contributions of Goods and Services 
Why might it be inefficient for the national government to de­
mand regulatory services from state and local governments? When 
the national government commandeers services from nonfederal 
governments, it essentially demands that such governments provide 
in-kind contributions to the national government. But such de­
mands can inefficiently deter voters and politicians from participat­
ing in state and local politics. In effect, when the national 
government commandeers state and local regulatory processes, it 
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undermines the very institutions that the national government seeks 
to exploit. 
To illustrate how commandeering can undermine the incentive 
to participate in state and local politics, consider why conscription 
of private services might be undesirable. Suppose, for example, that 
the national government wished to ensure that there were a suffi­
cient supply of sites for the storage of low-level radioactive waste. 
In order to accomplish this goal, the national government might 
require certain private operators of landfills designated by the En­
vironmental Protection Agency to "take title" to low-level radioac­
tive waste generated by other persons and store such waste on their 
property. 
Quite apart from the possible constitutional problems raised by 
such a scheme of waste disposal,268 such conscription of property 
and services from private landfill operators might be an extremely 
inefficient method of :financing landfill space. By demanding that 
landfill operators alone bear the cost of storing low-level radioac­
tive waste, the hypothetical statute effectively would impose an ex­
cise tax on the production of landfill space. Depending on the 
elasticity of supply of such space, this "tax" on investment in landfill 
space might deter private investors from investing money in the cre­
ation of further space. Through conscription, then, the government 
might actually find itself confronted with an even more dire 
shortage of landfill sites than that which it wished to remedy. Such 
selective conscription of specific service-providers' labor or prop­
erty, in short, functions as an inefficient excise tax.269 
The national government's demands for state and local regula­
tory services can be analogized to such inefficient conscription of 
private services. When the national government commandeers the 
268. One might argue that such a measure might constitute a permanent physical inva­
sion of private property and, therefore, a per se takings. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Man­
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Given the grotesque formalism of takings doctrine, 
however, the Court might conceivably hold that, because the landfill owner takes title to the 
waste, there would be no physical invasion within the meaning of Loretto. 
269. For an account of how excise taxes might lead to "excess burden" - inefficient 
disincentives to engage in the taxed activities - see KARL CAsE, EcoNOMics AND TAX PoL­
ICY 142-43 (1986); JosEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 192-94 (5th ed. 1987). Con­
fiscation of specific sorts of property can have similar effects. See William A. Fischel, The 
Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military Draft for the Takings 
Issue, 20 liARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 23, 26 (1996) (noting that "if the king did not pay for corn, 
horses, or boats for his army, then farmers, teamsters, and sailors would make them hard to 
find or be discouraged from producing them at all"). It is a familiar point that conscription 
can lead to a similar sort of deadweight loss, because the threat of conscription can lead 
potential conscriptees to engage in wasteful efforts to avoid conscription. See, e.g., Walter Y. 
Oi, The Economic Cost of the Draft, AM. EcoN. Assoc.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 
1967, at 39, 59. 
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services of state or local governments, it necessarily reduces either 
the revenue or the policymaking discretion available to such gov­
ernments' officers.270 It is logical to infer that such erosion of the 
power, money, and prestige of nonfederal offices can only reduce 
the incentive of voters and politicians to expend time, energy, and 
money in voting, running for office, monitoring representatives, and 
otherwise engaging in political activities to control such offices.271 
Moreover, the (admittedly limited) empirical evidence concerning 
voters and politicians' incentives suggests that, as the real poli­
cymaking discretion of nonfederal office decreases, ambitious and 
civic-minded citizens would abandon nonfederal politics and in­
stead substitute other activities where their public spirit and 
ambition can be satisfied more fully.272 In this way, federal com-
270. At first glance, this statement might seem incorrect. After all, state and local offi­
cials gain significant powers when they administer federal statutes. This factual observation 
is certainly correct - but also irrelevant. Nonfederal officials can obtain such federal re­
sponsibilities even if the national government lacked the power to demand their services. 
They merely would have to offer to assist the national government on mutually acceptable 
terms. By giving the national government the power to conscript nonfederal officials' serv­
ices, one simply diminishes nonfederal officials' capacity to bargain for either greater 
amounts of policymaking discretion, nonsource revenue, or both. It is difficult to see how 
this loss of bargaining power would enhance the desirability of nonfederal office. 
271. The intuition suggested here is more formally elaborated in Robert P. Inman & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrnst State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political 
Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1203, 
1214 n.34 (1997); see also JACK H. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 43 (1987) ("[P]eople are more 
willing to take part in decision making when there is more at stake."). 
272. The evidence suggests that innovative policymakers, sometimes known as "public 
entrepreneurs," tend to emerge when there are offices with policymaking discretion - for 
example, "strong" mayor positions - that allow significant policy innovation. See MARK 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERN­
MENT 94-96 (1995). The loss of discretion might be an especially great deterrent to local 
officeholding, because an enormous number of local offices are volunteer positions that pro­
vide no salary. See Sydney Duncombe, Volunteers in City Government: Getting More than 
Your Money's Worth, 75 NATL. CIVIC REv. 291 (1986); William D. Duncombe & Jeffrey L. 
Brudney, The Optimal Mix of Volunteer and Paid Staff in Local Governments: An Applica­
tion to Municipal Fire Departments, 23 PuB. FIN. Q. 356 (1995); Sandra Reinsel Markwood, 
Volunteers in Local Government: Partners in Service, 76 PuB. MGMr., April 1994, at 6. The 
only incentive for participation in such voluntary activities is the opportunity to "make a 
difference" - to exercise power. As the real power of such offices diminishes, one would 
expect that ambitious or civic-minded persons would direct their energy to other fora -
private nonprofits, trade unions, and private corporations - where their longing for office, 
prestige, or an outlet for altruistic energy can be more easily satisfied. 
There is also some evidence that voters and residents are more willing to engage in more 
time-consuming political activities - for example, contacting a politician or attending a hear­
ing - if their city has neighborhood organizations with genuine policymaking power. See 
JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBmTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 89-98 (1993). Moreover, 
citizens' willingness to engage in politics is related directly to the willingness of politicians 
and other politically active persons to "get out the vote." It is well established that the more 
resources that politicians invest in a political campaign - canvassing, advertisements, and so 
on - the higher the turnout. See, e.g., Gary W. Cox & Michael C. Munger, Closeness, Ex­
penditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections, 83 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 217 (1989); 
Gerald H. Kramer, The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior, 34 PuB. 
OPINION Q. 560 (1970); Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Getting Out the Vote: 
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mandeering of state and local activities is analogous to an excise tax 
on state and local political activity. That is, federal commandeering 
would reduce the marginal incentive to invest in the burdened 
activity. 
Of course, it is highly unlikely that a few minor demands of the 
Brady Act variety on nonfederal officers would affect the interest of 
voters and politicians in those offices. Only pervasive and draco­
nian conscription of state and local services would diminish constit­
uent and candidate interest in nonfederal office. One might, 
therefore, object that Congress never actually conscripts nonfederal 
offices so extensively as to deter political participation. 
But such a confident assertion is supported by scant data. We 
have little evidence one way or another about whether or not Con­
gress would refrain from conscripting nonfederal officers if there 
were no constitutional norm against such conscription. To be sure, 
Congress historically did not conscript nonfederal officers' regula­
tory services very extensively prior to 1970. But this abstinence 
proves little, given that Congress in the past has operated under the 
assumption that such conscription would be unconstitutional.273 
Given our uncertainty about Congress's incentives and the substitu­
tion rate between private and public activities,274 one might think 
that it is at least unduly risky to allow Congress to conscript 
nonfederal officers' services and thus diminish the incentives of 
candidates and voters to produce such services. Undertaking such a 
risk is completely unnecessary if, as argued in Part II, the federal 
government can easily purchase the services of nonfederal officers 
through intergovernmental transactions. Maybe Congress will 
show self-restraint in conscripting nonfederal services. But, given 
that such conscription is unnecessary because Congress can 
Participation in Gubernatorial Elections, 77 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 675 (1983). Therefore, one 
would expect voter turnout to fall as politicians' interest in some elected office diminishes. 
Assuming that ambitious, innovative policymakers prefer to have more, rather than less, dis­
cretion when they assume office, one expects that such persons would invest fewer resources 
and less time to getting out the vote for offices rendered less desirable because of federal 
commandeering. 
273. For an example of such congressional concern about the constitutionality of con­
scripting nonfederal officers to provide regulatory services, see the summary of debates over 
§ 1983 in Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 249, 257-66. 
274. Clayton Gillette has pointed out to me that selective federal conscription of 
nonfederal officials' services simply might cause voters and politicians to redirect their atten­
tion away from services likely to be conscripted by the federal government to other govern­
mental activities less likely to be so burdened. This is possible if federal conscription of 
nonfederal services is limited and predictable in scope. But given our uncertainty about the 
likely scope of federal conscription, it might seem unwise to assume such a limited effect on 
nonfederal incentives. 
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purchase nonfederal officers' "property rule" entitfement free from 
high transaction costs, why take the chance? 
In sum, commandeering of state or local services seems ineffi­
cient in the same way that confiscation of private property or con­
scription of private services is inefficient; it places the burden for 
providing a service on persons who invest in the production of such 
services and thus discourages such persons from continuing to make 
the desired investment, at least whenever the supply of private 
goods and services responds elastically to increases in costs. 
One might respond that commandeering nevertheless might be 
more efficient than the use of voluntary intergovernmental agree­
ments, because purchasing nonfederal governments' services re­
quires the national government to raise revenues through 
potentially inefficient taxation.275 For example, income taxes might 
inefficiently induce taxpayers to substitute leisure for labor, while 
sales taxes might inefficiently deter taxpayers from consumption of 
taxed goods.276 It is a familiar point that conscription of private 
services can be more efficient than purchase of such services 
through voluntary agreements precisely because such conscription 
reduces the need to use inefficient taxes.277 Why is not conscription 
of nonfederal governments' services also a good way to avoid such 
tax inefficiencies? 
The difficulty with such an argument is that, unlike the conscrip­
tion of private individuals, the commandeering of nonfederal gov­
ernments is neither necessary nor sufficient for avoiding the 
275. For a discussion of the deadweight losses resulting from taxation, see JosEPH 
STIGLITZ, EcoNOMICS OF THE PUBuc SECTOR 375-76, 390-92 (4th ed. 1995); Charles L. Bal­
lard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxes in the 
United States, 75 AM. EcoN. RE.v. 128 (1985); Edgar K. Browning, On the Marginal Welfare 
Cost of Taxation, 77 AM. EcoN. REv. 11 (1987); Charles Stuart, Welfare Cost per Dollar of 
Additional Tax Revenue in the United States, 74 AM. EcoN. RE.v. 352 {1984). 
276. See RICHARD A. MusoRA VE & PEGGY B. MusGRA VE, Pusuc FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 297-303 {4th ed. 1984). 
277. This argument applies regardless of whether the government conscripts personal 
services or confiscates property. For an application of the argument to conscription, see 
Milton Friedman, Why Not a Volunteer Army?, in THE MILITARY DRAFr. SELECTED READ­
INGS 625, 626 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982); Thomas Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive The­
ory of Military Recruitment, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 109, 114-15 {1994). For an application of the 
argument to regulation of real property, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Spe­
cies Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 355-58 (1997) (noting 
the danger that the Endangered Species Act may induce farmers to overplow their land to 
discourage the presence of endangered species on their property). The argument works only 
if conscription functions as a lump-sum tax that one cannot avoid by changing one's behavior. 
As Ross notes, however, military conscription does not function in this way; the availability 
of exemptions for married persons, students, and so on encourages potential conscriptees to 
engage in wasteful draft avoidance such as enrolling in graduate school. See Ross, supra, at 
114 n.14. 
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deadweight losses of inefficient taxes. Such commandeering is not 
sufficient to achieve tax efficiency because state and local govern­
ments must impose nonfederal taxes to finance federally mandated 
services, and state and local taxation might be every bit as ineffi­
cient as the federal taxation that it replaces. State and local govern­
ments, after all, raise money by imposing some mix of income, 
sales, or property taxes that can distort private choices just as much 
as the federal tax code. Therefore, to avoid inefficient taxation, it 
would not be sufficient for the national government to demand that 
state and local governments perform regulatory services. The na­
tional government would also have to demand that state and local 
governments finance such services with taxes approved by the na­
tional government. 
But, if the national government can determine which state and 
local taxes are more efficient than federal taxes, then it is difficult to 
see why the national government could not simply enact such effi­
cient taxes as federal revenue-enhancing measures. There does not 
seem to be any efficiency-based reasons for forcing state and local 
governments to enact taxes that the national government could sim­
ply impose directly as a matter of federal law. The national govern­
ment would not necessarily have to administer this federal tax itself; 
instead, the national government could purchase the assistance of 
state and local governments by transferring some share of the reve­
nue derived from such taxes to state and local governments in re­
turn for their administrative services.278 Precisely such a funding 
mechanism was upheld in New York. Congress authorized the im­
position of surcharges on the interstate transfer of waste and allo­
cated the proceeds of the surcharge to those states that carried out 
the federal siting scheme.279 In sum, unlike the conscription of pri­
vate services, the commandeering of the state governments' regula­
tory machinery is unnecessary to provide any benefit such as tax 
efficiency. 280 
278. State-federal cooperation in the collection of taxes is well established. See, e.g., 
GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-86-8, TAX ADMINISTRATION: THE FED­
ERALISTATE TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM 1-11 (1985) (describing and evaluat­
ing the IRS's information exchange agreements with 49 states' tax collection agencies). 
279. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992). 
280. David Dana presents an interesting argument that state taxes might be systemati­
cally more efficient than any federal tax. By forcing state governments to implement envi­
ronmental schemes exclusively with state tax revenue, such mandates ensure that the cost of 
environmental cleanup within each state will be born by the residents of that state. If the 
national government provided funding to each state for such cleanup, then there would be a 
likelihood of a cross-subsidy from clean, wealthy states with sophisticated regulatory agencies 
to poorer, dirtier states that lack such agencies. Wealthy states, after all, tend to pay more 
federal taxes for the same level of environmental regulation, simply because the federal gov-
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One might make a second objection to the argument that com­
mandeering is inefficient. One might reason that it proves too 
much, because it would seem to condemn preemption just as much 
as commandeering. As Publius noted, the federal government 
would diminish voters' interest in state and local politics simply by 
preempting state and local policymaking in interesting areas like 
war and trade and replacing them with federal legislation.281 If it is 
somehow inefficient to reduce the influence of state and local of­
fices, then why should not such preemption be just as suspect as 
commandeering? 
Preemption can be distinguished from commandeering on two 
grounds. First, unlike commandeering, federal money cannot buy 
preemption. As argued in section II.B.2, it would be extremely 
costly for the federal government to purchase the power to regulate 
activities with interstate commercial effects from state and local 
governments, because any individual state's refusal to sell the 
power would necessarily prevent uniform enforcement of a federal 
regulatory scheme throughout the nation and thus affect other 
states' willingness to allow their laws to be preempted by national 
legislation. But federal efforts to purchase the use of state and local 
governments' regulatory processes do not present this danger, be­
cause the national government can bargain with each nonfederal 
government one at a time.282 Therefore, even if commandeering 
and preemption impose exactly the same harm on state and local 
governments, commandeering is less necessary than preemption; 
the federal government can use its spending power to secure all of 
ernment relies on progressive taxation rather than fees. Likewise, if the federal government 
funds mandates, then dirtier states that lack an environmental bureaucracy will tend to re­
ceive more funds than states that have already cleaned up their environment. In short, resi­
dents of richer and cleaner states might actually prefer that state governments be forced to 
clean up the environment without federal funding, as such funding will cause them to export 
tax dollars to residents of poorer, dirtier states. See David Dana, The Case for Unfunded 
Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 26-35 (1995). 
Dana's argument, however, presents a non sequitur. It does not justify mandates but 
rather a federal system of financing that does not depend on general revenues. If the United 
States wishes to finance environmental cleanup within each state only with funds derived 
from that state's residents, then it could easily do so simply by creating a federal scheme 
under which environmental regulation within a state would be financed exclusively by taxes, 
impact fees, or special assessments imposed exclusively on the state's residents. Tue financ­
ing mechanism upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), involved pre­
cisely such a system: if a state government did not adopt a system of unemployment 
insurance acceptable to Congress, then Congress imposed a special payroll tax only on em­
ployers within the state. 
281. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 50, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The regula­
tion of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to 
ambition."). 
282. See supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text. 
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the advantages of commandeering, but it cannot use its spending 
power as easily to preempt state and local laws. 
But quite apart from the necessity of preemption, preemption is 
generally less harmful to usefel state and local political activity than 
commandeering legislation. So, for example, when Congress for­
bids state and local governments from enacting a collective bargain­
ing law, a monetary policy, a tariff on out-of-state goods, or a 
bankruptcy code, Congress does so on the assumption that 
nonfederal interest in such topics would be counterproductive. Of 
course, lobbyists, voters, and aspiring politicians who are interested 
in these topics might have their interest in state and local govern­
ment dampened by the preemption of nonfederal governments' ju­
risdiction, but that is the point. Congress essentially makes a 
declaration that such interest ought to be dampened, because state 
and local institutions should not meddle in what ought to be exclu­
sively national concerns. 
By contrast, when the national government demands regulatory 
services from state and local governments, Congress can hardly ar­
gue that state and local governments ought not to be involved in the 
regulatory field in question. The whole point of commandeering, 
after all, is to use state and local officials to regulate in some federal 
field, presumably because such officials are well-suited for such du­
ties. By commandeering state or local regulatory processes, Con­
gress effectively admits that the institutions that it exploits ought to 
be maintained and developed. The perversity of commandeering is 
that, by unconditionally demanding services from nonfederal gov­
ernments, Congress undermines the very institutions that it seeks to 
exploit, by denying them the federal grant revenue that would 
otherwise be necessary to induce them to act.283 
283. This difference between preemption and commandeering legislation can be ex­
plained by an analogy to regulation of private persons. As Jed Rubenfeld notes, the U.S. 
Supreme Court generally allows the government to regulate private property to prevent spe­
cific uses of the property, even when the regulations impose large costs on private owners. It 
is only when the government regulates private property in order to exploit the value of such 
property - in Rubenfeld's phrase, to "use" the property - that the Court finds a violation 
of the Filth Amendment and a duty to pay compensation. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 
YALE L.J. 1077 {1993). The distinction between preemption and commandeering follows 
similar logic: when the government commandeers state governments for the purpose of ex­
ploiting the value of their services, then it makes sense for the government to compensate the 
state government so as not to deter persons from investing in the desired activity. 
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B. Commandeering as Distributionally Unjust Confiscation 
of Property 
901 
So far, this article has raised questions about the efficiency of 
commandeering. But, quite apart from efficiency-based objections, 
one might worry about the distributional equity of federal laws that 
unconditionally demand state and local services. The inequity of 
such systems can be illustrated by the hypothetical statute requiring 
private landfill operators to provide storage space for low-level ra­
dioactive waste. One might object to the statute because it places 
the burden of storing low-level radioactive waste on private landfill 
operators without any ethically persuasive basis for the imposition. 
Landfill operators do not generate the waste being foisted upon 
them and therefore do not receive special benefits from the waste 
storage program. Landfill operators are distinguished only by their 
ability to deliver the service that the government desires. It is hard 
to see why this ability suggests a greater moral obligation to bear 
the costs of waste storage when such storage benefits society 
generally.284 
One might generalize from this example and state that the gov­
ernment ought not to force private persons to bear the costs of de­
livering a service to the public merely because those persons 
happen to be most capable of delivering the service. The ability to 
provide the service might be distributed unevenly throughout the 
population, and there is no reason to believe that the distribution of 
this ability bears any relation to a morally plausible distribution of 
the costs of government. Such considerations of distributive justice 
might explain why the government generally does not obtain spe­
cialized services by conscripting them from private persons possess­
ing such skills. When the national government wishes to secure the 
services of lawyers or tax collectors, it acquires their services 
through voluntary contract. 
Similar reasoning might suggest that it is distributively inequita­
ble for the national government to force state and local govern­
ments to bear the cost of implementing federal law. Nonfederal 
governments might be well-suited to delivering a service, but it 
hardly follows that they should bear the cost of providing it. So, for 
284. This point is frequently made concerning military conscription. See, e.g., Comments 
of George Hildebrand, AM. EcoN. Assoc: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, May 1967, at 63, 65 
("Why should servicemen be required to pay this special tax for the benefit of the rest of the 
taxpayers?"). Of course, conscription of private persons - for example, military service and 
jury duty - is generally randomly distributed across the entire population by lottery. One 
cannot so distribute the burden of other sorts of in-kind contributions that require specialized 
skills. 
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example, even if county sheriff departments are capable of provid­
ing background checks on gun purchasers, none of the standard 
theories of public :finance would suggest that allocating the costs of 
such background checks to sheriff departments is equitable. If one 
wished to distribute the costs of background checks to the persons 
that create the need for such checks, then presumably one would 
:finance the service by an excise tax on firearms manufacture or 
sale.285 Likewise, if one wished to allocate the costs based on abil­
ity to pay, then one would use a steeply progressive income tax. 
But neither a "benefits received" theory nor an "ability to pay" the­
ory suggests that county governments ought to be saddled with the 
cost. 
One might respond to this argument against commandeering by 
complaining that it anthropomorphizes state and local government. 
According to this argument, state and local governments are differ­
ent from, say, private landfill operators because, unlike private per­
sons, nonfederal governments have the power to spread the costs of 
federal mandates across the general public through imposition of 
state and local taxation. The burden on the nonfederal government 
does not translate into any disparate burden on private persons. 
Therefore, when the national government commandeers state and 
local governments, there is no danger that any real person will be 
singled out to bear costs more properly borne by the public at large. 
This response, however, exaggerates the difference between pri­
vate firms and governmental organizations. It is certainly correct 
that state and local governments have the legal power to spread the 
costs of mandates among the public through broad-based state and 
local taxes. But private firms frequently also have the legal power 
to spread the costs of confiscatory regulations among their custom­
ers through increasing the prices of the goods or services that the 
firms sell. So, for example, in response to a demand that they pro­
vide landfill space to generators of radioactive waste, landfill opera­
tors can raise the price of the space for nonradioactive waste. 
One might object that the capacity of private firms to pass along 
the added cost of mandates is limited practically by the consumers' 
elasticity of demand for the product that the firm sells; if demand 
responds elastically to price increases, then the firm will not be able 
285. The House Judiciary Committee's Report on the Brady Act unsurprisingly identified 
gun retail stores as a major source of firearms used in crimes. See H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 
9 {1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984, 1986. 
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to increase its prices to cover the burden.286 This is certainly true, 
but it does not distinguish private firms from governmental organi­
zations, because governments also are constrained by limits on the 
taxpayers' demands for the governments' services. No government 
can raise taxes at will to cover costs resulting from federal man­
dates. Many state and local governments are constrained from rais­
ing additional taxes by charter and state constitutional provisions 
that require the taxes to be approved by a referendum.287 Even 
governments that lack such plebiscitary devices are constrained 
practically in their ability to increase state and local taxes by voters' 
resistance to higher tax bills.288 Thus, like private firms facing elas­
tic consumer demand, nonfederal governments facing elastic tax­
payer demand for public goods might find that they cannot 
distribute the costs of federal mandates broadly among taxpayers in 
the form of a broadly based increase in taxes.289 
Instead, the federal mandate might force the nonfederal govern­
ment to cut nonmandated services. Such cuts could, in theory, be 
broadly distributed across every state or local interest group and 
constituency, but, assuming that state legislators respond to normal 
electoral incentives, one would expect that legislators would target 
those programs favored by the least influential interest groups in 
the "benefits coalition" that control a particular level of govem­
ment.290 For example, it would be foolhardy for a legislator to fund 
a federal mandate by imposing equal cuts on popular programs like 
highways and less popular programs such as low-income housing. 
Instead, the rational legislator would target the programs with less 
powerful constituencies to bear the brunt of the cuts. 
Thus, small and less influential interest groups may bear the real 
cost of the federal demands for state or local regulatory services, 
286. On businesses' ability to respond to product taxes by increasing prices, see 
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 276, at 251-53. 
287. See Yuri Rozenfeld, Developments in State Constitutional Law, 1993: Legal Limits 
on Taxing, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 1265 (1994). 
288. State legislators are notoriously fearful of raising their constituents' taxes. See 
WA YNB L. FRANCIS, LEGISLATIVE lssUES IN THE FIFTY STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
11 (1967). 
289. There is mixed indirect empirical evidence that elected officials will reduce services 
rather than raise taxes in the face of increased costs. One study indicates that, when con­
fronted with reductions in federal aid, counties in Pennsylvania reduce expenditures rather 
than replace the lost aid with local taxes. See William F. Stine, Is Local Government Revenue 
Response to Federal Aid Symmetrical? Evidence from Pennsylvania County Governments in 
an Era of Retrenchment, 47 NATL. TAX J. 799, 810-12 (1994). 
290. A "benefits coalition" is a coalition of interest groups that control a particular level 
of government and seek to use such control to extract benefits from the government. See 
.ANToN, supra note 2, at 80-99. 
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because, if taxpayers resist higher state or local taxes, then 
nonfederal governments might finance compliance with the federal 
mandate by cutting the budgets of programs favored by the weakest 
interest groups. But it would be hard to argue that such targeted 
state or local budget cuts are a sensible or equitable way to finance 
federal services. There is no reason to suspect that the members of 
such groups receive more benefits from, or have a greater ability to 
pay for, the federal programs that they subsidize with the loss of 
their favored state or local programs. Rather, they are forced to 
pay simply because the weaker interest groups' programs are the 
most convenient source of revenue. 
To be sure, precisely the same distributive consequence would 
arise from any federal budget cut that selectively eliminated fund­
ing for a program favored by a politically weak interest group. 
Thus, one might regard "commandeering" of nonfederal officials' 
services as no more alarming than, say, budget cuts eliminating sub­
sidies for low-income housing. Apparently arbitrary fiscal decisions 
are the inevitable result of democratic dealmaking in Congress. 
The distinction between arbitrary budget cuts and conscription 
of public or private services, however, is that neither nonfederal of­
ficials nor private persons have any prima facie claim to federal 
money, whereas both have a prima facie claim to their own services. 
Such a distinction requires a defense of a particular, controversial 
baseline of entitlement, an issue that I defer until section N.A.2 
below. 
For now I wish to establish only that conscription of public and 
private services creates the same risk of distributional arbitrariness. 
One might believe that this risk is small, because arbitrary confisca­
tion is indistinguishable from arbitrary budgeting, and arbitrary 
budgets are constitutional. The important point is simply that, to 
the extent that one regards confiscation of private services as dis­
tributionally arbitrary, one should have precisely the same reaction 
to confiscation of nonfederal officials' governmental services: the 
two stand or fall together. 
In short, at least where the supply of private and public goods is 
not perfectly inelastic, federal demands for either nonfederal gov­
ernments' or private services can impose concentrated costs on spe­
cific interest groups that are indefensible under either an "ability­
to-pay" or "benefits received" principle of distributive justice. Such 
demands for in-kind contributions are defensible only on the theory 
that those who are practically capable of providing some service 
ought to bear the cost of providing it to the rest of the nation. To 
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the extent that such a theory seems morally arbitrary, the comman­
deering of regulatory services from state and local governments will 
seem just as morally arbitrary as confiscation of goods from private 
persons. 
Indeed, one can view Printz and New York as extending protec­
tions to nonfederal government that are already enjoyed by private 
persons under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. As the 
Court has repeatedly noted, the Fifth Amendment's Just Compen­
sation Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus­
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole."291 But, as ex­
plained above, any demand for specialized in-kind contributions 
based solely on the contributor's ability to render the service will 
tend to impose precisely such an inequitable burden: a demand 
that a private landowner take title to other persons' radioactive 
waste and store it on their land would certainly seem to be a regula­
tory taking. 
To be sure, the Court has upheld many governmental demands 
that private persons perform various affirmative duties. But these 
duties tend to be distinguishable from the obligations that New 
York and Printz prohibit. First, the Court has upheld "certain civic 
duties" owed by every adult citizen to the state - for example, the 
duty to testify as a witness,292 jury duty,293 military conscription,294 
and so on. But, because such obligations are widely and randomly 
distributed across the entire population, they do not pose the same 
problem of distributive injustice as duties imposed on particular 
persons or organizations, and such universal obligations would 
probably be exempt from New York and Printz as generally appli­
cable laws if imposed on nonfederal officials. 
Second, the Court frequently has upheld legal obligations to 
perform various services as a condition of pursuing particular occu­
pations. So, for example, several courts have upheld the obligation 
of lawyers to represent the indigent on the theory that lawyers are 
officers of the court who owe such duties as a price of exercising a 
291. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
292. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973). 
293. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916) (describing "services in the army, 
militia, in the jury" as outside the scope of involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
294. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). 
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public responsibility.295 But, as explained in more detail in section 
IV.A, New York would permit such conditional duties under the 
exception allowing conditional preemption, at least if the condition 
bore some nexus to the special benefits enjoyed by the occupations' 
members. It is also worth noting that courts will strike down even 
such conditional obligations as unconstitutionally confiscatory if the 
obligation seems unrelated to the conscripted persons' profession296 
or commercial pursuit.297 
In sum, government almost never unconditionally demands in­
kind contributions from particular persons or organizations simply 
because they happen to have skills or property that would be useful 
to the government: any such demands would likely offend both dis­
tributive justice and constitutional doctrine.298 One can regard New 
York and Printz as merely extending such norms to nonfederal gov­
ernments, providing them not with special state rights but merely 
parity with private rights. 
C. Commandeering as Forced Speech 
There is a third objection to commandeering legislation. Unlike 
preemption of state and local law, federal demands for nonfederal 
regulatory services force state and local politicians to advance fed­
eral policies with which they might disagree. The conventional ob-
295. See, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 
672 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965). 
296. An increasingly large number of state courts have stated that state legislatures can­
not force lawyers to represent the indigent without payment of just compensation. See 
DeLisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 
1991); White v. Board of County Commrs., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989); Makemson v. 
Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1986); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 
P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 
S.E.2d 536, 547 (W. Va. 1989). See generally Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: 
The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1990) 
(surveying cases). 
297. So, for example, some state courts have been suspicious of rent control because it 
resembles a demand on landlords to provide the in-kind benefit of housing. See Seawall 
Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that an ordinance 
establishing a moratorium, requiring 'rehabilitation of certain residential properties, and re­
quiring rental at controlled rates is a facial physical taking). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
rejected the theory that rent control combined with restrictions against the eviction of ten­
ants is a physical occupation taking under Loretto. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 
519 (1992). But even courts that do not reject rent control across the board recognize its 
potential to unjustly concentrate costs on landlords under particular circumstances. See, e.g., 
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (striking down a 12% cap on rent 
increases as denying a landowner a just and reasonable rate of return). 
298. For an argument that nonmilitary conscription of civilians' services constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking of property, see Philip Bobbitt, National Service: Unwise or Uncon­
stitutional?, in REGISTRATION AND THE DRAFr 323-24 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982). 
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jection to such forced association with federal policy is that it might 
undermine political accountability by confusing voters about the 
true positions of state and local politicians. Political accountability, 
however, is only part of the story. Even if no voters are actually 
misled about ultimate responsibility for federally mandated regula­
tions, one might believe that it is objectionable for the federal gov­
ernment to force state and local politicians to promulgate federal 
polices at odds with their own ideological views. 
It is well-established that the First Amendment bars the govern­
ment from requiring private organizations to affirm specific political 
causes through speech or action. Since West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette,299 the U.S. Supreme Court has construed the 
First Amendment to bar government from demanding any "invol­
untary af:firmation"300 of "what shall be orthodox in politics, nation­
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion."301 Barnette barred the 
West Virginia Board of Education from forcing children to pledge 
allegiance to the American flag, but later cases extended Barnette 
to other contexts in which the government did not so directly de­
mand specific endorsements from individuals. 
So, for example, the Court has held that governments are barred 
from requiring drivers to carry specific messages on their automo­
bile's license plates.302 Likewise, the First Amendment constrains 
the government's ability to force private individuals to pay dues to 
unions, bar associations, or other private organizations for the pur­
pose of subsidizing the organizations' lobbying activities and other 
political messages with which the contributor disagrees.303 Along 
similar lines, the First Amendment limits the power of government 
to force a private organization to subsidize the messages of other 
groups through in-kind contributions such as place in a parade3°4 or 
rebuttal space in a newspaper.3os 
How might these limits on private compelled speech be relevant 
for evaluating the national government's power to demand regula­
tory services from state or local governments? Quite simply, by de-
299. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
300. 319 U.S. at 633. 
301. 319 U.S. at 642. 
302. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
303. See Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 
Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 
{1977). 
304. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573-74 
{1995). 
305. See Miami Herald Publg. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974). 
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manding that nonfederal governments enact or enforce laws, the 
national government demands that state and local officials speak on 
behalf of the federal government by issuing commands to third par­
ties. State or local legislation is, of course, speech; when a legisla­
tive body enacts a law, its members endorse a command addressed 
to the persons covered by the rule. Likewise, in any enforcement 
action, executive officials issue commands to regulated persons de­
manding that they do or cease to do something which the law com­
mands or forbids. In either case, the government speaks to the 
citizenry. The national government's demand that nonfederal gov­
ernments issue such commands, therefore, implicates worries about 
compelled speech suggested in Wooley, Barnette, Abood, and other 
First Amendment cases. 
Of course, the law pervasively and quite properly requires pri­
vate and public entities to speak. Persons are obliged to serve as 
witnesses when they are subpoenaed, manufacturers must fre­
quently place warnings on their products, and employers must often 
notify employees about their statutory rights on company bulletin 
boards. But commands are an especially troubling sort of speech to 
demand from others, because, unlike disclosure of facts, commands 
inevitably are hortatory; they necessarily serve the purpose of re­
quiring the compelled speaker to lend his or her authority to the 
proposition that the command ought to be obeyed.306 This is not to 
say that factual statements, warnings, and so on, lack normative im­
plications.307 But demands that speakers utter commands or exhor­
tations are unique in that one cannot intelligibly require the 
utterance of an exhortation ·or command without intending that the 
compelled speaker lend his or her authority to the utterance. 
Such compelled endorsement of normative beliefs strikes at the 
heart of Barnette's and Wooley's rule against involuntary affirm­
ance. This is intuitively easy to see with laws demanding exhorta­
tions from private organizations. For example, a federal law 
requiring the National Rifle Association to pass a resolution con­
demning gun ownership or endorsing gun control would seem to be 
a classic example of an involuntary affirmance of an ideological po­
sition forbidden by the jurisprudence condemning forced speech. 
But a fortiori a federal law demanding that county sheriffs issue 
306. For a subtle analysis of co=ands, or "exercitives," and their connotation of "advo· 
cacy that [something] should be so," see J.L. AuSTIN, How To Do THINGS Wllli WORDS 155-
56 {2d ed. 1975). 
307. The statement "smoking causes lung disease," for example, obviously carries the 
connotation that one should not smoke. 
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commands barring felons from purchasing guns by performing 
background checks on gun purchasers effectively requires precisely 
the same exhortation from county officials; the county sheriff's 
commands differ from the hypothetical NRA resolution only in that 
the sheriff must back his or her words urging compliance with fed­
eral policies with actions. 
Examining the purposes underlying the Barnette rule confirms 
this intuition that the federal government ought to be prohibited 
from demanding regulatory speech from nonfederal governments. 
For example, the rule against forced speech is often justified as an 
effort to prevent listeners from misattributing mandated speech to 
the sincere opinion of the coerced speaker.3os Under such a "misat­
tribution theory," the purpose of the Barnette line of cases might be 
to prevent the government from effectively censoring private 
speakers' messages by compelling them to utter governmental opin­
ions that would be mistaken for the speakers' own views.309 But 
Justice O'Connor's "political accountability" argument justifies 
New York in precisely the same terms as a way to prevent voters 
from misattributing compelled utterances as the sincerely held be­
liefs of the nonfederal politician. 
Justice O'Connor's invocation of "political accountability," 
however, overlooks some other reasons to be wary of forced speech 
that are at least as powerful as the risk of misattribution. After all, 
if the only purpose of the doctrine against compelled speech were 
to prevent misattribution of government-mandated beliefs to pri­
vate persons, then the purpose could be accomplished simply by 
accompanying every government-mandated message with a dis­
claimer explaining that the message was required by law and did 
not necessarily reflect the views of the speaker. Under such a the­
ory, the government could require Prune Yard Shopping Center to 
festoon its walls with the government's preferred messages praising 
308. So, for example, the Court stated in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74, 87 (1980), that the owner of a shopping center could be forced by the State of California 
to provide pamphleteers with access to his customers and property because "[the shopping 
center is] . . .  a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they 
please" so that "[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or 
seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner." 
Likewise, in Turner Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994), the Court suggested that 
the Federal Communications Commission could require cable television companies to pro­
vide broadcasters with access to the cable system because "there appears little risk that cable 
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or 
messages endorsed by the cable operator." 
309. For such a characterization of the Court's doctrine concerning compelled speech, see 
Abner Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451 (1995). I dis­
cuss Greene's views infra note 311. 
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managed health care or condemning smoking so long as the owner 
could easily post signs "disclaim[ing] any sponsorship of the 
message,"310 because then no member of the public would misat­
tribute the beliefs to the owner.311 Likewise, Congress could re­
quire county sheriffs to issue orders forbidding the sale of firearms 
on the theory that the sheriffs had adequate incentive and ability to 
inform voters about the true source of the command. The risk of 
misattribution seems, in either case, to be highly speculative. 
There are other, equally powerful reasons for the Barnette doc­
trine that do not rest on risk of misattribution,312 and there are like­
wise dangers to communication posed by "commandeering" besides 
loss of "political accountability." Consider, for example, the danger 
of governmental speech becoming overly pervasive. If government 
could force private persons to use their property, writings, and 
voice to carry government-mandated affirmations or assertions, 
then the government essentially would have the power to conscript 
all private property and persons into a vast information agency 
working to promulgate governmental views. It is a familiar point 
that governmental speech can be threatening to private expressive 
liberties.313 But, whatever the dangers posed by governmental 
speech, they surely are exacerbated greatly if government could 
commandeer all private resources - voices, cars, walls, books, 
newspapers, front lawns, airwaves, and so on - in order to pro­
mote governmental officials' views. Unlike governmental speech 
that is funded entirely from general revenues, governmental con­
scription of private property to carry governmental messages lacks 
the limit imposed by constrained fiscal resources. To the extent 
310. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. 
311. Greene suggests that such a disclaimer itself would unconstitutionally force a private 
person to reveal his or her beliefs to the public. See Greene, supra note 309, at 474-75. But 
this is not true, because one does not reveal any of one's beliefs by simply stating that one's 
statement is compelled by law and does not necessarily reflect one's opinions. Such a dis­
claimer does not suggest that one does not, in fact, share the beliefs that the government 
requires one to announce. It simply provides a correct description of the law. 
312. The Court has never upheld a law compelling speech simply because the law 
presented no danger of misattribution. While the Court mentioned that the risk of misat­
tribution was low when it upheld the state and federal laws in Prune Yard and Turner Broad­
casting, the decisions' holdings seem to rest just as much on the fact that, in both cases, the 
government had never required the private owners to promote any specific viewpoint. In 
both cases, the right of access did not depend on the content of the message being promul­
gated. In PruneYard, the Court upheld the limit on PruneYard Shopping Center's rights by 
noting that, by granting access to all petitioners and pamphleteers, "no specific message is 
dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There consequently is no dan­
ger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular message." Prune Yard, 447 U.S. 
at 87. Likewise, the Court emphasized the content-neutrality of the "must carry" provisions 
in Turner Broadcasting. See 512 U.S. at 655. 
313. See generally MARK YuooF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983). 
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that one worries that government-favored views will enjoy an over­
weening advantage in the marketplace of ideas, one might object to 
giving government freedom from such fiscal constraint by allowing 
government to conscript in-kind communication services.314 We 
would not want government to mandate portraits of Our Leader on 
every private house even if it were well-known that such portraits 
were present by order of the state, not the wish of the owner. 
The same concern about the pervasiveness of Congress's speech 
would suggest New York's anticommandeering rule. The parallel 
between private and governmental entities here is well-stated by 
Mark Yudof: Just as the fragmentation of the national economy 
into "private economic entities . . . operat[ es] as a constraint on 
government communications,"315 so, too, "[f]ragmentation [of gov­
ernment] is inconsistent with the sort of single voice that appears to 
make government communications most effective."316 By demand­
ing that nonfederal officials legislate on behalf of the federal gov­
ernment, Congress essentially requires them to lend their authority 
to the federal policy. It is difficult to see how they could do so 
without compromising their ability to lead a rhetorically effective 
opposition to such policies. The anticommandeering rules of 
Barnette and New York both deprive the national government of 
the communicative capability of state and local governments - a 
limit that might be a healthy way to preserve political pluralism. 
Aside from worries about overextension of governmental 
speech, governmental demands impose an especially demoralizing 
psychic cost on persons who are forced to promulgate views incon­
sistent with their own purposes. Quite apart from the possibility 
that such compelled speech might garble private persons' intended 
messages, it is simply insulting to have one's property and person 
used against oneself.317 One might call this injury a burden on 
one's "integrity" - one's ability to have one's words and actions 
match one's beliefs. Some commentators have suggested that cor­
porate entities lack this interest in integrity because corporations 
cannot feel demoralized or insulted.318 But this view ignores the 
314. For an account of how fiscal limitations genuinely can confine governmental speech, 
see id. at 57 (noting financial constraints that limit governmental agencies' ability to run 
advertisements). 
315. Id. at 114. 
316. Id. at 115. 
317. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-5 (2d ed. 1988) 
(describing infringement, in the right-not-to-speak setting, of the individual's interest in 
selfhood). 
318. See Greene, supra note 309, at 482. 
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interest of an organization's members in maintaining the integrity 
of a corporation as a way of facilitating the integrity of their own 
speech.319 The government, for example, surely would undermine 
the integrity of at least some members of the National Rifle Associ­
ation by requiring the NRA to issue proclamations endorsing gun 
control because membership in the NRA is one important way in 
which individuals express their views about firearms. To the extent 
that an association provides a means by which its members' views 
and voices can be heard, federal policies that distort the organiza­
tion's voice pro tanto distort the members' voice. 
One might object to this analogy between forcing private per­
sons to speak and governmental officials to issue commands by not­
ing that governments force their employees and agents to speak all 
the time: police officers are required to issue commands to sus­
pects, district attorneys are required to issue exhortations to juries, 
and county commissioners are forced to enact taxes for state pro­
grams. For that matter, federal agencies must surely carry out the 
will of Congress. If the state can force its agents and employees to 
speak as part of their governmental duties, then why cannot the 
federal government also force such officials to speak on behalf of 
the federal government? 
The short and simple answer is that state and local officials have 
agreed to speak on behalf of their employer, the state governments; 
they have not agreed to speak on behalf of the federal government. 
Public or private organizations can certainly require their agents to 
speak as part of the agents' organizational duties: if the Tobacco 
Institute hires a spokesperson, then the spokesperson surely must 
say what the Institute tells him to say at a press conference and set 
aside his personal scruples about smoking, or else lose his job. 
Without such a power, an organization would cease to exist. It 
hardly follows, however, that organizations can force persons who 
have not voluntarily assented to act as the organization's agents to 
speak on behalf of the organization. One does not waive one's 
right to abstain from speech with respect to every organization just 
because one has done so with respect to one organization. 
First Amendment doctrine reflects a distinction between gov­
ernment's power to control the speech of its own agents and gov­
ernment's inability to control the speech of persons who are not its 
employees. A government's restrictions on the speech of its own 
319. For an account of different ways in which a corporate entity might assert the auton­
omy interests of its members, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, Rimrrs, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZA­
TIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 60-77 (1986). 
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employees can be justified as a necessary concession to bureau­
cratic efficiency.320 After all, the very idea of bemg an agent is that 
you speak not for yourself, but for your principal.321 By contrast, 
nonfederal governments are not agents of Congress.322 If Congress 
wishes to induce state or local officials to speak on their behalf, 
then Congress can do what it routinely does with private persons: it 
can induce them through voluntary contracts to waive their First 
Amendment rights.323 
But a stubborn insistence on the public-private distinction might 
still lead one to object to the analogy between private persons' First 
Amendment rights and nonfederal officials' right not to issue or en­
force federal commands. One might object that, unlike private or­
ganizations, governmental organizations cannot possess an interest 
in free expression. As Mark Yudof has noted, "[t]he First Amend­
ment has been viewed historically as involving limitations on gov­
ernment, not as a source of government rights."324 Several courts 
have echoed this view, stating that the First Amendment does not 
protect governmental speech.325 
But this sharp distinction between private organizations' rights 
and governmental immunities is more a product of a habitual obses­
sion with drawing sharp distinctions between public and private 
spheres rather than an accurate account of the law. As Akhil Amar 
has explained insightfully, the First Amendment was not enacted 
originally merely to protect individual rights; it was enacted to pro­
tect the people's collective right of self-government through petition 
320. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563 (1968). 
321. Cf. ROBERT Posr, CoNSTITUTIONAL DoMAINs: DEMOCRACY, CoMMUNITY, MAN­
AGEMENT ch. 6 (1995) (arguing that the autonomy of governmental agents is necessarily cur­
tailed for such managerial purposes when they play an instrumental role in an organization 
dedicated to accomplishing some specific goal). 
322. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
323. The Court generally has affirmed conditions on government employment requiring 
employees to waive specific speech rights when such waiver is related to the job that the 
employees are hired to perform. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 
(1980) (holding that a CIA agent may be required to waive his First Amendment right to 
publish an account of the agency's operations as a condition of employment). 
324. YUDoF, supra note 313, at 44. 
325. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The Frrst Amendment protects the press from governmen­
tal interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government."); Muir v. Alabama 
Educ. Television Commn., 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that it "may be 
essentially correct" that governmental speech lacks Frrst Amendment protection); Anderson 
v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass. 1978) (stating that a state law forbidding mu­
nicipal expenditures to promote a referendum issue could not violate the Frrst Amendment 
because "we suspect that the Frrst Amendment has nothing to do with this intra-state ques­
tion of the rights of a political subdivision"). 
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and public speech.326 Doctrines of federalism, likewise, are not sim­
ply a matter of "structure," without relationship to "rights" of free 
expression. To the contrary, state immunities routinely are justified 
by the Court in terms of their power to protect free expression of 
nonfederal officials. 
Consider, for example, the constitutional doctrine of legislative 
immunity. The Court justifies this doctrine by invoking arguments 
and rhetoric familiar from First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has long held that state and local legislators 
cannot be held liable for their public statements or legislative ac­
tions - their speech, debate, and voting records.327 This immunity 
bars liability even for what might otherwise violate the U.S. Consti­
tution itself when such injuries are the result of legislative 
speech,328 and it limits the power of the federal courts to remedy 
what are conceded to be violations of federal constitutional 
rights.329 Although the Court has not cited the First Amendment as 
a justification for such immunity, the Court's reasons for the immu­
nity invoke precisely the same sorts of interests that the First 
Amendment protects: the need to protect "the fullest liberty of 
speech" in the legislature330 and thereby preserve "the rights of the 
people to representation in the democratic process. "331 
The Court's doctrine of legislative immunity suggests a view of 
state and local elected policymaking bodies as "expressive organiza­
tions" analogous to, say, the ACLU or the Sierra Club.332 Such or­
ganizations are devoted to promulgating beliefs of the 
organizations' constituents by coordinating and amplifying that 
voice. Publius seems to share this view of nonfederal governments 
when he argues that, by providing "signals of general alarm," state 
legislative bodies would coordinate opposition to any attempt by 
the federal government to launch a coup d'etat.333 In Publius's 
326. See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1152 
(1991). 
327. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 
U.S. 719 (1980); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl. Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 
(1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
328. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373 (invoking immunity to bar a claim under the U.S. Consti­
tution that a state legislators' investigation deprived a person of his federal due process 
rights). 
329. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). 
330. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373. 
331. Lake Country Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 404-405. 
332. The phrase is coined by Meir Dan-Cohen. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Col­
lective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and 
the State, 19 CAL. L. REv. 1229 (1991). 
333. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 50, at 298 (James Madison). 
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view, state and local governments serve the purpose that commit­
tees of correspondence served during the Revolutionary War. They 
"open a correspondence" and generally overcome collective action 
problems that might otherwise hinder opposition to federal policies 
through such mechanisms as hortatory resolutions and coordination 
of plans of resistance.334 In short, the Court and Publius recognize 
what should be obvious: like the leaders of other expressive organi­
zations, nonfederal politicians are paid to talk. 
Such a role for state and local governments implies that such 
governments ought to enjoy an entitlement to withhold their voice 
and refuse to implement federal policies enacted by Congress. New 
York and Printz provide a right to silence analogous to the Barnette 
entitlement that private persons enjoy, a right to silence that is the 
mirror image of the protection for speech and debate protected by 
Tenney and its progeny. By allowing state and local legislators to 
refuse to vote for federally favored programs, New York prevents 
the federal government from compromising the legislator's inde­
pendence from such policies. At least two courts have noted this 
connection between the implied right of free speech enjoyed by 
state and local policymakers under Tenney and the power to refuse 
to follow the command of the federal government to vote for fed­
eral programs.335 In short, the same considerations of autonomous 
speech and silence that are used to support the speech rights of 
nongovernmental organizations such as newspapers,336 political par­
ties,337 or corporations338 can vindicate the New York entitlement. 
334. See id.; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurispru­
dence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 341, 360. 
335. See Clarke v. United States, 886 F.3d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 
699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane); Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523 {1st Cir. 1989); see also 
Steven Sherr, Note, Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment's Protection of Legisla­
tive Voting, 101 YALE LJ. 233 (1991). Clarke, however, is a deeply flawed opinion, because it 
fails to recognize that public officials, like private persons, can waive their Flrst Amendment 
interests when they agree to act as the agents of a government. In Clarke, the D.C. Circuit ' 
held that Congress could not require the City Council of the District of Columbia to rescind a 
"gay rights" ordinance as a condition for receiving federal aid, because such a condition on 
the legislative speech of the council members violated their Flrst Amendment rights. See 
Clarke, 886 F.2d at 417. But D.C. City Council members, like members of the other federal 
agencies, have agreed to act as federal agents. It is difficult to see why their acceptance of 
federal office should not waive their right not to carry out Congress's policies. 
336. See Miami Herald Publg. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974). 
337. See Democratic Party of United States v. WISconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). 
338. See Frrst Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 {1978). 
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IV. FOUR .APPLICATIONS OF THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY: 
"GENERALLY .APPLICABLE LAWS," CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, MANDATES ON 
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS, AND FUNDED MANDATES 
This article, relying on general intuitions about the cost of inter­
governmental transactions and the propriety of forcing persons to 
make in-kind contributions to government, has argued so far that 
the states ought to have an entitlement to refuse to implement na­
tional law. Even if the general allocation of authority provided by 
New York is sensible, however, four more specific questions remain 
concerning New York's application. These are: (1) whether New 
York should be applied to so-called "generally applicable laws"; (2) 
the limits on conditional preemption that a doctrine of unconstitu­
tional conditions ought to impose; (3) the application of New York's 
anticommandeering rule to executive and judicial officials; and (4) 
the possibility of allowing the federal government to impose funded 
mandates on nonfederal governments - that is, the possibility of 
protecting state and local governments from commandeering only 
with a liability rule. Using the defense of New York in Parts II and 
m as a benchmark, Part IV answers these four questions, refining 
and qualifying the case for New York and Printz. 
A. "Generally Applicable Laws, " Conditional Preemption, and 
the Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions 
One might object to the arguments presented so far by noting 
that the government routinely and uncontroversially requires pri­
vate businesses to comply with federal mandates. Consider some of 
the requirements imposed on business enterprises by the modern 
regulatory state that require economic enterprises to pay employees 
a minimum wage, pay unemployment insurance premiums, install 
safety devices on consumer products, install wheelchair ramps to 
provide reasonable access for the handicapped, bargain in good 
faith with collective bargaining units, install scrubbers in smoke­
stacks, and otherwise provide dozens of in-kind contributions to 
protect the health and safety of consumers and employees. What 
distinguishes these sorts of duties that are routinely imposed on 
businesses from the sort of obligations forbidden by New York? 
The majority in New York sidestepped any careful analysis of 
such regulatory burdens by simply exempting them from the scope 
of New York without any explanation. In a cryptic paragraph, the 
Court distinguished the minimum wage law imposed on a local gov-
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ernment in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority339 
from New York on the ground that the minimum wage law in 
Garcia was "generally applicable" to both private and governmen­
tal organizations. By contrast, in New York, Congress had not 
"subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private par­
ties."340 The Court did not hazard any opinion as to why this dis­
tinction should matter, even in the face of Justice White's complaint 
that the distinction was "an insupportable and illogical distinction," 
because "an incursion of state sovereignty hardly seems more con­
stitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' spe­
cific actions also applies to private action."341 
Some commentators have attempted to make sense of the dis­
tinction between "generally applicable laws" and laws applicable to 
governments alone by arguing that the political process is more ca­
pable of preventing the former.342 But, as this article noted in sec­
tion I.A, such an argument is unpersuasive. Indeed, as explained 
below in section IV.A.1, the entire concept of general applicability 
should be mostly irrelevant to the scope of New York. "Generally 
applicable laws" should be exempted from New York, not because 
they apply to private persons as well as nonfederal officials, but 
rather because such laws typically have the form of conditional pre­
emption rather than unconditional command; they give both pri­
vate and governmental organizations the option of reducing their 
activity level - laying off workers, ceasing to emit air pollution, 
and so on - rather than complying with the standard of care im­
posed by the federal government. 
As section IV.A.2 suggests, if such a power of conditional pre­
emption were unlimited, New York would be rendered an empty 
formality. If the Court constrains conditional preemption with a 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, however, allowing condi­
tional preemption of nonfederal policymaking only when the condi­
tion mitigates the costs of a preemptible nonfederal government's 
activity, then all properly constrained conditional preemption - in­
cluding generally applicable laws - ought to be exempt from the 
anticommandeering rule of New York. 
339. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
340. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992). 
341. New York, 505 U.S. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting). 
342. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 1384. 
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1. Generally Applicable Laws and the Functional Defense of 
State Autonomy 
All governments frequently place conditions on private activi­
ties, prohibiting anyone from engaging in those activities unless 
such activities meet governmentally defined standards. So, for ex­
ample, the federal government places a myriad of restrictions on 
economic enterprises: federal labor and employment law bars en­
terprises from hiring employees unless they meet federal standards 
regarding wages, hours, unemployment insurance, and workplace 
saf ety;343 likewise, federal environmental laws bar manufacturers 
from burning fuel unless they meet federal air pollutant emission 
standards,344 and federal consumer safety laws prohibit the sale of 
goods that do not meet consumer safety standards.345 
As a formal matter, one need not invoke the notion of "general 
applicability" to explain why such regulatory duties can be ex­
tended to nonfederal officials: quite apart from their application to 
private persons, such laws are not formally covered by the New 
York doctrine because such laws are instances of conditional pre­
emption rather than unconditional demands for goods or services. 
Such laws typically give both private and governmental organiza­
tions the option of either reducing the levels of some costly activity 
- for example, incinerating waste, dumping sewage into rivers, em­
ploying workers, or selling goods - or conducting such activity ac­
cording to federal standards of care. In other words, the federal 
government "preempts" some activity unless the activity conforms 
to federal standards. One theoretically could uphold the applica­
tion of minimum wage laws to state and local governments on the 
same theory that New York expressly permits other systems of con­
ditional preemption such as the OSHA. Just as OSHA gives state 
governments the option of either getting out of the business of reg­
ulating workplace safety or regulating according to federal stan­
dards, so, too, the Fair Labor Standards Act gives state 
governments the option of getting out of the business of employing 
persons in covered occupations or employing them according to 
federal standards. 
Of course, the fact that such laws formally give regulated orga­
nizations the "option" of reducing activity levels might seem trivial, 
given that such an "option" might require the abolition of the or-
343. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). 
344. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994). 
345. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). 
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ganization itself. There are, however, two reasons to believe that 
such an option is less trivial than one might believe at first glance. 
First, many such conditional duties can be described as efforts to 
preempt undesirable activities by requiring private or governmental 
entities to mitigate the costs of their own socially harmful activities. 
So, for example, consumer product safety standards, environmental 
laws, workers compensation, disability insurance, and a plethora of 
other social welfare legislation are all analogous to tort duties of 
care. Like Pigouvian taxes, they ensure that governmental and pri­
vate enterprises internalize the costs of their own costly activities by 
requiring them either to reduce activity levels, take precautions 
against hazards, or offer insurance to cover the likely costs of such 
hazards. The option provided by such laws to reduce activity levels 
is not a trivial formality but rather a central mechanism by which 
the purpose of such laws is realized.346 
Thus, when federal environmental laws bar a municipal sewage 
treatment plant from dumping sewage into a river unless the sew­
age is treated according to federal standards, the federal govern­
ment is not conscripting the municipality into providing clean 
water, but rather barring ("preempting") it from injuring the public 
through water pollution. Likewise, the federal government is not 
conscripting states when it forces states to provide a state judicial 
forum to hear complaints that their own officers violated a com­
plainant's federal constitutional rights347 because the state can 
avoid the duty to provide a forum simply by abstaining from the 
preemptible conduct. In all such cases, federal laws serv:e the same 
purpose as simple preemption - elimination of preemptible activi­
ties - but do so by giving the nonfederal government an option to 
reduce the activity levels ex ante - for example, by reducing sew­
age output or civil rights violations - or remedying them ex post -
by treating the sewage or providing state courts to hear constitu­
tional violations. 
Moreover, to the extent that "generally applicable laws" serve 
the purpose of mitigating the social costs of state and local govern­
ments' own activities, it is not difficult to see why such laws are 
consistent with the functional defense of New York and Printz that 
Parts II and III of this article presented. Recall the argument in 
section III.A concerning efficiency. According to this · argument, 
346. See WILUAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 66-71 (1987) {discussing how a reduction in activity levels is an option for reduc­
ing tort liability under a strict liability regime). 
347. See General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). 
920 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:813 
the federal government's unconditional demands for nonfederal 
governments' regulatory services tend to be inefficient because such 
demands for in-kind contributions tend to discourage investment in 
the goods or services that the federal government demands.348 But 
such an argument based on efficiency has less application to federal 
laws that force state and local governments to internalize the costs 
of their activities. Such laws certainly discourage nonfederal gov­
ernments' activities, but, if the activities impose costs on society, 
then they ought to be discouraged. Compare the mandate to an 
excise tax on a harmful activity like smoking, gas consumption, or 
gambling. To the extent that the taxed activity really imposes costs 
on society, the disincentive to engage in the taxed activity is needed 
to ensure an efficient level of the harmful activity.349 
Likewise, as noted in section ID.B, it may be distributively un­
just to force state and local governments to pay for some public 
service if those nonfederal governments do not create any special 
need for the service, derive no special benefit from the program, or 
have no special ability to pay for the program. This objection, how­
ever, is inapplicable to federal demands that nonfederal govern­
ments mitigate the costs of their own actions. It is intuitively 
obvious that such governments - like private organizations -
ought to pay for the costs that they impose on society. 
Not all conditional prohibitions, though, can be described as ef­
forts to force actors to internalize the costs of their activities. It 
would be difficult, for example, to characterize minimum wage laws 
as having such a purpose. Instead, such regulatory burdens are typ­
ically justified as efforts to prevent employers or producers from 
reaping "exploitative" profits by engaging in "unfair" commercial 
practices. In effect, such statutes prohibit the regulated entities 
from forming "unconscionable" contracts with their employees, 
customers, etc.3so 
348. See supra section III.A. 
349. For the conventional case in favor of excise taxes to discourage costly activities, see 
JosEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 195 (5th ed. 1987). 
350. Consider, for example, the Senate's justification for the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619, 2631-2636, 2651-2654 (1993): 
A central reason that labor standards are necessary is to relieve the competitive pressure 
placed on responsible employers by employers who act irresponsibly. Federal labor 
standards take broad societal concerns out of the competitive process so that conscien­
tious employers are not forced to compete with unscrupulous employers. 
S. REP. No. 103-3, at 7 (1993); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (uphold­
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act on the theory that the statute was a reasonable means of 
preventing low-wage paying employers in states lacking employment regulations from de­
pressing wages in other states through "unfair competition"). 
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Like Pigouvian taxes, such limits on "exploitative" contracts are 
entirely consistent with the functional defense of the New York en­
titlement presented in this article. The presumption of regulations 
barring some contractual relationship - say, employment contracts 
that pay the employee wages beneath the statutory minimum - is 
that such agreements do not represent welfare-maximizing bargains 
because of inadequate information or other impediment to fair bar­
gaining. Such regulations also presume that the gains from such 
"exploitative" trade represent ill-gotten gains from "unfair compe­
tition." Depriving the parties of such gains, therefore, is not dis­
tributionally unjust. 
None of these arguments in favor of generally applicable laws 
depend on the notion that such laws are applicable to private as 
well as governmental organizations. It is true as a matter of fact 
that most generally applicable laws - that is, environmental regu­
lations, regulations of employees' working conditions, and so on -
can be defended as conditional preemption of what legislators re­
gard as socially costly activity. But whether a law is "generally ap­
plicable" is a distraction that confuses the real normative issue 
raised by such laws - whether the federal regulation requires the 
regulated entity to mitigate or insure against the costs of the entity's 
own activity or disgorge profits from inefficient or unconscionable 
contracts. If it does, then the functional argument suggests that 
New York and Printz should interpose no barrier to such a federal 
demand. 
2. Conditional Preemption and the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions 
Invoking New York's exception for conditional preemption to 
uphold generally applicable laws, however, raises some difficult 
questions that New York does not attempt to answer. If there are 
no limits on Congress's power to use conditional preemption, then 
New York is a meaningless formality, because the national govern­
ment could always require that state and local governments either 
make policy according to federal standards or disband themselves. 
If such a broad use of conditional preemption seems fanciful, 
consider the Court's decision in FERC v. Mississippi.351 In FERC, 
Mississippi challenged Titles I and III of the Public Utility Regula­
tory Policies Act ("PURPA"). These provisions required the Mis­
sissippi Public Service Commission to "consider" the adoption and 
351. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
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implementation of specific rate designs and standards of regulation 
for the purpose of encouraging the conservation of energy.352 In 
upholding these provisions, the FERC Court characterized these 
provisions as conditional preemption, asserting that "[t]here is 
nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legis­
lative program."353 Rather, the Court reasoned that, because 
"Congress could have pre-empted the field [of utility rate­
making]," Titles I and III of PURPA "simply condition continued 
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of 
federal proposals."354 The Court acknowledged that it would be 
difficult for the states to abandon the field of utility regulation 
given that "Congress . . .  has failed to provide an alternative regula­
tory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default. "355 
The Court stated, however, that "in other contexts the Court has 
recognized that valid federal enactments may have an effect on 
state policy - and may, indeed, be designed to induce state action 
in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress' regulatory au­
thority."356 To support this statement, the Court cited Oklahoma v. 
United States Civil Service Commission, 357 observing that Congress 
has the power to attach conditions to federal funds that, if imposed 
unconditionally, would be beyond Congress's power to regulate.358 
The FERC Court's analogy between the power of conditional 
preemption and conditional spending, however, uncritically abdi­
cates any responsibility for defining a baseline of state entitlements 
by which to define federal coercion of state governments. It cer­
tainly may be true that Congress can attach any conditions to fed­
eral funds without depriving state governments of autonomy.359 It 
hardly follows that they can attach any conditions to denial of pre­
emption. When Congress refuses to provide a grant-in-aid to state 
governments, it denies them an asset that, absent federal efforts to 
raise and appropriate revenue, would not be available to the state 
governments.360 In other words, the federal government is denying 
352. See 456 U.S. at 746-48. 
353. 456 U.S. at 765. 
354. 456 U.S. at 465-66. 
355. 456 U.S. at 766. 
356. 456 U.S. at 766. 
357. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
358. FERG, 456 U.S. at 766. 
359. The Court seems to have come close to such a position, over Justice O'Connor's 
objections. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
360. This is not to deny that the federal taxation required to fund a grant-in-aid makes 
state taxation more difficult by decreasing the tax base available to the state. But a reduction 
of federal taxes by the amount of the federal grant program certainly would not increase 
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the state governments a "benefit" that is largely the product of 
Congress's legislative effort. By contrast, when the federal govern­
ment preempts existing state laws, the federal government deprives 
state governments of something that, absent federal action, state 
governments would retain. In conventional terms, the federal gov­
ernment is imposing a "cost" or "harm" by destroying something 
that is largely the result of state legislative effort. Conflating the 
two regulatory techniques is as illogical as arguing that, when a lo­
cal government downzones a private parcel of land to reduce its 
purchase price, it acts no more improperly than when it simply 
purchases the lot with its revenues.361 
To be sure, one need not accept uncritically such a distinction 
based on conventional understandings of "harms" and "bene­
fits."362 But, while no baseline can be described as natural, some 
are less arbitrary than others.363 One plausibly can argue that Con­
gress's spending power should not be constrained by a doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions because, as section II.A suggests, the 
federal government has no monopoly over the power to generate 
revenue.364 By contrast, Congress does have a monopoly over the 
power to waive preemption of state or local policies; no other insti­
tution can reinstate nonfederal policies that Congress has pre-
state governments' revenue by the same amount as the bestowal of a federal grant-in-aid. 
See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 144-46. The benefit of the federal grant to the state, therefore, 
is the amount of the grant minus the revenue loss to the state resulting from the increase in 
federal taxes necessary to fund the grant and consequent loss of tax base available for state 
taxation. 
361. The former technique is generally condemned as unconstitutional by state courts. 
See, e.g., Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); City of 
Miami v. Silver, 257 So. 2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 40 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 1949). 
362. The judicial decisions and academic literature dealing with regulatory takings have 
repeatedly criticized the distinction. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit­
conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsi­
bility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVIL 
L.J. 433 (1995). Lucas itself invokes the distinction, however, just before criticizing it. See 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 ("[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically 
beneficial or productive options for its use . . .  carry with them a heightened risk that private 
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm."). The conflation of harms and benefits certainly makes sense from an 
economic perspective. But, as William FISchel, an economist, has observed, "[i]t is cleverness 
of this sort by which economists read themselves out of the takings debate." WILLIAM F1s­
CI-1EL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, EcoNoMics, AND PoLmcs 354 (1995). 
363. The literature on the definition of baselines for defining unjustified coercion is rich 
and large. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 3-103; CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTI­
TUTION (1993); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1351-78 (1984); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HAR.v. L. REv. 1413, 1421 (1989). 
364. See supra notes 179-84. 
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empted. Therefore, following one frequently defended theory of 
unconstitutional conditions, one might wish to constrain Congress's 
conditional preemption of nonfederal policies in order to prevent 
abuse of monopolistic power.365 
By conflating conditional preemption and conditional spending, 
the FERC Court essentially abandoned any effort to define a doc­
trine of unconstitutional conditions that might be invoked for the 
defense of federalism. While this sort of formalism has been used 
by both academic commentators and judicial opinions to deprive 
state governments of meaningful constitutional protection, it is hard 
to see why the notion of unconstitutional conditions should be re­
pudiated when applied to federalism doctrines but accepted in 
other contexts.366 
How might one avoid such a result and yet preserve the tool of 
conditional preemption for Congress's use? Following the Court's 
theory of unconstitutional conditions suggested in Nollan v. Califor­
nia Coastal Commission, 367 one might prohibit conditional preemp­
tion of state or local policies whenever (1) the condition that the 
nonfederal government must meet would, if imposed uncondition­
ally, be unconstitutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption 
of nonfederal policy merely to gain leverage to extract compliance 
with the condition. Nollan provides an illustration of how such a 
theory would operate in practice. The Court struck down the Cali-
365. For arguments that the theory of unconstitutional conditions is well·suited to con­
strain the monopoly power of the government, see EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 52-58; 
Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983). 
One also might argue that the "normal" entitlement enjoyed by nonfederal organizations 
in the United States ought to define nonfederal governments' baseline of entitlement. 
Robert Ellickson has argued that, in the context of land-use regulation, the "normal behav­
ior" within a community ought to define the landowners' baseline of entitlement against the 
state. See Robert Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 
86 YALE LJ. 385, 419-21 (1977). Reasoning by analogy, one might argue that nonfederal 
governments ought to enjoy a baseline of entitlement rooted in the normal behavior ex­
pected of other organizations within the United States. That is, like private organizations, 
nonfederal governments should not be required to make in-kind contributions of goods and 
services to finance federal operations. 
366. The Supreme Court, for example, rejected the notion that Congress's power to block 
the movement of goods and services across state boundaries is constrained by a doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Professor David 
Engdahl has applauded this decision, asserting that Congress should be free to pursue any 
purpose whenever it uses a regulatory technique enumerated in Article I. See David 
Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE LJ. 1, 17-21 (1994). Engdahl, however, presents no 
sustained argument for why such a view of the Article I either makes any functional sense or 
even is required by the text of Article I. For a criticism of Darby, see Donald Regan, How to 
Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Re-Write United States v. Lopez, 
94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 576-77, 589 (1995). 
367. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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fornia Coastal Commission's conditional denial of a building permit 
because, according to the Court, the denial of the Nollans' applica­
tion for a building permit was nothing more than a way to pressure 
the Nollans into donating a lateral easement across their private 
beach to the public.368 The Court reasoned that an unconditional 
demand for such an easement would certainly constitute a regula­
tory taking.369 But, if the denial of the permit served no purpose 
except as a device by which to punish the Nollans for refusing to 
donate the easement, then the denial of the permit was just as un­
constitutional as an unconditional demand for the easement.370 
The analogy to conditional preemption is straightforward: if the 
only purpose of preemption of state or local policy is simply to pres­
sure state or local governments into enacting regulations according 
to federal standards, then the preemption would be just as unconsti­
tutional as an outright demand for the regulatory services. In such 
a case, the threat of preemption would be no more than a sanction, 
akin to a fine or prison sentence, with which to enforce an admit­
tedly unconstitutional demand. 
If one applies such Nollan analysis to New York, then the crucial 
question becomes determining the purpose of a federal threat to 
preempt state or local policy. Following Nollan, one might make 
this determination by asking whether there is a "nexus" between 
the threatened preemption and the condition that the nonfederal 
government must meet to avert preemption. If the government 
genuinely believes that the activity threatened with preemption im­
poses a cost on society and if the government also believes that the 
condition tends to mitigate that cost, then one might uphold the 
conditional preemption as a more refined effort to achieve what the 
government is entitled to achieve through outright preemption. On 
the other hand, if there seems to be no similarity - no "nexus" -
between the purposes served by preemption and those served by 
the nonfederal governments' compliance with the condition, then 
one might suspect that the threat of preemption is nothing more 
than a convenient sanction with which to exert leverage over state 
and local governments and induce them to yield their New York 
entitlement. 
Using this test of unconstitutional conditions, the system of con­
ditional preemption upheld in FERC would seem to be at least sus-
368. 483 U.S. at 841. 
369. 483 U.S. at 831. 
370. 483 U.S. at 840-41. 
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picious. The FERC Court reasoned that, because the United States 
could preempt all state regulations of public utilities, the United 
States' demands that state public utility commissions consider vari­
ous energy-saving proposals could be regarded simply as implicit 
preemption of all state utility regulations that did not meet federal 
standards.371 But this reasoning does not explain how the implicit 
threat of preemption has any nexus to the goal of insuring that utili­
ties implement federal energy-saving standards. After all, unless 
unregulated utilities are somehow more inclined toward conserva­
tion of energy than regulated utilities, the preemption of utility reg­
ulation does nothing to advance, and might even impede, PURPA's 
purpose. Like the California Coastal Commission's denial of a 
building permit, the preemption of state utility regulation resembles 
nothing more than an effort to exert pressure on state governments 
to comply with federal regulatory standards. Knowing that it is po­
litically infeasible for states simply to cease regulating utilities, Con­
gress threatened to eliminate ratemaking as a way to induce 
compliance with the federal regulatory scheme. 
Most conventional systems of conditional preemption avoid the 
suspect character of PURPA by calling for federal agencies to im­
pose federal regulations if the nonfederal government decides to 
withdraw from the regulatory field. The willingness of the federal 
government to occupy the field with its own regulations suggests 
that the national government really regards nonfederal law as im­
posing costs that can be mitigated either by federal preemption or 
by the nonfederal governments' regulation according to federal 
standards. Overruling FERC, in short, would not entail judicial dis­
ruption of many other established regulatory programs. 
What about generally applicable laws - regulations of wages 
and hours, employment discrimination, worker safety, emissions of 
pollutants, and so on - that are frequently applied to state and 
local governments? As suggested above, such federal standards 
seem rationally defensible as efforts to mitigate the costs of private 
or governmental activities by requiring the regulated organizations 
either to reduce their own activity levels or to conduct the activity 
according to federal standards. But these characteristics would also 
allow such laws to survive the unconstitutional conditions analysis 
suggested here. 
Take, for example, the application of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to a local government in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
371. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-66 {1982). 
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Transit Authority. 372 As observed above, such a law has the form of 
conditional preemption. The statute gives state and local govern­
ments the option either of ceasing to employ persons covered by 
the statute or of setting wages and hours in conformity with federal 
standards. The law arguably imposes no unconstitutional condition, 
because both options provided by the statute serve the same pur­
pose; they both prevent unscrupulous employers from forcing their 
competitors to impose harsh working conditions on employees in 
response to unfair competition. If the transit authority pays the 
minimum wage, then there is no danger that transit authority wages 
will drive down the wages of competitors. But, if the transit author­
ity stopped paying substandard wages by simply ceasing its opera­
tions altogether, then the danger of unfair competition would also 
be averted, albeit at greater cost. 
The same case can be made for virtually all common-law or reg­
ulatory standards - such as OSHA, the Clean Water Act, or the 
common law rule against negligence - imposed on nonfederal gov­
ernments. So long as the federal government genuinely imposes 
conditions on the activity to reduce or insure against costs arising 
out of the activity, the conditions bear a sufficiently close nexus to 
the complete prohibition of the activity. As section III.D.1 noted, 
such conditional preemption also would be consistent with the 
functional defense of New York. In this sense, the test for unconsti­
tutional conditions that Nollan suggests in the context of govern­
mental regulation of private actions also is suggested by the 
functional argument in Part III of this article for federal regulation 
of nonfederal governments' activities. 
B. The Functional Theory and Federal Laws That Commandeer 
Nonfederal Judicial and Executive Officers 
Aside from the exception for generally applicable laws, a second 
important qualification to the New York entitlement has inspired 
controversy in the Court and among commentators - the excep­
tion allowing Congress to impose duties upon state courts and, 
more controversially, state and local executive officials. Since the 
Court first announced the doctrine of state autonomy in 
Dennison, 373 it has been suggested that the doctrine ought not to 
372. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
373. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
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apply to "ministerial duties" of executive officials,374 and, since the 
Court's decision in Testa v. Katt, 375 the doctrine has provided that 
Congress can force state courts to adjudicate federal cases, at least 
when the federal issue is "similar" to state law issues that such state 
courts resolve. 
The Printz decision and numerous scholars canvass the ques­
tions raised by Testa and analogous issues of executive duties to 
implement federal law. This section shall explore a much more lim­
ited issue: what does this article's functional argument suggest con­
cerning the propriety of such exceptions? 
1. Testa v. Katt and the Federal Commandeering of State Court 
Judges 
In Testa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state courts of 
Rhode Island could not refuse to enforce the Emergency Price 
Control Act, a federal wartime measure allowing buyers of goods to 
sue sellers in state court for selling goods above the federally im­
posed price ceiling.376 The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied 
the traditional rule that state courts do not enforce the penal laws 
of the United States or sister states. But the Testa Court rejected 
the Rhode Island court's premise that the state courts have "no 
more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United States 
than [they have] to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign 
country."377 
Testa's ambiguous character has long been recognized. The case 
can be read either as suggesting that state courts have only a duty of 
nondiscrimination against federal law or as implying a broader un­
conditional oblig'ation on the part of state courts to hear federal 
claims and cases. In favor of the former "nondiscrimination" the­
ory, one can cite the Testa Court's statement that the case presented 
the question of whether Rhode Island courts could refuse to adjudi­
cate federal questions "though their jurisdiction is adequate to en­
force similar Rhode Island 'penal' statutes. "378 This language 
suggests that Testa amounts to nothing more than a specific applica­
tion of the rule that states may not discriminate against federal in-
374. See 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 80 (relating the suggestion by counsel for Kentucky that the 
rule against forcing state officials to assume federal duties does not apply to the "ministerial" 
duty of extraditing a fugitive from justice). 
375. 330 U.S. 386 (1946). 
376. See 330 U.S. at 394. 
377. 330 U.S. at 389. 
378. 330 U.S. at 388. 
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stitutions and laws379 - a norm first suggested in dicta from 
McCulloch380 and developed in both case law and federal statutes 
expounding the doctrine of federal tax immunity.381 Indeed, this is 
how Justice O'Connor interprets Testa in her dissent in FERC v. 
Mississippi when she describes Testa as holding that "a State may 
not exercise its judicial power in a manner that discriminates be­
tween analogous federal and state causes of action."382 On the 
other hand, commentators have noted that Testa also seems to give 
Congress an unconditional right to demand that state courts hear 
federal causes of action.383 Such a view is suggested by Testa's ap­
proving quotation of language from Mondou v. New York stating 
that the policies chosen by Congress were deemed to be the policy 
· of all states - " 'as much . . .  as if the act had emanated from [the 
states'] own legislature."'384 
Other writers have thoroughly canvassed the doctrinal case for a 
nondiscrimination rule.385 This article asks a narrower question: 
Which view of Testa - the nondiscrimination view or the broader 
duty-to-hear-all-federal-claims view - makes more functional 
sense in light of the arguments already presented in Parts II and 
ill? Part II suggested that a congressional power unconditionally 
to conscript state courts is utterly unnecessary. Congress probably 
can obtain the services of state courts simply by paying the costs of 
such service to state legislatures. Moreover, the considerations of 
distributive justice that section ill.B discussed suggest that Con­
gress should pay for the services that it receives from state govern-
379. See McNett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233.34 (1934) ("A state may not 
discriminate against rights arising under federal laws."); Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, 
Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Juris­
dictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 838 (1983) (stating that "[s]tates 
may refuse to adjudicate federal claims when the jurisdictional restriction applies neutrally"); 
Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State 
Court, 75 MicH. L. REv. 311, 350 (1976) (summarizing the nondiscrimination position). 
380. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (suggesting the rule 
requiring nondiscrimination when taxes fall on private persons holding beneficial interests in 
federal property). 
381. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1977) (describing 
the basic doctrine forbidding state taxes that discriminate against federal interests). 
382. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 776 n.1 (1981) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
383. Professor Sandalow notes that the Testa Court's reliance on Mondou v. New York, 
223 U.S. 1 (1911), suggests that Testa imposes an unconditional duty on state courts to hear 
federal claims. See Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: 
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 187, 205-06. 
384. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1946) (quoting Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57). Professor 
Caminker relies heavily on Testa's invocation of this language from Mondou to support the 
argument that, because federal law is the supreme law of the land, it is also the supreme "in­
state" law as far as the state government is concerned. See Caminker, supra note 31. 
385. See Collins, supra note 99, at 42 n.6. 
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ments just as it 1pays for the services that it receives from private 
contractors. As Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of 
Appeals recently has noted, state courts' dockets overflow with the 
judicial business of the nation.386 Why should the federal govern­
ment not pay for these costs in an intergovernmental transaction? 
Is there any sensible reason why such costs should be borne by the 
consumers of state-provided services - the frustrated state-court 
litigants who suffer delay as a result of state courts' preoccupation 
with federal claims?387 
The traditional response to such objections invokes the so-called 
"Madisonian Compromise" - the view that Congress implicitly has 
the power to demand that state courts hear federal questions, be­
cause Congress was given the option not to create lower federal 
courts by Article III, section 1.388 Such a view implicitly assumes 
that, if Congress lacked the power to conscript state courts to hear 
federal claims, then some Article III business would go unheard 
unless Congress could conscript the services of state courts. 
Whatever the grounds for such a view in precedent or original un­
derstanding,389 the view makes little functional sense because it as­
sumes that, if Congress cannot conscript state courts' services, then 
it cannot obtain such services at all. But this premise is as ground­
less as the assumption that Congress must have the power to confis­
cate private property in order to construct federal buildings.390 The 
end of cooperative federalism simply does not justify the means of 
conscription, for the latter is unnecessary for the former. As Part II 
explained, a lively intergovernmental market exists through which 
the federal government can purchase state court services. 
The functional argument outlined in Parts II and III, therefore, 
suggests that conscription of state courts is unnecessary and im­
proper. But what about a duty of nondiscrimination that Testa also 
386. See Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES (Late New York Edition), 
Dec. 13, 1994, at A29. 
387. Justice Story relied on precisely such a consideration of distributive justice when he 
stated that the state legislature "may refuse to allow suits to be brought [in state courts] 
'arising under the laws of the United States"' because such adjudication of federal cases 
"may most materially interfere with the convenience of their own courts, and the rights of 
their own citizens, and be attended with great expense to the state, as well as great delays in 
the administration of justice." Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 
499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9662) (Story, Circuit Justice). 
388. See Collins, supra note 99, at 42-43 (summarizing the argument based on the Madis­
onian Compromise). 
389. See id. 
390. See Amar, supra note 326, at 1168 (noting that inferences of congressional power to 
conscript state courts from the congressional option to use them is just as illogical as inferring 
power to conscript tax collectors from the power to collect taxes). 
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suggested? Is such a duty also improper, or is it justifiable in func­
tional terms? 
The answer to this question is ambiguous, because the concept 
of discrimination depends on ambiguous notions of the baseline en­
titlement by which "equal" treatment is measured. As a general 
matter, some sort of state governmental duty not to discriminate 
against the federal government is perfectly consistent with the func­
tional theory. As argued in Part II, the functional theory concedes 
that the national government needs to preempt state law and carry 
out federal tasks with purely federal institutions: the federal gov­
ernment would likely be unable to purchase preemption of state 
laws with its spending power. Such a power of preemption presup­
poses, however, that the state governments cannot interfere with 
the federal government by harassing or intimidating federal 
officials. 
"Discrimination" against the federal government might consti­
tute precisely such a form of harassment. So, for example, if a mu­
nicipal police force generally protected all other persons from 
burglary within a city but refused to protect the U.S. Post Office 
building from such crimes, it would be obvious that the discrimina­
tory inaction formed a sort of harassment of a federal agency. Like­
wise, if the state courts within a jurisdiction generally adjudicate 
disputes arising under the laws of other jurisdictions but refuse to 
hear federal claims, then such refusal to hear the federal claims can 
be viewed as a sort of attack on the federal government.391 
The functional theory, therefore, does not condemn the general 
duty of state officials not to discriminate against federal interests, 
and such a duty can be invoked to prevent state courts from dis­
criminating against federal law. A familiar difficulty arises, how­
ever, because nondiscrimination norms depend on a concept of 
"equality," and the notion of equality notoriously depends on com­
plex and often inarticulate definitions of a baseline by which equal 
treatment is to be measured.392 The duty not to discriminate 
against the federal government easily mutates into a duty to give 
federal interests the same benefits and services that the state pro-
391. Certainly, such a refusal can impose costs on the federal government just as surely as 
a refusal to provide police protection to federal officials. If claimants asserting both state and 
federal claims arising out of the same transaction are barred from pressing both in state 
court, then they will be forced either to forfeit their federal claim or instead file both claims 
in federal court, taking advantage of the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction. In effect, 
the state would be forcing the federal court to hear state business by depriving federal liti­
gants of a state forum for related federal claims. 
392. See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990). 
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vides to its own interests, simply because the Court will often take a 
state's treatment of its own interests to be the relevant baseline by 
which to measure whether federal interests are receiving equal 
treatment. 
Testa provides a case in point. In Testa, the Court rejected the 
notion that the Rhode Island courts afforded equal treatment to 
federal law by treating federal law exactly as they treated the law of 
other foreign states. Instead, the Court insisted that the proper 
baseline was the state courts' treatment of its own state legislature's 
analogous laws. As other scholars have noted, this moves Testa 
very close to being an unconditional duty to enforce federal law, 
because the concept of an analogous law is nebulous and 
expansive.393 
The potential expansiveness of nondiscrimination norms is not 
peculiar to the Testa doctrine or state court duties to hear federal 
claims. The Court has also expanded the duties of state legislatures 
in precisely the same way. So, for example, in Davis v. Michigan 
Department of the Treasury, 394 the Court held that Michigan must 
exempt pensions paid by the federal government from state taxa­
tion just as Michigan exempted pensions paid by the Michigan gov­
ernment from such taxation. Michigan's tax policy actually 
subjected federal pensioners to the same tax obligations as the vast 
majority of pensioners in Michigan, because the state only ex­
empted the pensions of its own employees from state taxation as a 
sort of additional form of deferred compensation.395 But the Court 
reasoned that the proper baseline of comparison was Michigan's tax 
treatment of its own former employees, not Michigan's tax treat­
ment of the majority of state residents, and so it ordered the state to 
provide tax refunds to federal pensioners residing in Michigan. 396 
There are reasons to object to both the Davis and Testa base­
lines for measuring discrimination. The notion that a state govern­
ment cannot use state-funded institutions to advance its own 
policies is a bit odd. It is difficult to see how Michigan is somehow 
taxing federal interests because it does not provide the same sub­
sidy to former federal officers that it provides to state officers. It is 
not the state governments' job to provide compensation, deferred 
393. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 750-66 (1981). 
394. 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
395. See 489 U.S. at 805. 
396. See 489 U.S. at 815 n.4, 817-18; see also Robert Mueller, Rejection of the "Similarly 
Situated Taxpayer" Rationale: Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 43 TAX LAW. 431 
(1990) (noting that Davis departs from the traditional rule for defining discrimination). 
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or otherwise, to federal employees. Likewise, the notion that 
Rhode Island is somehow impeding the federal government be­
cause it wishes to use its own courts for its own claims seems 
strained. In either case, the Court defined the federal government's 
baseline of entitlement in such a way that the state was forced to 
give extraordinary fiscal and judicial preference to federal policies. 
An antidiscrimination norm that is defined so expansively might be 
viewed as contradicting the argument in Part III that the federal 
government should pay for the services that it receives. 
2. The Commandeering of State Executive Officials 
Nondiscrimination norms apply with less force to state and local 
executive officials who typically do not enforce laws or policies 
other than those of their own state or local policymakers. More­
over, any mechanical rule giving Congress the power to demand 
services from certain categories of state officials is likely to founder 
on the fact that state and especially local law does not permit neat 
distinctions between legislative, judicial, and executive offices. 
Even state courts have some legislative functions.397 Likewise, the 
same local agencies are sometimes considered to be acting quasi­
judicially and sometimes considered to be acting legislatively.398 It 
is a perennial question whether a local legislature's decision to 
re-zone a single parcel is legislative, quasi-judicial, or both 
simultaneously .399 
Nevertheless, there might be good reasons for allowing the fed­
eral government to demand some sorts of services from nonfederal 
executive officials. The functional theory suggested in Parts II and 
III suggests two circumstances that indicate when such conscription 
might be proper. 
First, if certain services only can be provided by specific state or 
local officials and cannot be duplicated by federal officials, there 
might be greater dangers of holdout problems absent a federal abil-
397. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 
731-34 (1980) (holding that the state supreme court enjoys legislative immunity in rulemak­
ing for the state bar). 
398. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti­
Federalism from the Attack on 'Monarchism' to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 96 
(1989) (describing local governments' rejection of many federal constitutional principles, in­
cluding separation of powers). 
399. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Commrs., 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (holding 
that small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial); Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 
565, 566-67 (Cal. 1980) (holding that small-scale rezoning is not quasi-judicial); Margolis v. 
District Ct., 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981) (holding that small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial 
for purposes of judicial review but legislative for purposes of eligibility for plebiscites). 
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ity to demand such services. The best example is the state and local 
provision of unique records or information to the federal govern­
ment. Assuming that only one state or local government has access 
to such information, the normal competitive framework for inter­
governmental relations described in Part II is missing, and federal 
demands for state or local assistance might be necessary to accom­
plish legitimate federal purposes. 
Second, the national government might have a greater entitle­
ment to demand services that do not require state or local officials 
to issue commands to third parties. As noted in section III.C, such 
demands for local officials to enforce federal policies by command­
ing third parties to obey such policies strongly resembles a demand 
that such nonfederal officials endorse federal policy with their of­
fice. Such forced speech might be objectionable for the same rea­
sons that demands for private organizations' speech are widely 
regarded as unconstitutional. But such worries about forced affir­
mation of belief do not apply to federal demands that state officials 
undertake other services that do not require them to issue com­
mands. Again, a federal demand for state officials to turn over 
unique records would not offend any rule against forced speech, 
any more than the normal rule that witnesses can be forced to tes­
tify would constitute either a regulatory takings or involuntary ser­
vitude.400 Like analogous rules applicable to private persons - for 
example, the rule that private witnesses can be forced to testify in 
court - such demands enable the federal government to obtain 
services that it can get no other way, at a relatively modest cost to 
state or local autonomy. 
C. The Impracticality of Protecting Nonfederal Governments' 
Autonomy with a Liability Rule 
Even if one accepted all of this article's arguments made so far 
in favor of the anticommandeering rule in New York and Printz, 
one still might have reservations about protecting nonfederal gov­
ernments' power over their regulatory processes with a property 
rule. One might agree that it is inefficient, distributionally unjust, 
and an unwarranted invasion of expressive autonomy for the fed­
eral government to force nonfederal governments to implement 
federal policy. But one might also believe that, if the national gov­
ernment is willing to pay the objective cost of a federal mandate to 
400. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (upholding the power of the gov­
ernment to force a witness to testify against a Thirteenth and Fifth Amendment regulatory 
takings challenge). 
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a state or local government, then the national government should 
be entitled to receive the services of that nonfederal government. 
In effect, such a doctrine would give the national government a 
power of eminent domain over nonfederal governments' regulatory 
processes. , 
Justice Souter seems to have endorsed precisely such a rule 
when the national government commandeers the services of state 
or local executive officers.401 In theory, such a rule would have sev­
eral advantages. It presumably would mitigate any distributive in­
equities caused by commandeering, and it would eliminate any 
inefficient tendency of federal mandates to undermine incentives to 
participate in state and local politics. Such a rule could even reduce 
the danger of unjust invasions of expressive autonomy.402 
Justice Souter's proposal seems especially attractive if one is not 
completely convinced by this article's argument in section II.B.2 
that intergovernmental transactions are free from transaction costs. 
Such a skeptic about intergovernmental transactions might prefer a 
rule that allows the national government to bypass voluntary mar­
kets when transaction costs are high. Moreover, such a rule is sug­
gested by the analogy to private organizations, which are only very 
rarely protected from governmental condemnation of their prop­
erty.403 Why give public organizations more protection for their 
regulatory processes? Such deference to governmental decisions to 
use eminent domain arguably makes sense, because, as Professor 
Merrill notes, such decisions may be self-policing: the costs of liti­
gating "just compensation" are so high that prudent politicians gen­
erally use condemnation only when voluntary transactions are 
impractical because markets are thin and there are significant risks 
of private strategic behavior.404 
Therefore, Justice Souter's "liability rule" proposal appears to 
represent an ideal compromise position, one that protects state au­
tonomy but also protects national supremacy. But Souter is wrong. 
Justice Scalia is perfectly correct to note that such a rule would be 
401. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2364, 2404 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I do 
not read any of The Federalist material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could re­
quire administrative support without an obligation to pay fair value for it . . . . If, therefore, 
my views were prevailing in these cases, I would remand for development and consideration 
of petitioners' points, that they have no budget provision for work required under the Act 
and are liable for unauthorized expenditures."). 
402. Professor Rubenfeld notes that the liability rule provided by the Fifth Amendment's 
Just Compensation Clause has such a tendency to prevent the instrumentalization of persons. 
See Rubenfeld, supra note 283, at 1139-47. 
403. See Merrill, supra note 157, at 63. 
404. See id. at 74-81. 
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completely impractical in that it would "create a constitutional ju­
risprudence [for determining when the compensation was ade­
quate] that would make takings cases appear clear and simple. "4os 
The difficulty with Justice Souter's proposal is that the cost of 
implementing federal policy is not simply the fiscal outlay necessary 
to fund such implementation. Such a measure would grossly 
overcompensate some jurisdictions and undercompensate others. 
Federal law can impose what appear to be costly demands on state 
and local officials that, in fact, are costless, because the federal pol­
icy might be no different than the preexisting state policy.406 By 
contrast, one can imagine fiscally cheap demands - say, a demand 
that sheriffs perform background checks on local inhabitants -
that would be extremely costly in practice because local residents 
experience high nonfiscal costs as a result of the program. 
Therefore, in order to determine the real, as opposed to nomi­
nal, cost of a federal mandate, courts would have to calculate the 
size and matching formula of a hypothetical grant that a state would 
have to be offered to implement the particular program imposed on 
them by the federal government. It defies credibility to believe that 
judges are capable of managing such a counterfactual inquiry.407 
405. Printz, 111 S. Ct. at 2374 n.7. 
406. So, for example, detailed federal restrictions requiring localities to spend categorical 
grant money on developmental purposes - say, downtown redevelopment - might impose 
no costs on the locality, because the locality probably wants to spend money for precisely 
such a purpose. See PETERSON, supra note 32, at 23-27. 
407. Indeed, both federal and state efforts to make such hypothetical calculations in other 
contexts have not been notable successes. In the state context, some state constitutions re­
quire state legislatures to provide a "fiscal note" with mandates imposed on local govern­
ments estimating the cost of the mandate. As Edward Zelinsky notes, these requirements 
have imposed no serious restriction on state mandates, because no court can assess whether 
fiscal notes are accurate. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 1366-67. 
In the federal context, many federal grants have "nonsupplanting" or "maintenance-of­
effort" conditions attached to them requiring state governments not to supplant state dollars 
devoted to a federal purpose with federal grant money designed to supplement those dollars. 
See Mark Greenberg, HHS Policy Guidance on Maintenance of Effort, Assistance, and Penal­
ties: Summary and Discussion, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING PoVERTY 315 (1997) (describing 
maintenance-of-effort provisions). But federal administrative efforts to enforce such provi­
sions often have been mechanistic and incomplete - in part due to the almost metaphysical 
difficulty of the inquiry of calculating what state contributions would have been absent the 
federal grant. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People 
Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. 
Soc. POLY. & L. 3, 102 (1996) (arguing that maintenance-of-effort rules do not take into 
account depreciation of state effort due to inflation); Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some 
Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & PoLY. R.Ev. 1, 19 (1996) (arguing that 
maintenance-of-effort rules may "lock[ ] the state into an outdated and undesirable pattern 
of expenditure"). Such enforcement efforts also have been hotly controversial. See, e.g., 
Robert Pear, States Bristle at U.S. Welfare Spending Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRin., Dec. 29, 
1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 12584353 (noting that a federal suggestion that state ex­
penditures on legal immigrants might not satisfy the maintenance-of-effort requirement 
under federal law has sparked a national controversy). Justice Souter's proposal essentially 
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But even if courts could manage the empirical difficulties of Jus­
tice Souter's proposal, there are conceptual problems with liability 
rules in this context that are even more daunting. Consider, for 
example, how courts should define the proper measure of compen­
sation: Should this measure be based on the mandated jurisdic­
tion's costs of implementing national programs or on the national 
government's benefit from nonfederal implementation? These two 
definitions might produce quite different results. For example, it 
might cost the states very little to use their sheriffs and municipal 
police chiefs to process applications for firearms, while it might cost 
the national government an enormous amount to expand the ATF 
or FBI to undertake such mundane administrative duties. In such a 
case, there is a question about how to divide the gains from trade. 
Conventional wisdom in eminent domain regards such gains as 
"rents" to which the condemnee has no entitlement. The con­
demnor ought to get all gains from trade, while the condemnee de­
serves only its opportunity costs.408 But such a convention might be 
based on the case of condemnations of real estate, where the con­
demnee supplies the asset of land to some regulatory project con­
ceived by the condemnor. Following some sort of Georgist 
intuition of distributive justice,409 one might argue that the con­
demnee ought to receive nothing more than its opportunity costs 
for passively contributing an asset like land that the condemnee did 
nothing to create.410 
Such an intuition fails when one is dealing with the "condemna­
tion" of the state's regulatory machinery. Unlike land, the creation 
of regulatory processes take political energy and creativity. 
Whether a police force is honest or crooked, efficient or over­
staffed, trusted by the public or despised as an occupying army, all 
depends in part on the political courage and energy of civilian re­
view boards, mayors, activists, city council persons, and so on. If 
the federal government decides to use such a force to implement 
federal law, why should the federal government get to retain all the 
budget savings that such an efficient and trustworthy force creates? 
would require that the Court constitutionalize an analogous controversial and policy-laden 
inquiry. 
408. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. 
U. L. REv. 721, 736-38 (1993) (describing the controversy in courts about whether to award 
gains from trade to condemnee based on the principle of restitution). 
409. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Modem Lib. ed. 1938). 
410. See Merrill, supra note 157, at 85-86. Richard Epstein makes a similar point when he 
argues that the gains from trade ought to be allocated to those persons who initiate the 
transactions that create the gains. See EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 95. 
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Under any sort of Lockean intuition of distributive justice, the state 
politicians and their constituents who contribute their political la­
bors to forge such a force ought to get at least some of the gains 
from intergovernmental trade.411 
This is not to say that such a Lockean theory is necessarily com­
pelling. It has become conventional wisdom to argue that such a 
theory is indefensible.412 We have no uncontroversial way to divide 
up gains from trade, and there is no reason to assume that the na­
tional government should get all of them. Moreover, if the 
nonfederal governments get only their opportunity costs and no 
share of the rents derived from creating a valuable resource, then 
the national government can be expected to overuse forced sales in 
order to capture all of the gains from intergovernmental trade. Al­
lowing Congress to force the states to accept funded mandates, in 
short, might encourage Congress to engage in "secondary rent­
seeking" in order to confiscate all gains from cooperative 
federalism. 413 
In short, while there is no reason in principle why one could not 
protect adequately the states' New York entitlement with a liability 
rule, a property rule seems preferable for practical reasons. Be­
cause the danger of holdouts is low, it is wisest to let Congress fend 
for itself in the intergovernmental marketplace and keep the courts 
from being drawn into a practically impossible inquiry into the costs 
of cooperative federalism. 
V. BEYOND NATIONALISTIC DUAL FEDERALISM: PROTECTING 
NONFEDERAL GOVERNMENTS' ROLE IN THE NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This article has argued that the doctrine of state autonomy an­
nounced in New York and Printz makes good functional sense. Yet 
the Court's decisions expounding the doctrine of state autonomy 
have not provided a functional basis for the doctrine. Instead, as 
explained in section I.B, the Court has relied either on palpably 
untrue statements that the federal and state governments operate in 
separate, independent, and mutually exclusive spheres or on con­
clusory assertions that commandeering legislation deprives states of 
411. See Jo.HN LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. 5 (Thomas Peardon ed., 
1952). For a modem restatement of Locke's labor theory of value, see LAWRENCE C. 
BECKER, PROPERTY RJoHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 2-4 (1977). 
412. For one such prolonged effort, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE R1mrr TO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY ch. 6 (1988). 
413. See Merrill, supra note 157, at 85-88 (describing "secondary rent-seeking"). 
February 1998] State Autonomy 939 
sovereignty. In short, we have a useful rule without a persuasive 
reason in the judicial precedents. 
Is there any persuasive way to show that the functional argu­
ment that I proposed actually fits into the text and constitutional 
traditions of the U.S. Constitution? This final section provides a 
preliminary outline for how the functional arguments really are re­
flected in constitutional tradition. But the tradition is not the bank­
rupt theory of dual federalism as reflected in Dennison and Day. 
Rather, it is the tradition of individual and organization rights re­
flected in the jurisprudence of takings and free speech under the 
First and Fifth Amendments. The crucial consideration is not to 
ensure that federal and nonfederal governments operate in mutu­
ally exclusive spheres. Rather, the doctrine presupposes plentiful 
intergovernmental bargaining and instead seeks to ensure that such 
transactions occur in the same spirit of fairness as bargains between 
private organizations and the federal government, a spirit that pre­
cludes resort to conscription or confiscation unless there is some 
clear necessity for such extreme measures. 
Consider, first, how the functional argument maps on to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, section 8. The general 
power to demand regulatory services from state and local govern­
ments nowhere is granted expressly to the national government. 
Congress, therefore, has the power only if it is "necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution" Congress's other enumerated 
powers.414 
Part II suggests why such a commandeering power is not neces­
sary. Congress can obtain the services of nonfederal officials simply 
by entering into an intergovernmental agreement with them. It has 
no need to conscript them any more than it needs to conscript jani­
tors or secretaries or FBI agents. This is not to say that nonfederal 
governments will never tum down federal proposals to implement 
federal programs. But, given the degree to which nonfederal gov­
ernments compete with each other for federal funds, they rarely 
will decline such revenue if it covers the real fiscal and nonfiscal 
costs of assisting the federal government. 
This view of necessity echoes Justice Story's argument in Hous­
ton v. Moore, 415 except that Justice Story implied that all state im­
plementation of federal law was unnecessary, because the federal 
government can create its own tribunals. By contrast, the argument 
414. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
415. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
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in Part II of this article suggests only that coercion of state govern­
ments is unnecessary, because the assistance of state officials can be 
obtained without direct orders. Put in the terms of Calabresi's and 
Melamed's system of entitlements, Story would protect state auton­
omy with an inalienability rule, whereas the functional theory here 
would protect it with a property rule, allowing state governments to 
sell the entitlement for federal revenue. 
One might respond that such a constrained view of "necessity" 
contradicts the broad discretion enjoyed by Congress under McCul­
loch to choose the means by which it attains legitimate purposes. 
As suggested in section I.B, however, McCulloch provided Con­
gress with such discretion in order for Congress to make itself in­
dependent from state governments by fashioning its own federal 
bureaucracy. The deep purpose of the opinion was to give Con­
gress the power to fashion its own institutions so that it would not 
have to rely on state officials. Nothing in McCulloch suggests that 
Congress should also have the power to demand assistance from 
state and local institutions that it did not create. 
Ironically, it is the very nationalism of McCulloch that provides 
the practical basis for a vigorous doctrine of state autonomy. The 
tradition of nationalistic dual federalism has forced the United 
States government to develop its own institutions - federal trial 
courts, field offices, and administrators - rather than rely on state 
officials. As a result, the United States is blessed with regulatory 
redundancy - two sets of officials capable of performing identical 
tasks. Such redundancy undercuts the capacity of state officials to 
"hold out" when Congress seeks their services. In other words, the 
tradition of dual federalism has fortuitously created the conditions 
necessary for a purely voluntary system of intergovernmental rela­
tions: precisely because the United States has slowly developed an 
independent regulatory capacity, it is not necessary for the United 
States to conscript nonfederal officials' services. 
Part III suggests why the national government's demands for 
nonfederal governments' services also is not proper. First, as sec­
tion III.B suggests, such demands are analogous to the confiscation 
of private property in that they force state and local governments to 
bear the costs of federal programs that serve needs that nonfederal 
governments do not create and that create benefits for which 
nonfederal governments have no special ability to pay. Second, as 
section III.C suggests, such programs force state and local officials 
to act as the spokespersons of the national government, requiring 
them to issue commands to third parties with which the officials 
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might disagree. Both of these consequences suggest that federal 
commandeering of federal governments is analogous to both regu­
latory takings forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensa­
tion Clause and a deprivation of the freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment. 
The impropriety of such demands suggests a second reason why 
McCulloch would not give Congress the discretion to demand regu­
latory services from state and local governments. As Professors 
Lawson and Granger argue, the original understanding of the Nec­
essary and Proper Clause suggests that Congress would not have 
broad discretion to judge the propriety of its own actions. Rather, 
the definition of "proper" action set jurisdictional limits on Con­
gress's power reflecting concerns about individual rights, separation 
of powers, and federalism.416 
As Lawson and Granger admit, their analysis provides little gui­
dance about what sorts of burdens on state power would be im­
proper burdens.417 The analysis provided in Part III, however, 
provides the beginnings of an answer; one might model states' 
rights on the rights of private organizations such as political parties, 
nonprofit corporations, and business enterprises. One could argue 
that federal burdens upon state and local governments are im­
proper if they deprive state and local officials of rights extended to 
private organizations by the Bill of Rights. By using the Bill of 
Rights as a standard by which to measure the institutional rights of 
state and local governments, one can provide content to the Neces­
sary and Proper Clause that it otherwise lacks and that is consistent 
with its original jurisdictional purpose. 
This is not to say that one mechanically would extend to all 
nonfederal governments all of the rights enjoyed by private persons 
under the Bill of Rights. To the contrary, there are at least two 
good reasons to provide fewer protections to nonfederal govern­
ments than to private individuals or organizations. First, govern­
ments are organizations with involuntary members; by giving 
government officials constitutionally protected powers, one can 
sometimes endanger the rights of their captive constituents. For ex­
ample, one could not give government officials the right to use tax 
dollars to advance those officials' or the majority of the constitu­
ents' free exercise of religion without establishing religion in viola-
416. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267 (1993). 
417. See id. at 331. 
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tion of the constituents' First Amendment rights.418 Second, one 
should not anthropomorphize any organization, whether private or 
governmental; a constitutional right is not necessarily endangered 
just because an organization lacks the same immunities enjoyed by 
individual persons. For example, freedom of speech would not ob­
viously be endangered if private, for-profit corporations were de­
nied the same right to contribute money to political campaigns that 
private individuals enjoy.419 
But, despite these qualifications, there is no reason to exclude 
categorically nonfederal governments from enjoying at least some 
of the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution.420 The trick is to 
discover the purpose of the particular right and determine whether 
that purpose would be well-served by extending the right to cover 
nonfederal governments. Indeed, the Court has already made such 
an extension, holding, for example, that the Filth Amendment's 
Just Compensation Clause bars the federal government from taking 
nonfederal governments' property without paying just compensa­
tion. 421 Similar considerations suggests that federal demands for 
nonfederal governments' regulatory services should be regarded as 
so distributionally improper as to be precluded by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 
By analogizing a theory of states' rights to the constitutional 
rights enjoyed by private individuals and organizations, the Court 
would depart from an unpromising tradition of dual federalism and 
instead embrace a theory of administrative federalism. By adminis­
trative federalism, I mean a theory of nonfederal governments' en­
titlements that assumes that such governments will administer 
418. For an account of how organizations with involuntary members ought to have con­
strained rights of expression under the First Amendment, see Victor Brudney, Association, 
Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995). 
419. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) 
(holding constitutional a statute prohibiting corporations from making expenditures from 
their general treasuries). 
420. Indeed, such an application of the Bill of Rights may be more consistent with the 
spirit in which they were originally enacted. As Professor Akhil Amar argues, the Bill of 
Rights was not originally understood to be concerned exclusively or even primarily with the 
protection of people as individuals. Rather, the Bill of Rights protected the collective "peo­
ple's" right of self-government. See Amar, supra note 326, at 1133 ("The essence of the Bill 
of Rights was more structural than not (in 1791]."). The essence of the proposal in this article 
is to treat state and local governments as vehicles through which this collective right is real­
ized - one of the "various intermediate associations" similar to the "church, militia, and 
jury" through which "an educated and virtuous electorate" is created. See id. at 1132. As 
Amar argues, this was not a peripheral purpose of the Bill of Rights in 1791; it was a central 
purpose. 
421. See Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Ques­
tion of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1989). 
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federal law but then ensures that they will enjoy a certain minimum 
of discretion in such implementation. Such a theory of administra­
tive federalism animated the Articles of Confederation, which enti­
tled the states to administer the Continental Congress's requisitions 
for troops and revenue. Articles 83-89 of the German Grundgesetz 
(Constitution) also embody such a theory of administrative federal­
ism, because the lander (the German analogue to states) enjoy the 
constitutionally protected prerogative to administer the laws en­
acted by the federal government. 422 
As Justice Breyer noted in his Printz dissent, such systems en­
hance rather than denigrate the position of their subnational juris­
dictions by giving them responsibilities to administer the national 
government's law. Breyer concluded that, when the national gov­
ernment demands regulatory services from state governments, it 
also enhances the influence of the state governments in a similar 
way.423 
But Justice Breyer's contention overlooks a critical difference 
between genuine systems of administrative federalism in Germany 
or under the Articles of Confederation and the system provided by 
the commandeering of nonfederal governments by Congress. In 
the former, there are constitutional rules requiring the national gov­
ernment to respect the administrative autonomy of the subnational 
jurisdictions. In the latter, Congress has constitutionally unlimited 
power to control the state and local governments in the execution 
of their federal duties. 
By giving state and local governments an entitlement to with­
hold from the federal government, Printz and New York enhance 
the bargaining position of such governments and allow them to ex­
tract a degree of discretion or revenue for the implementation of 
federal law that such governments would otherwise lack. Contrary 
to the repeated assertions of the dissents in Printz, this entitlement 
hardly suggests that national law will be administered exclusively by 
a national bureaucracy. One might as well argue that McDonnell 
Douglas's ability to withhold their warplanes from the Pentagon 
will lead the Pentagon to produce aircraft in-house. Rather, the 
entitlement extended by Printz and New York simply allows 
nonfederal governments to extract a fair price for their services -
422. I borrow the term "administrative federalism" from the German context. Under a 
system of administrative federalism, the central government is forced to use the bureaucracy 
of the local governments to implement national law. See .ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, LoCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 203 (1986). 
423. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2404-05 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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an entitlement "already enjoyed by private persons and organiza­
tions when they deal with the national government. In this way, 
Printz and New York provide a mechanism to produce the sort of 
system of administrative federalism that Justice Breyer rightly 
praises. 
